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THE ISSUE OF PKK FROM THE PERSPECTIVES OF KURDISH IDENTITY AND POLITICAL REPRESENTATION

by

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THE ISSUE OF PKK FROM THE
PERSPECTIVES OF KURDISH IDENTITY AND
POLITICAL REPRESENTATION
REPRESENTATION



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To my wife

APPROVAL PAGE

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ABSTRACT

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THE ISSUE OF PKK FROM THE PERSPECTIVES OF KURDISH IDENTITY AND POLITICAL REPRESENTATION

Especially after WWII the change in the world balance and variations in international relations started the Cold War. Psychological warfare emerged as a requirement of the Cold War, and low-intensity conflicts as an indispensable element, the attack on the United states took the form of ‘‘Global Terrorism’’. Today terrorism is a very important issue threatening all states, ethnic structures and societies. In Turkey terrorism stems from the conditions inside and is supported from the outside.

This study examines the thoughts, structure and political violence strategy of Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) terrorist organization. The historical process of Kurdish nationalism, in the context of social, economic and political factors the PKK terrorist organization and their relations with international forces have been discussed.

Key Words: Emic perspective, Ethics perspective, Identity, Terror, Terrorism.

KISA ÖZET

Doğukan DOĞAN

Şubat 2014

KÜRT KİMLİĞİ VE SİYASİ TEMSİLİYET AÇISINDAN PKK MESELESİ

Özellikle 2.dünya savaşından sonra dünya dengelerindeki değişim ve uluslar arası ilişkilerde farklılaşmalar sıcak savaşların yerini soğuk savaşlara bırakmasına neden oldu. Soğuk savaşın gereği olarak ortaya çıkan psikolojik savaş ve bu savaşın vazgeçilmez unsuru, düşük yoğunluktaki çatışmalar, Amerika' ya yapılan saldırı ile "Küresel Terör" şeklini aldı. Bu gün Terörizm tüm devletler, etnik yapılar ve toplumun tamamını tehdit eden çok önemli bir sorundur. Türkiye' de Terörün sebebi içinde bulunduğu koşullardan kaynaklanmaktadır ve dışarıdan desteklenmektedir.

Bu çalışma Kürdistan işçi partisi (PKK) Terör örgütünün düşüncelerini, örgütsel yapısını ve siyasal şiddet stratejisini inceleyecektir. Kürt milliyetçiliğinin üzerine oturduğu, sosyal, ekonomik ve siyasi faktörler bağlamında son dönemde bu fikir sahipleri PKK Terör örgütünün ve uluslararası güçlerle ilişkilerini de göz önüne alarak Tarihsel süreci anlatılmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Emik bakış açısı, Etik bakış açısı, Kimlik, Terör, Terörizm.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BC = Before Christ

PKK= The Kurdistan Workers' Party

TYPE = Workers Party of Turkey

DDKO = Revolutionary Eastern Cultural Centers

PSK = Kurdistan Socialist Party

USA = United States of America

TKDP = Turkey Kurdistan Democratic Party

CHP = Republican People's Party

KNC = National Liberation of Kurdistan

KDP = Kurdistan Democratic Party

PUK = Patriotic Union of Kurdistan

KDP = Iraqi Kurdistan Democratic Party

TAF = Turkish Armed Forces

KIP = Kurdistan Worker's Party

TKSP = Kurdistan Socialist Party of Turkey

DDKD = Revolutionary Democratic Culture Association

UDP = National Democratic Party

DHKD = Revolutionary People's Cultural Association

CCC = Kurdistan Cultural Center

ARGK = Artesa Rizgari Gele Kurdistan / Kurdistan People's Liberation Army

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INTRODUCTION

Every century has its own characteristics and a distinctive discourse. The 19th century was the era of rampant nationalism all over the world, whereas the 20th century was the era of ideologies. However, it seems impossible to reveal a clear expression about the characteristics and discourse of the 21st century, for the characteristics of each century can be expressed based the results of developments during that whole century. Therefore it would be wrong to evaluate and make accurate assessment of a whole century before the end of its first quarter. On the other hand since the beginning of the 21st century, looking at either certain developments in the world or debates in Turkey, it would not be an overstatement to name the 21st century the century of “identities”. Such a statement is supported by factors as identity crises in the world and in Turkey and identity debates on this axis.

However, it should be noted that there are also opinions that this century will not be a century of “identities”. Indeed, according to an opinion of this kind actually it is difficult to discuss about, because this is crisis caused by those who tell us there is such a crisis. However, those who say there is an identity crisis remain ambiguous. In addition, as it will be explained in the "Theoretical and Conceptual Framework” section, such a statement, using or emphasizing the word “we” is a natural manifestation of the current crisis. Then again even if we suppose that twenty years from now, there will be storms of ethnic identities, it is not clear how and by which actors these debates will be formed and/or results to. Maybe if this possibility is considered, which rhetoric will these discussions replace? All these counter-arguments and questions leads us back to the aforementioned expression.

CHAPTER 1

ETHNIC IDENTITY AND KURDISH ISSUE IN TURKEY

1.1 Defining the Concept of Identity

As the concept of identity , in short, is defined as " a conscious insight of a person's or a group's qualifications, values, status and origin" (Şimşek, 2002, p. 31) can also be defined as the" , or a person's or a group's given - rather than natural sense of self or enduring features self- identification" (Aydın ve Açıkmeşe, 2008, p. 200). Furthermore, a sense of identity is related to the effort of a particular ethnic group to create a collective history as a source of reference by building its distinctiveness. Therefore, this past, as a legacy, can be filled with many various things (biological, cultural, etc.) and the perception and representation of the elements of the past can be shaped according to the direction of identity claims (Bilgin, 1994 , p. 55, 56) .

Since identity is a "conscious understanding", "self-identification" and "formation based on demands", the presence of the subject in the foreground and the view of a person's/group's self as "who" and "what", is more important than the definitions ascribed from outside and this reflects the "emic view".

The concept of identity is the stalemate of two main paradoxes that both have created and constantly injure it. The first of these paradoxes stems from the name of the concept and the nominal-historical background of this name. The word identity, derived from Latin idem (same) (Dağ, 2005, p. 249), expresses sameness.

In Turkish, kimlik, kim meaning "kimlerden(sin) (which group are you from) and is a sign of a mandatory membership. So the concept shows a membership in and similarity with a majority which is not within the sphere of preference. This is not a

separation but rather homogenization. The second paradox has to position and form those identity areas (identity; identity) that are not so relative to the others (Kılıçbay , 2003, p . 162).

Ethnic identity as a concept is a certain community members distinguishing themselves from other community members and having a differentiating sense of belonging. This feeling unites the members by highlighting the difference between a certain members of ‘we’(Bilgin, 1994, p. 57).

This means that identity is a feeling and a posture of both similarity to some and difference from others and it differentiates ‘us’ from ‘others’ or ‘them’. Therefore, identity differentiates or borderlines between me/us and others (Dağ, 2006, p. 57).

As seen, the obvious function of identity is to differentiate a person from others. Identity is variable and also includes a static structure in itself. In order to solidify this matter it is useful to give the following example: A man in Sarajevo in 2000s. Going back to 1980, this man would proudly say: ‘I am Yugoslavian’ and when asked more closely, he would say he lives the Autonomous Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and comes from a family with Muslim tradition. Twelve years later, during the war’s most violent days would answer without hesitation: ‘I am a Muslim’. He may have even grown a beard according to the rules of Sharia.

When immediately reminded that he used to proudly say that he was Yugoslavian, he would add: ‘today if you stop and ask our man, he would first say he was Bosnian and then a Muslim who went to mosque regularly, but that his country is in Europe and one day would join the European Union (Maalouf , 2006, p. 17)

As can be seen, during nearly a quarter century owned identity is getting a new state according to the conditions brought by time. This is the variability of identity. On the other hand, using the same example, a Yugoslavian identity or a Bosnian identity shows the static dimensions of the phenomenon. However, it is necessary to state that the dimension meant here is not a ‘frozen stereotype’. For

this reason, the term 'static' has gained a place. Because there is a loop in this generality.

The distinction between the variability and static structures related to the existence of multiple sources of identity.

The sources of Identification appear in the following aspects (Huntington, 2004, p. 27)

- ▶ Attributed, undertaken: for example, age, race, gender, family (blood ties) and ethnicity

- ▶ Cultural: clans, tribes, ethnic origin (as a lifestyle), language, nationality, religion, civilization;

- ▶ Regional: environment, village, town, city, county, state, region, country, geographic location, continents, hemisphere;

- ▶ Political: factions, committees, leaders, interest groups, movement, target, party, ideology, state;

- ▶ Economical: job, positions, occupation, work groups, employers, industry, economic sector, workers, union;

- ▶ Social: friends, club, team, colleagues, club activities, status.

It is not possible distinguish these resources from each other with definite boundaries. For example, ethnic origin can be shown as a life style like between attributed and overloaded resources, as can be shown between overloaded resources. Likewise, the "state" as a regional resource, can also be one of the sources of political identity. These examples are the reflections of expressed intertwined past. Therefore, it is necessary to pay attention to the changes that continue to exist in a

static form during the process of self-definition of the man in Sarayova during a quarter of a century.

Even if there is a serious change in the self-identification between being Yugoslavian and living in a part of the European Union, at the point of being Yugoslavian the European Union it is seen that being a Muslim is present at the beginning, middle and the end of all descriptions.

In the process of identity construction, before the concept of "the other" takes its role, it is useful to make a distinction. (Davutoglu, 1997, p. 11) makes a distinction between "identity" and "self - cognition" concepts: "while requiring two sides on the basis of the relationship-dependent consciousness, the "I-cognition" reflects lack of need of a counterparty or a social recognition of an individual. While identity carries a definition and attribute given by a social, economic and political authority, it is not possible for the "I-perception" to be identified or liquidated by any other authority.

Here, regardless of accepting the need of identity for a counterparty (the other/others), it cannot be thought that identity can only be a phenomenon defined by a social, economic and political authority. Because the perspective of identity being defined externally and being given that dimensions will be discussed in the next section, the ethical vision . This view is located in identification definition. However, as expressed above, once again it must be expressed that identity also has another dimension based on the subject (emic view).

1.1.1. The role of "the other" in the process of identity formation

Emic view is defined as how a group see themselves as "what" and "who". Whereas etic view is a group's identification of another group from outside and generalization (Leader 2007; Özdağ, 2011, p. 162). Even if emic view is considered as the basis in identity expressions, actually even here the "what" or "who" view point of an individual or a group, the existence of "the other" is unavoidable and this "other" is also defined and generalized by another group (we and/or others).

This means that it does not seem possible for both views to be intertwined and make a clear identification based on mere glance.

The emic view provides easier solutions in identity debates than the etiv view. When etic view is taken as the basis, a paradox appears as follows: while an individual or a group is defining themselves, this individual or group is being defined from outside simultaneously. The stress point between both definitions makes the process of identification difficult. On the other hand, the suffering the tension between self-identification and that made from outside makes identification of others inextricable. Even if it is not claimed that taking the emic view as the basis would as a result eliminate the etic view and tensions, considering the individual's or group's view of 'what' and 'who' can minimize this tension.

In a way, the inevitable existence of "the other" against "we" makes it possible to see the different manifestations of relative dependence between 'we' and "the other" in identity formation.

Because of the formation of identity is both comprehensive and exclusive at the same time. "We", being a collective selfness thought, brings those that belong to us together, and on one hand creates and on the other hand excludes those who do not look like us and do not belong to us. (Mountain, 2006, p. 58). While we are faced with the exclusionary aspect of the process as a known fact and assuming the necessity of an "other", the fact that identities cannot be separate from and independent on each other should also be considered (İnaç , 2003, p . 195).

Sense of belonging, one of the basic components of identity, on one hand determines the common points of defining 'we' and on the other hand determines the ones outside 'us', meaning 'the others' (Karaduman, 2010, p. 2888) and requires that 'we build who we are and at the same time demonstrate who we are not (Leo and Çulha, 2008, p. 134). The Claimed identity, built on the opposite direction of the adversary and by redefining and tagging who is not provides the emergence of the owner of the identity in the forefront. (Maalouf , 2006, p. 19)

In the construction of identity the "other" hosts an essentially complex interaction process. So that in every definition of "we", just as the necessity of an "other" or "others" and identities cannot be given as separate and independent, the situation of "we" is the same for "the other" or "others".

This means that every "we" is "the other of the other". However, the fiction here should not be constructed in a way that would increase marginalization. On the contrary, it should be noted how the "other" defines himself as a "we". Otherwise, as mutual marginalization gains strength, it divides the world into "we and they", with shrinking "we" strengthening the idea of reaching the growing and seeming scarcely "they" (Turkone, 2008, p.83).

1.2. Globalization and Identity

The phenomenon of globalization includes economic / commercial, political , cultural and communication dimensions. Each dimension is known to be the subject of major or minor debates in many different areas.

Globalization brings with it a serious identity crisis . It is not so easy for people as individuals and societies to perceive themselves and say who they are anymore. The difficulty is caused by the influence of many factors on biological identity in the natural flow of social life, such as especially culture, values and economy. As one side of the identity problem will be discussed later, accepting the narrow and rigid definition of identity by nation-states, the other dimension is formed by the current identity and sense of belonging of the global capitalism and consumer culture by abrading and mitigation (Kolukirik , 2008, p. 134).

Widespread trade in a global world this planet is becoming integrated. However, the world is also experiencing a breakdown in the political arena during the same process and today as a result of the world's technical homogenization, protecting the economic order is dominated by tensions between intellectual spiritual rebellion among 10 cultural and religious differences (Barloew , 2001, p. 5).

As a result, while the cultural elements inside the phenomenon of globalization are transforming into identity problems, two approaches which seem to contradict each other are emerging. One of these , emphasizing the principle of universality of cultural homogeneity (homogeneity) or popular culture, mass culture, and the other, protecting differences, is multiculturalism that is incongruent but is the pluralism of reasonable inclusive cultures.

This mentioned situation is linked to the two historical currents of thought of problem of identity.

The first is the universalist (Universalist) current developing a uniform community organization, composed of similar items towards creating a world of systems and standards universal longing of the universe uniformization.

Free market economy and Western-type democracy are the main goals of this current. The second is a differentials current that is developed in the direction of creating smaller groups than global humanity. This stream can emerge with nationalism versus cosmopolitanism, regionalism versus centralism, specific culture versus mass culture, decolonization versus colonization and with demands for independence. (Bilgi, 1994, p. 11).

It must be said that from the viewpoint of the separatist current the globalization caused by economic changes also lead to the emergence of decentralization. (Say, 2008, p. 206). While decentralization, or put in a more powerful way fragmentation, is an inevitable condition of globalization, globalization gives notice of such a fragmentation and serves as a reference in its integration (Mutlu, 2009, p. 51). While discussing a homogenization in economic and trade fields on the one hand, the differences and decentralization should be emphasized on the other hand.

As a result of increasing emphasis made on the differences, globalization is the spread of an understanding as viewing the principle of the protection of democratic rights an integral part of cultural differences (Kongar , 2011). Rather than

being an economic and commercial phenomena, the basis of globalization is seen as mutual acceptance of cultures, religions and languages (Karpas, 2009, p. 99). The "Mutually acceptance" process expressed will be discussed in the second section of the third part.

1.3. Kurdish issue Gaining International Dimension

There are three turning points in the context of the Kurdish issue that attract international attention (Kongar, 2001 , pp. 302-304). The first of these is the Halabje Massacre that occurred out of the will of Turkey that politically put the South East in international agenda as the "Kurdish issue" and Turkey's "humanistic approach to pledge the right to asylum to those fleeing the carnage. The second, politically, the most important step in re- shaping the Kurdish issue, was the French President's wife Danielle Mitterrand's 1989 of Diyarbakır. The third, again, was Danielle Mitterrand, the president of the Freedom Foundation and the Kurdish Institute in Paris holding a Kurdish conference on 14-15 October 1989. After these three turning points in 1990 after doing ' the Kurdish issue became the West's top issue in the 1990s.

The "export" of the Kurdish issue to Western Europe has made it an international issue. The supranational structure of the European Union has forced it to take a stance in regards with international organizations such as the Kurdish issue (Fuller and Barkey , 2001, p. 21).

This view, causing the problem to gain international dimensions, the first of the foreign powers not to gain an international dimension , but rather as a fundamental internal problem arising in certain periods of the Kurdish problem , especially with an active interest in the international dimension of foreign actors is noteworthy to mention (Kurubaş , 2009 p: 49).

1.3.1. Kurdish Identity and International Aspects of Current Kurdism

In the axis of identity debates, even if the problem in Turkey is not discussed in terms of security and identity completely, and assuming it to be an

internationalized ethnic problem, it constitutes an important foreign policy issue because of the threat to national unity and integrity of domestic policy (Kurubaş , 2009, p.41).

Even if the Kurdism stream is considered as more developed by Western states, the Armenian factor emerges in the dimensions of the Kurdish identity. Apart from Western countries, it can be said that the Armenian nationalism has also contributed to the formation of the Kurdish identity.

According to some, the Armenian “Fear has played a positive role in the formation of Kurdish identity”. But a larger number of researchers believe that the Armenian fear has caused the unconditional surrender to Kemalists and has eventually given a big blow to the Kurdish identity issue”(Kutlay, 1997, p . 81).

In a speech at the Kurdology Institute in Yeravan on December 7, 1936, Public Inspector General Abidin Ozmen mentioned that the purpose of Armenians was to save the Kurds from the Turks’ influence.

It can be said that Armenian element has been referred to in Kurd identity debates. However, except for some debatable opinions no clear results have ever been obtained. (Mumcu, 1994 , p. 142).

Apart from all these cause result and effect discussions, since the end of the 19th century and specially the end of the 20th century the " Kurdish issue " became an element of international political dimensions and the Kurdish identity carried an international nature due to various factors (Kolukırık, 2008, p. 140), and right from the beginning the Kurdism found a place in international communities.

1.4. Historical Background of the Kurdish issue

The Kurdish issue has not just emerged in recent years. This issue has been present for almost two hundred years. Furthermore, this historical background has resulted in the shaping of the current condition. In order to understand today’s problem it is necessary to look to the past.

1.4.1. Regarding the Kurdish name

In this section, Kurds' historical texts will be discussed without any self-seeking. In general, looking at the records of places where places whose inhabitants called themselves Kurds, we will face with the following picture: First of all in 2000sBC we see a clay tablet called 'Kirti' found from an area located in the territory of Sumerians which is in Syria today. Later the people living in Zagros Mountains who attacked the Greek army in Xenophon's Anabasis epic.

Some Turkish nationalists use the word "Körtle" in Orkhon's inscriptions to prove that Kurds were a Turkic tribe. But all of these connections are based on etymological solutions and tries to capture a certain essence for nationalism. Therefore, it is not very reliable. But if we consider the direct use of the word, for the first time Papakan, a Sasanian king, talks about Kurdish people living in the west of Iran in a book he wrote in 226A.D. Later in the 9th century, an Arab called Yakubi talks about Kurds living together with Arabs and Iranians in Jabal (Hakan Özoğlu p: 37 -38).

One of the most outstanding points that is taken from inspecting all of these resources is that the words 'Kurd' and 'Kurdistan' were designated by Kurds. The first book written by a Kurd and talking about Kurds was written by Serefhan Bitlisi in 1596. People living in the region named themselves more as members of tribes and or families. Actually all the initial government organizations all of the first government organizations established in this region were in the form of tribal federations. Most of the governments after the spread of Islam in the region were also named with family and tribal pnames. The same situation applies to who a Kurd is and where Kurdistan is. For example, famous Russian linguist Minorsky says that some Kurdish- Jewish and Armenian dynasties have become Iranians. The geographic definitions of Kurdistan also contain similar ambiguities. While in some descriptions they talk about a whole Iraqi, Armenian and Azerbayjani Kurdistan, in some maps only the Zagros Mountains and a part of Mesopotamia region. Then again, none of these descriptions belong to the Kurds living in those eras. From the point of view of religion, the influence of Yezidism, Zoroastrianism and

Manichaeism can be seen at the beginning. There are still people among Kurds who have Yezidi and Zoroastrian beliefs. A significant number of the people here turned into Islam by the introduction of this religion in the region. While most of these were followers of the Shafi sect, the Shiite Kurds lived in regions close to Iran. There is a substantial number of Kurd-Alevi communities in Turkey. Also many Kurds belonging to the Hanafi sect live in Urfa.

So far, I have written about the historical background of the name “Kurd” and the social structure of Kurds. Now let us look at the relations between the Kurds and the Ottoman Empire during the beginning of the spread of nationalism. (Özoğlu p: 38)

1.4.2. Kurd-Ottoman relations at the beginning of Nationalism

The nationalist movement that started to strengthen in the 18th century started to destroy the prior linguistic and religious communities In Europe 18th from the strengthened nationalist movements. We described this in the first part of this study. We are going to examine the relations between Kurd and the Ottoman Empire in this section.

The Ottoman Empire was frequently shaken by riots during the 18th and 19th centuries. All the nations living in the Balkans started to gain their independence one by one. Most of these minorities were non-Muslim. The Ottoman rule entered centralization movements caused by revolts. Kurds became disturbed by this centralization movement under the Ottoman rule. The reason for this was the rules, laws, and tax collection by the emirates ruled by aristocrats. The first major reaction to the Ottomans’ centralization motions came from Bedirhan Pasa. Mr. Bedrihan revolted in the summer of 1847. This revolt is seen the result of many factors intertwined. With his interests in danger, Mir Bedrihan both wanted to maintain his influence in the region and on the other hand tried to establish a large Kurdish association. Suppressed Mir Bedrihan family was exiled to Istanbul after a long fight. Nearly 30 years after this revolt, affected by the promises given to Armenians at the treaty signed in Berlin in 1878 as well as the spread of nationalistic

thoughts. He was the first Kurdish leader to declare a unified Kurdistan as his goal. The uprising was suppressed in the same year.

Due to the mentioned revolts and some disobedience the aristocrat families exiled to Istanbul were more interacted. On the other hand, the because of disobedience, riots and some Kurds in Istanbul driven aristocratic families here are more interaction history. On the other hand the intervention of the Young Turks (the Second Constitutional Proclamation of 1908) made the environment a place culturally and politically where nationalism could flourish. Because the government gave more importance to the parliament compared to the constitutional monarchy, they opened the doors to nation-state citizenship. In addition, with the opening of parliament a relatively liberal environment was formed and a nation-state without a sultanate had been discussed. Witnessing all these discussions and having become familiar with modern institutions, the aristocrat families close to the palace were influenced by the idea of a nation-state. But the first associations that they established were aimed at promoting people's reading (literacy) and did not include any direct idea of separation. Later, the Kurds who were exposed to the rhetoric of the Terakihi Committee of Union and Progress led the Kurds to their opposite attitude.

Now a fight had started among young university students. Going back to classrooms from breaks, one could see large slogans such as ‘‘good for who claims to be Turk’’ and ‘‘long live Turks’’ written on blackboards with chalk. Against this we were forced to write our own slogans such as ‘‘how happy who claims to be a Kurd’’ and ‘‘long live Kurds’’ on the blackboard.

These statements belong to Nuri Dersimi who was a student back then and later on held an important position in Kurdish nationalism. 1918 was the year Kurdish Teali society emerged. This society would demand a separate independent Kurdistan and carry on to reach their goal. Kurdish elites affected by the education they had received at modern institutions, tried to build a Kurdish identity. As we mentioned earlier, nationalism is a modern structure. The spread of nationalism is realized by these modern corporations. In his book called ‘Imaginary Communities’

Anderson talks about schools that belong to these institutions. In an obvious manner, in places like India, Malaysia and Africa exploited by European states, the constituent elements of colonial nationalism have all gone to western-style schools and studied in languages other than their own mother tongue and this goes for Kurds also. The first nationalist movements developed among Kurds studying at Turkish schools. In fact, the PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan - Kurdistan Workers' Party), that has been fighting on Turkish soil for 30 years, was formed at Faculty of Political Information faculty of Ankara University.

The part described so far was related the Ottoman Empire and from here on will be the connection between Kurds and the Turkish Republic that defines itself as a nation-state in the geography that we live in.

1.4.3. Turkish National Government and the Kurds

Today, while discussing the emergence of Kurdish issue it is thought that it started 30 years ago. However, this situation has been a problem since the founding years of the Republic. People related to the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire were subject to discrimination based on their religion. Muslim communities were named as the Ottoman Empire different applications for non-Muslims. For example, when committing an offense, criminals were tried according to their religious beliefs in different courts. Non-muslim communities had their own courts.

Cases of the Muslims were handled by Ottoman Empire's assigned Muslim Judge (kadi). Another different issue would occur in the military. Non-Muslims were exempted from military service in exchange for paying a certain amount of money as tax while Muslim people were taken to the army.

With the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, different management approaches began to discuss to save the state. During that time nation states in Europe were emerging. Abroad, people who studied or worked as a bureaucrat especially in Europe, gathered around the committee of union and progress for defending the nation state. During the First World War with the defeat of Allied

Powers including the Ottoman Empire, Anatolia began to get occupied. However, Mustafa Kemal began to organize a liberation movement in Anatolia after Ottomans signed the Treaty of Sèvres.

During the Independence War, discourses which used in defending the movement of national forces were close to the discourse of the Ottoman Empire. We can give an example of opening the Grand National Assembly of Turkey after the Friday prayers. With the end of the Independence War and declaration of a republic after the end of the Ottoman Empire the vague concept of citizenship in the new republic gradually became evident.

Ottoman's understanding of religion-based nation replaced it with the idea of a nation. Now the state based its legitimacy on the nation. The new understanding was handing over sovereignty to the nation unconditionally. Institutions which were remaining from the Ottoman Empire were removed or rearranged. Education in 1924 by the Law on Unification of Education was connected to the government and accordingly madrasas, dervish lodges were closed. With this law, foreign schools were taken under control of the government. Ataturk believed that education was the most important tool in order to continue a new government. Education both developing the faith of secularism and the idea of the nation would gather different social sectors in the country under the state. Changes in education were the clearest manifestation of a growing nationalism. In the new constitution citizenship was defined which was based on the 1921 Esau Organization law. According to the article, "people connected to Turkish citizenship without distinction of race and religions were accepted as Turks". Later on this definition caused many discussions. Even if Turkish word is defined in an inclusive definition, in this discourse, it is used to emphasize an ethnic origin. This debate also continues at the present time. Kurdish political parties want to change Turk definition to Turkish. All these were aimed primarily at assimilation of Kurds. Bruinessen's opinion on this issue would be helpful in terms of understanding of the subject.

Populism, in the process of nation-building, based on the denial of the existence of a separate Kurdish culture and has created ideological support to justify

the policy which makes Kurds Turk. Orders are given to historians to produce "Scientific evidence" about these two nations being the same. A law was enacted which can be used as a weapon against masters and sheikhs who give the authority to expropriate the vast territory in the eastern provinces under the guise of fighting against feudalism. Lands have not been expropriated, for the purpose of distributing to landless Kurdish villagers; it is because of giving migrants who called Turkified Turks come from other places. Generally it is certain that these applications would be forcible assimilation policy in the following logical conclusion.(Yalkut, p.402)

The newly established governments both abolished caliphatism and became secular and began nationalist attitudes and made tremendous impact on Kurdish inhabited areas. Sheikh Said started a rebellion the effects of which would last five or six years by attacking the republican army in 1925. In history, religion was the biggest reason that kept the Kurds in the Ottoman Empire. Now the withdrawal of religion from the state has weakened the ties between them. Effects of nationalist movements in the region have been thoroughly increased around the world and among the political elite in Anatolia.

In the following years nationalist mentality was so strengthened in the state that the Sun Language Theory which connects the origin of all languages to Turkish affected state's power, but it was not accepted. When it came to 1930s, two Kurdish rebellions broke out: the first one in Agri (1930-31), the other in Tunceli in 1938. These two rebellions were suppressed in a bloody way. In the same year, "citizens speak Turkish" campaigns were launched, languages other than Turkish were no more tolerated and besides that, assimilation policies were implemented by increasing enrollment rates in these regions. As we mentioned before, the union law was enacted for these purposes in the education.

After the 1938 Dersim (Later its name was changed to Tunceli) riot, Kurds did not get into any action for a long time. But in this time period the New Republic was completed and all the requirements of the nation-state and nationalism continued

to increase in value. So, when it came to 1956, events called September 6-7 events were experienced. According to rumors a bomb was thrown to the house where Atatürk was born in Salonica Greek and Armenian citizens were killed and their goods were plundered. In 1960, the names of Kurdish villages were replaced with Turkish names. The Republic of Turkey's idea of creating a nation from the Ottoman people had succeeded. But as it is in many parts of the world, this situation created a permanent crisis in a region inhabited by different ethnic groups.

With the 1968 movement which created a new left wave all around the world, class discrimination began to rise in Turkey. The rise of the struggle for socialism in the younger generation affected Kurdish youths. During this period, many Kurds, especially young people studying in universities in the left movement began to express themselves. (This case is all about modern structure of national identity. If you take into consideration, in this period all political organizations which held Kurdish national identity passed the nation state from a modern institution such as schools.) The debate about the position of Kurdish people was developed in the left movement in Turkey.

During this period, Kurds got into action in many political organizations such as; Turkey Workers' Party (TIP), Revolutionary Eastern Cultural Centers (DDKO). It would be better to mention here that some determinations which declared Turkey's Workers' Party congress in 1970;

Kurds were already living in the east of Turkey, however the ruling class and fascist administrations applied oppression, terror and assimilation policies over Kurds. One of the main reasons for Kurdish-inhabited regions to be underdeveloped, in addition to the law of the inequality development of capitalism, there exist economic and social policies that take into consideration The fact that the Kurdish people live in this region... Using the constitutional citizenship rights of the Kurdish people and all other democratic aspirations and desires struggle on this road are ordinary and necessary revolutionary task, supporting by our enemy parties which are all anti-democratic, fascist, oppressive nationalist movements and accepts Kurd

and Turk socialists to work side by side in the party.(Sosyalizm ve Toplumsal Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi, p:2132–2133).

Kurds started to establish their own organizations after the 1960s. ‘Ala Rızgari’(Freedom Flag), ‘Stérka Sor’(Red Star), PSK (Kurdistan Socialist Party) and still active today ve PKK (Kurdistan Labor Party) are a few of them. All these organizations have risen from socialist movements an have adopted Marksist-Leninist models. Most of these organizations have either disappeared or lost heavily after the September 12 1980 coup de ta. Only PKK started to gain power and expand day by day after the coup. Heavy tortures on PKK convicts and their resistance during the coup made PKK known to the public. In 1978 PKK declared their habitat a colony. According to PKK an independent socialist Kurdistan was necessary to ‘save’ this region. Starting to clash with the Turkish Armed Forces during the raids in Semdinli and eruh in 1984 a new era started in the Kurdish issue. The subject of the next sections is the social, political and psychological effects and reflections of this clash period.

1.5. Revival of the Kurdish movement in Turkey

After the May 27 military coup in 1961 and then the approval of the constitution some changes in Turkey's domestic and foreign policies were immediately noticeable. The 1961 Constitution, compared to the one in 1924, defined some rights wider and this made different political ideas to come to life and also make Turkey’s domestic and international policies debatable. In terms of foreign policy, it made the previous one-track foreign policy a subject of criticism. Also foreign policy started to be widely discussed among the public. Another factor that made foreign policy public was the softening process of the Cold War. (The Détente process made it possible for opposite sides to develop relations with each other). On the other hand, with the re-emergence of the Cyprus issue, talks of military interference with the island and with the US trying to prevent this, negative public response against the US increased. This also brought with itself the beginning of expansion of the political spectrum in Turkey, expression of Islamist socialist ideas themselves, and a rise in Turkey's foreign policy criticism. Even Turkey’s

withdrawal from NATO and seeking new alliances are among the topics argued. This tendency was also shown on the applications of foreign policy. This situation was in particular a bit more noticeable in the relationship with the Middle East. A few examples are taking sides with Arabs in the 1967 Arab-Israel war and participation in the Islamic Conference in 1968. In addition, relations with the Soviet Union were more developed than it was in the 50s. A visit to the Soviet Union at the level of prime minister in 1967 concluded this situation.

In such a political environment the Kurdish problem starts to appear again on the agenda of Turkey and there were both domestic and international factors that caused this. The two most important external factors were: 1) the successful Asian and African movements that resulted in their independence and the United Nations recognizing those countries. 2) More importantly was the strengthening of Kurdish movement in Iraq and their call to Kurds in other countries. (Angel Euphrates, 1997 p: 17)

1960s were the period of getting to know the Kurdish issue especially inside the left-wing. Social and economic issues start to be discussed extensively among Turkey Worker's Party members and the DIRECTION magazine readers heavily. "Eastern problem was also among these subjects. Subjects of discussions were initially more the issue of inter-regional disparities. Lack of advancement of the East, exploitations brought by the feudal and pre-capitalist icons, etc., ie more economic and class based analyses were discussed. With the presence of the group inside TIP, called Easterners, the subject gained more importance inside the party. The following assessment was given at the 1st Congress in Izmir:

"...while Turkey Worker's Party made the country's uprising possible; one of its immediate and scrupulous services will be the East issue..... Parallel to the economic backwardness of the region, the citizens here are also behind in social and cultural rights. In addition, Kurdish and Arabic-speaking or Alevi citizens are facing discrimination due to this situation. These citizens have generally paid taxes to the state, given their blood in defense of their homeland and have not spared their efforts. In return, they have not received the full joy of the blessings of citizenship

that they deserve. The Workers Party of Turkey is going to treat these compatriots as full citizens..... The Workers Party of Turkey accepts Turkey and its nation as whole and indivisible and rejects any kind of separatism and regionalism, as stated in Article 3 of the Constitution''. (Yeğen 2006 p: 160 -161)

As can be understood from the program items, the issue was primarily taken more in class and economic dimensions and in the framework of the Constitution of 1961 and albeit shyly there were references to the ethno-cultural aspects of the issue.

There was an important turning point in terms of the Kurdish political movements in Turkey in 1966 and 1967. A series of rallies were organized in the eastern provinces after the earthquake that occurred in the town Varto in Mus in 1966. Known as "Eastern Rallies" in political literature, were originally called "Rallies of Protesting the Backwardness of the East". The rally in Diyarbakir in 1967, began on September 16 and continued in centers like Silvan, Siverek, Batman, Tunceli, and ended in Ankara on November 19. While these rallies emphasized mainly on issues such as economic problems and fair distribution of land, political pressures in the region were also protested.

East rallies played an important role in politicization of Kurdish identity. With these rallies, especially Turkish left wing found the opportunity to get to know the people of that region more closely and begin to understand not only the socio-economic aspect of the issue, but also ethnicity, identity and culture.

On the other hand, the effect of Barzani movements in Iraq in the same period was also observed. Some Kurdish groups in Turkey established the illegal Turkey Kurdistan Democratic Party (TKDP). Since the rebellions of the 1920s and 1930s TKDP was the first Kurdish party of a national Kurdish party in Turkey. The ideology of this party was close to Barzani's. Barzani was ideologically close to the party line. TKDP was aiming at establishing a federation inside Turkey and had entered a relationship with barzani and delivered a letter including an offer of help to him. But the letter was not answered. Faik Bucak had now assumed the leadership of

TKDP. His coming from a big landowner family in Sanliurfa and also due to the conservative line of the party, TKDP was far from being an attractive center for young Kurdish intellectuals inside TIP who were against feudalism. Therefore, TKDP failed to turn into a mass organization.

At the end of 1960s the left wing was radicalized... Left-wing political and youth groups started to argue about strategies like seizing power by armed struggle and a part of these youth groups went to Fatah and other Palestinian camps, helping palestinians in their fight and also getting guerrilla training there. On their return home from palestine, they began to establish their own organizations after a while. This radicalization of the left also reflected on Kurdish nationalism, that used to express itself on the left wing. In particular, also by the creation of politicization by East rallies there was also a noticeable change on how to approach the problem in Turkey's left wing. Now that the problem was defined, not only economic backwardness or feudalism, but also terms such as "identity" and "national oppression " began to be described. The clearest example of this is when at the 4th congress of TIP in 1970 they discussed the issue. The decisions made at the 4th congress were as follows:

"In addition to uneven development law of capitalism, one of the main reasons for the oppression on Kurdish people by the ruling class, bloody persecutions by fascist governments, pressure, terror and application of assimilation politics on Kurdish prople and lagging of regions inhabited by Kurds compared to other regions is the economic and social politics of the ruling class and due to this considering the East problem as a local one is nothing but an extension of the ruling class. Our party, an enemy of all the anti - democratic, fascist, oppressive, chauvinistic nationalist movements, finds supporting Kurdish people's constitutional citizenship rights to use and all other democratic demands and aspirations toward the realization of the struggle is a normal revolutionary duty. We accept and declare that Turkish and Kurdish socialists must work inside the party in order to integrate our force as a single wave to materialize the Kurdish people's evolving democratic demands and aspirations of the expression and realization issues with the working class.

With this attitude of the Turkey Labor Party, Kurdish nationalism was now surpassing the boundaries of TIP. Therefore, there was need for new organizations. Founded in 1969, Revolutionary East Cultural Stoves became the most important organization of that era. First they started in Istanbul and Ankara, and then in 1970 in Ergani, Silvan and Diyarbakir. With the emergence of new generations, Kurdish nationalism first took a cultural appearance and later on a political one.

However, after the administration of the memorandum of 12 March 1971, there was a temporary decline in public mobilization in Turkey. After the declaration of martial law a month later, democratic institutions such as received more pressure and many intellectuals, journalists, and activist students were arrested. Martial law put more pressure on the left-wing. We can say that Kurdish organizations also received heavy blows like the left wing... DDKO was shut down and lawsuits were filed on its members.

Among the charges filed were "separatism" and "treason ". Another organization that was indicted was the T- KDP. Also known as the East hearings, prosecutors had said that "Kurds came from the Turanian race" and that "Kurdish is not separate language" and the defendants said in their defense that Kurdish race exists and Kurdish is a language and thus the hearings turned into a political ground from the point of view of the Kurdish movements. (Revolutionary Eastern Cultural Centers Litigation File)

But after the 12 March 1974 amnesty many political prisoners were freed together and they quickly entered new organizations. After 1974 Kurdish nationalism went into a complete rupture and a separate political organization process. Therefore, when Workers Party of Turkey was founded for the second time in 1975 , it did not attract Kurdish politicians and even for some the CHP led by Bulent Ecevit would seem more attractive. Compared to the previous period there were outstanding differences within the Kurdish movement as well as in the radical left. The division in the China-Soviet Union axis in 1970s reflected on the left being debates and these debates also caused the formation of many small and large political groups in

Turkey. After March 12 Kemalism adopted a more distant political line. And Kemal's stance on the national issue was found to be 'anti-democratic'. The showdown with Remi ideology brought more radical analyses regarding the Kurdish issue.

Now the geography where Kurds lived was called "Kurdistan" and concepts like "colonial", "right to secede", and "National oppression" started to be used. Also during this period, a significant improvement was the start of Kemal publications in 1975. Kemal publications started to publish the works of sociologist Ismail Besikci, including thesis on "Kurdistan being an international colonial" and thus created a new platform for discussions about the issue. In much Kurdish political organization also appeared in the new era. A large number of these illegal political organizations of a political were trying to get organized around a legal journal. While some organizations chose armed struggle, others adopted political propaganda. Also Kurdish organizations tending towards the left wing had political differences parallel to divisions between China and the Soviet Union. In the 70s major political Kurdish organizations were : Rizgari , Ala Rizgari , KUK , and Freedom Road KAWA. (Mumcu, 1993 p: 14- 33).

PKK would unquestionably become the organization to mark the 80s and 90s in Turkey. It became the center of debates among intellectual circles. Abdullah Ocalan, one of the founders of PKK, was politically active during his study at the Political Science Faculty. He was arrested and taken into custody during a protest against the killing of one of the Youth leasers called Mahir Cayan and remained in prison for 7 months. After his release from prison he and his friends tried to make a new organization. Their first meeting was in 1973. With friends have new organizing efforts to enter within. The first meeting will take place in 1973 and then they laid the foundations of the organization during meetings in Dikmen and Tuzlucaayir in Ankara. Calling themselves the "Kurdistan Revolutionaries", they published a document called "Kurdistan Road (Manifest)" in 1977. In that document, they analyze the Kurdish history and then make assessments on social relations and list their "revolution goals".

" Kurdistan Revolution, targets, at the forefront, Turkish colonialism. Turkish colonialism destroys political independence, Kurdish language, history and culture, and powers of production. Imperialists from outside and feudal compradors from inside are supporting this colonialism. These closely tied powers constitute the goals of Kurdistan revolution. Any movement not being against Turkish colonialism as well as its inside and outside supporters cannot carry the title of revolutionary in Kurdistan. Turkish sovereignty, embodied in the form of classical colonialism over Kurdistan, based on properties of imperialism and feudalism, any ignorant understanding would serve to hide Turkish colonialism. The only way to fight against Imperialism and Feudalism is to fight against Turkish colonialism. A Kurdistan revolution aims at creating an independent and democratic Kurdistan.

It can be understood from above quotation that the Organization adopted an armed method and supported a staged revolution. The main factors in Kurdish nationalist movement's adoption of armed struggle were: the success of long guerrilla fights in Vietnam and Cambodia and coming to power of those who fought the war at the end and the conclusion of adoption of the law with the armed uprising of Iraqi Kurds. Also coming to power with an armed method was a common practice in the left radicalism in those years (Gul Demir, 1986 p:35- 36).

Also referred to as Apocu, the group quickly entered organizational activities in 1977 and started to struggle for domination against their rival Turkish leftists and Turkish nationalists. Thus, at times, violent clashes occurred between these groups. In one of these clashes in the same year a leading member called Haki Karaer was killed by another Kurdish organization in Gaziantep. With the murder of Karaer, Abdullah Ocalan became the only leader of another group. Karaer with the murder of Abdullah Ocalan, the leader came almost exclusively within the Group

The Apocu group met in the Fis village in the town of Lic in Diyarbakir on November 27, 1978 and founded the illegal party called 'Partiye Karkeren Kurdistan' in Kurdish and 'Kurdistan Worker Part' in Turkish (PKK). The program and statutes prepared in advance were accepted by the 25 attending members in Fis. Abdullah Ocalan was elected as the general secretary unanimously. The party

adopted Vietnam Workers' Party's method and aimed at establishing the Independent United Kurdistan. They agreed on people's war tactics based on party - army and the front trio. (Marcus, 2009 p :74 -75)

Immediately after the establishment, PKK carried out their first armed action against the tribes in the region. One of these happened in Siverek town of Sanliurfa. Raiding Kurbaslar village the PKK militants clashed with Şanlıurfa Justice Party's member of parliament and Bucak tribe's leader Celal Bucak's armed forces. The clash lasted until morning and left 5 dead and 11 injured. After the raid, the PKK funeral in Hilvan turned into a show down of Apocu militants.

Armed attacks against tribal chiefs by PKK, created the impression that feudalism, which was previously seen as an irresistible fact, could collapse and this helped PKK to attract some new members. However, with the arrest of Sahin Donmez who was a member of the central committee as a result of operations by the security forces, a disruption was caused in organizational activities. Worried about other members of the committee after the arrest of Donmez, Abdullah Ocalan moved to Syria. After a while he asked PKK's top executives to go to Syria also. (Başkaya, 2005, p:244 -250)

On the other hand, in the second half of the 1970s Turkey was experiencing serious political instability. Governments formed after 1975 would be short-lived and social political polarizations turned into violence in the streets. The number of dead in political clashes increased especially after 1977. After the December 19-24, 1978 events that left 111 dead, Ecevit's government declared martial law in 13 cities. Starting in 1977, economic crisis began to add to political instability. Economy gradually slowed down and fell to a negative rate in 1980. Founded in November 1979, the Justice Party minority government was asked to take some economic measures. Known as January 24 decisions, a stability program Prepared by Turgut Ozal, prime minister's undersecretary at the time, was made public. The program did not only include short-term precautions. It was a long-term, outward, export-based model. In short, a radical transformation of the economic structure was considered. In addition, the expiration of Fahri Koruturk's presidency in

April 1980 and election of a new president was the cause of another crisis. In international politics, there were developments that changed the ballance of power in the region. First the Iranian monarchy was toppled in Iran and replaced with an Islamic regime led by Ayatollah Khomeini in February 1, 1979. In the same year, the Soviet forces entered Afghanistan on the request of the Afghan government on December 27. These two critical developments were an alarm for the west, especially for the United States. On one hand, the US had lost their most important ally in the Middle East and on the other hand the security of the Persian Gulf began to gain importance with the Soviets' presence in Afghanistan. With the Middle East and the Persian Gulf in those circumstances , Turkey's position had become critical, too. In an article of New York Times on August 15, 1980 the following assessment was made:

"The situation in Turkey is considered by the West as a crisis. The west, seeking solutions, cannot tolerate this to continue any further, because Turkey being in NATO's strategic front is a buffer country between the East and the West after losing Iran... "

In such a conjuncture in Turkey, the Army took charge of the government by overthrowing Suleyman Demirel's government with a coup on September 12, 1980.

1.6. The Kurdish issue and Forced Migration in 1990s

After the September 12, 1980 coup socialist movements in the country were suppressed and thousands of people were arrested. The country started to be governed by pro-coup generals' written constitution and all existing oppositions were silenced. The military government mentioned the "integrity of the country and the unity of the nation" too many times. In October 1983 law No. 2932 was passed in order to ban Kurdish language was removed. Assimilation was accelerated after the coup.

The Constitution was reviving the Turkish Language Association and the Turkish Historical Society. These institutions were expected to bring back the political rhetoric of 1930s that argued that Kurds were Turks. Articles and books supporting the fact that there was no separate Kurdish language and that Kurds and Turks had common ancestors were immediately proliferated. It was claimed that efforts to separate Kurdish and Turkish identities from each other and simply divide the country were fabrications made by western intelligence agencies.

On 16 August 1984, newspapers published the following announcement given by the General Staff:

A group of terrorists attacked the gendarmerie station building in Eruh town of Siirt with bombs and arms on the night of August 15 and martyred one soldier and injured six others and three civilians. Also in the town of Şemdinli of Hakkari, another group attacked the gendarme officers' outdoor casino, the officers' lodgings and the gendarmerie station and killed one officer, one noncommissioned officer and wounded one soldier.

From this date on the Kurdish issue in Turkey would be referred to together with an actor. This actor was PKK, the organization founded by university students who were politically active in the 70s. After the 1984 Semdinli Eruh raids, the east of the country was gradually dragged into a spiral of violence and conflicts began to increase. In 1987 the government decided that the eastern region could not be managed in a normal way. In July 1987 Extraordinary State (State of Emergency 'OHAL') regional governance was declared. Clashes continued increasingly until 1995.

The region strictly supervised by OHAL governor witnessed tens of painful experiences. From the start of the war in 1984 until 1995, including 5,014 civilians, a total of 20181 people lost their lives. Social trauma was evolved in war zones. Memories of the war crashed the witnesses' world like a ghost. People living in war zones,, thousands of young soldiers returning from the war and the whole Turkey nation witnessed the pains of the war. This sometimes manifested itself as

insanity. An event that occurred in the latter days of the war is the most obvious example: A retired police officer had thrown a bomb into his own house and shot his own family with automatic weapons. There were many more insanity examples like this one.... killed PKK youths lined up on one side and soldiers' corpses wrapped in fled on the other were seen on TV screens and in newspapers. Thousands of people forcibly displaced from their homes would live this trauma almost every day.

Forced migration, at a social and individual level, is a traumatic process. In forcible migration of the Kurds the trauma is not only from the migration process, but also, as known to everyone, the trauma experienced from the war before migration. We can think of this as the August 17 earthquake trauma spread over 25 years. This type of trauma is sequential and cumulative. It can stay secret for a period of time and then become visible. Privacy laws, and much later periods can occur. Even if not in the same form, it can emerge in different forms and contexts and affect spouse, work, family and social relations. Another noteworthy point is that the effects of this trauma would be felt not only in the region but also in Turkish metropolitan areas.

Previously affecting only the Eastern and Southeastern regions of Turkey, the Kurdish issue spread into metropolises like Istanbul, Adana, Izmir and Mersin. The reason for this was forced migration from the mentioned regions to these cities. Thousands of villages were evacuated and burned down for helping and supporting PKK. A law enacted in 1984, provided weapons and monthly pay to guards to protect villagers against PKK and those villagers were not forced to migrate. Later on, the guards used the power and authority that the government had given to them for personal animosities and to put pressure on the people of the region. All the villages that refused the village guard system were evacuated. Hundreds of thousands of those who were forced to migrate went to big cities. A smaller part of migrants settled in eastern and Southeastern cities, because the cities there were also poor and deprived of job opportunities. But this migration was continuing forcibly. Only until mid 1990 more than 3000 villages were practically wiped off the map and according

to official figures, 378,335 villagers had been forced to migrate and become homeless. Unofficial figures are much higher.

A significant part of migration out of the East and Southeast Anatolia took place between 1990-1995. For example, %69.2 of migration from Diyarbakir happened between 1992-94, %56.1 between 1990-95 from Mardin, %63.9 between 1990-95 from Bingöl, %51 between 1990-95 from Muş, %83.7 between 1992-95 from Batman, %57.3 between 1990-95 from Siirt, %61.8 between 1993-95 from Bitlis, and %76.1 between 1994-95 from Hakkari.

Today the most Kurdish populated city in Turkey is Istanbul. Having lived on farming and animal husbandry while back in their villages, they were trying to both struggle against unemployment a live in slums in big cities and also fight against discrimination in their new place. Coming to big cities they settled in so-called slums far from city centers. Even there, seen as ‘‘a group in the most difficult situation’’, they were looked upon by their neighbors as ‘‘terrorists’’, were seen as ‘‘questionable’’ and audited by the police. Due to the hardship that they suffered in big cities, their sympathy towards PKK increased. Indeed, any trivial event in the East and Southeast would instantly resonate in big cities streets. TV images of pirate shows in Istanbul or Adana would signal the geographic spread of the issue.

In the meanwhile, this migration also increased interchange between Turks and Kurds. Forceful gathering of people in apartments, slums, public transport, shopping centers and places like parks and gardens made Turkish people to meet Kurds and listen to their stories. But this did not always have positive results. Kurds started to be seen as ‘‘supporters of terrorism’’ by the security forces, the reason for the increase in crime, the reason for unemployment and responsible for many negative situations.

Kurds carried their own identities and political narratives to big cities with them. So that public places became areas of political and identity ‘‘conflicts’’.

We had said that after the 1980 coup, the official policy of the state was to deny the Kurdish issue and to leave them exposed to assimilation. This official attitude despite the increase in conflicts ironically began to change at the end of the 1980s. In June 1989, the then President Turgut Ozal said he himself was of Kurdish origin too. In April 1991, after hundreds of thousands of Iraqi Kurd refugees flocked to Turkish borders because of Saddam's attack on the Kurdish region in northern Iraq, the ban on the Kurdish language was removed. In the same year, founded by MPs of Kurdish origin in 1990, the HEP party entered a provincial electoral alliance with the SHP led by Erdal Inonu and entered the parliament. Parties started to keep the promises about the Kurdish issue. While being deputy prime minister in 1991, Erdal Inonu called for the recognition of the cultural rights of Kurdish citizens.

In March 1992, the then Prime Minister Suleiman Demirel explicitly announced his recognition of the Kurdish reality. This was an indication that the state's official discourse had changed, conflicts were still going on in the same years. A gang working illegally on behalf of the government that had started operations during the government of Tansu Çiller, was discovered as a result of an accident in Susurluk. This gang was found responsible for many unsolved murders. Some tribal chiefs who had benefitted from war and military officers had organized gangs for their own benefit and with the aim of ‘‘protecting the state’’. The continuation of the war was to the benefit of this gang, also called deep state. On the other hand, no projects had been available for the solution of the problem. In addition, many sectors (especially in nationalist circles in Turkey) believed that the current conflicts had nothing to do with the Kurdish issue. They believed that the problem was related to the instigation of foreign states and the problem of terrorism.

In 1995 clashes stopped. In December of 1995 PKK declared a ceasefire before their general elections. Clashes started to decline after that year. The violent clash period of 1989-1995 turned into a relatively quieter one. Different solution methods were now being discussed

A new era started as a result of the agreement with the European Union to enter into Customs Union on January 1, 1996. The declaration of the European Union summit in Luxembourg on 12-13 December 1997 was a sign that Turkey's membership talks would continue. During the mentioned years, although violent events decreased, they still existed. Among the reasons for this Turkish nationalists' insistence on old politics, an institution benefitting from the war, and expectation from the army can be mentioned. In the National Security Council on February 28, 1997 the army liquidated the Refah Party on the grounds of having Islamist activities, calling it a post-modern coup.

Solution to the Kurdish problem was sentencing with violent methods. But by getting close to the European Union a different political ground began to appear. Exactly in this process, on February 15, 1999 PKK's president was arrested in an operation and brought back to Turkey and the Kurdish issue entered a different medium after this event.

1.7. Crisis in Kurdish Issue in 2000s

After Abdullah Ocalan was brought to Turkey, in the same year, led to PKK's armed forces out of the country and also ceasefire. Violence has almost stopped. Kurdish politics started to discuss Ocalan's Kurdish Democratic Republic thesis and abandoned the idea of an independent government. On December 11-12 of the same year at the Helsinki summit of the European Union Turkey was given a candidate status. AKP won the elections held on November 3, 2002 unanimously and came to power and announced that one of their main objectives was entering the European Union. Adopting a more ambitious perspective in EU membership and towards democratization, Turkey abolished OHAL in 2002 and the death penalty in June 2003. Kurdish language schools were opened in January 2004 and TRT was allowed to broadcast in local dialects and languages in June 2004. While some changes were made in Turkish Penal Code, a number of changes were also made in Anti-Terrorism Act and related laws on freedom of expression.

However, while some nationalists criticized these changes as being too much, contributions to solving the Kurdish issue did not go any further than just creating an optimistic atmosphere, because a solution was still not seen. The Kurdish issue continued to create crisis. But this crisis was a bigger one. Because the condition 5 years after a war had ended hopes. During these years social tensions started in big cities in Turkey. Attempted lynching, provocations and flag events began to take place. In 2004 clashes started again, ending the ceasefire declared by PKK in 2004. After burning flags in Nowrooz celebrations in 2005, the army issued a harsh statement calling the demonstrators the " so-called citizens " and this brought to surface militarist quarters' new nationalist imagination as a qualification in Turkey. This change brought disappointment; years of assimilation policy had failed. After decades the Kurdish issue still existed with its psychological, economic, political and social nature. This situation increased nationalist anger and is still doing it. Indeed, the assassinations of priest Santoro and Hrant Dink occurred in such atmosphere of rising anger.

Disappointment was not the matter of a significant number of Kurds being reluctant to onwards Turkishization. The resistance of a significant segment of the population of the country against Turkishization and increased the disappointment. After all, the hope of a Republic with a nation having a single language, and a homogenized culture remained impossible. There is a second element in Turkey with a different language and soil and this has not ended after decades. The first and the most important reason for the awakening of the traditional perception Kurds.

The Kurdish issue in Turkey since 2000 seemed closer to being resolved during the first years of 2000s. European Union and conditions like the silence of arms made people hopeful. But this optimistic atmosphere did not last very long. The course of the Kurdish issue started to change slowly. The attendance of hundreds of thousands of people in 2005 Newroz celebrations and the events afterwards, showed that: the word "treacherous" in the famous 1990s slogan "Turks – Kurds are brothers – discriminators are treacherous" initially referred to PKK, but later on

started to refer to all Kurds. These so-called ‘citizens’ started to grow in numbers. Their silhouettes were in more and more newspapers regarding crime every evening. The semi-independent Kurdish region in Iraq increased the government’s efforts and caused confusion. With a Kurd as Iraq’s president, because of ethnic identity and despite being invited, there was a verbal duel between Turkish authorities and Kurdistan region president Massoud Barzani. Even a newspaper printed an article with ‘‘Donkey Kurd’’ headline. The growing violent atmosphere pushed the Kurdish issue into a bigger crisis. This was not a new crisis. It was the government’s crisis; because as a project based on an ethnic homogenization, the government’s systems had produced a crisis since the day they started. The principle of the government had always tried to assimilate and suppress other ethnic identities. Indeed, designed as a Turkish Republic, the government had goofed in the crisis in the Kurdish issue since day one. The last 30-year-war had moved to many different branches. The cinema is one of the fields that adopted these crises. The next section will take up the reflection of these crises on movies.

CHAPTER 2

THE CONDITIONS THAT PREPARED THE EMERGENCE OF PKK

2.1. Historical Background of the separatist movement in Turkey

As stated by Durkheim, "social facts can only be explained by social facts" and social order is based on a reality established by people as a result of social interaction during a historical process. And this reality is formed during an institutionalization process.

Palmer and Biggard indicate that institutional theory deals with existing structures and that focus should be on how these structures emerge in historical process. And while doing this, links between institutional structures such families, organizations, organizational fields, government and society at different levels must be analyzed. Due to past traumatic shocks and crises ties between institutions may be weakened and depending on the severity and the frequency of them some dropouts may occur. (Alkan, 2002 p: 37)

As stated above, for emergence of corporate entrepreneurship, for mutual understanding of such sensitive social structures with the appropriate characteristics it is necessary to examine historical processes. Therefore, PKK's configuration of their own organizational space in the East and Southeast Anatolian region in time, to understand the cause underlying entrepreneurship role, this chapter will examine the region's near past historical separatist social movements

2.1.1. The Ottoman Period

During Yavuz Sultan Selim, Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia Region came under the Ottoman rule after the war of Chaldıran (1514). In those days, administrative systems applied in regions such as Albania, Yemen and Lebanon was also applied in those regions and since the beginning the local people continued their

lives depending on “beyliks” designated by the Ottomans in a semi-autonomous manner.

While this system worked very well during the Ottomans’ powerful periods, it started to shake with riots, especially with the connection problems between principalities and the Ottoman central authorities arising from the Jelali uprisings in the 17th which led to the deterioration of the loyalty of these principalities. With the intersection of national interests of England, France, and Russia in the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire’s life was prolonged a hundred years. Especially during the reign of Selim-III, Mahmut- II and Abdülmajid, the kings were dealing with political crises and uprisings on one hand and trying to dominate the country with their reforms and prevent external attacks on the other hand.

In this sovereign states, headed by the UK, conducted Kurdism propaganda in the East and Southeast Anatolia regions aiming at the creation of a separate Kurdish society. In parallel to this, we come across Bulgarians’ revealing Kurdism separatist activities in the 18th century. The first initiative in this field was the publication of a Kurdish grammar book by a Catholic priest called Garzoni in Rome during his activities in th region of Amedya in Southern Iraq in 1787. In the same period in 1789 the first Kurdish dictionary was published in Russia. Also under a series of reforms conducted by the Ottoman Empire, with the order of 1839 Diyarbakir, holding the status of a province of the Ottomans since 1515, was named ‘Kurdistan’ and ‘Gönye’, a city of Trabzon was named Lazistan Sancagi in 1850.

Sending students of tribal schools to study in Europe during thE reign of Abdul Hamid II and getting under thE influence of western nationalism of those students contributed to the formation of Kurdism consciousness in the region. In addition, with the mention of ‘Armenia’, ‘Kurdistan’ and ‘Lazista’n in the Ayastafanos Treaty signed after the 1877-1878 Ottoman-Russia war, the issue gained international dimensions. During the reign of Abdulhamid II as a result of the escape of all the dissidents headed by young Turks abroad and with the backing of foreign

states, a Kurdish language newspaper called ‘Kurdistan’ was published in Cairo on April 9, 1898.

However, regardless of all external influences and the rebellion of Eastern Anatolians against the administration from time to time, these uprisings did not go beyond being personal objections against unnecessary taxations and administrative shortcomings. For a better understanding, the ten most important uprisings that occurred from the increase of reform activities, Tanzimat Edict, I and II . Monarchy proclamation at the beginning of 1800s until the signing of Mondoros Armistice in 1918 are given below with the dates, location, names (Demirel, 2005, p :25- 31)

Table 1 : Uprisings in the East and Southeast Anatolian and its surrounding regions during the Ottoman era.

THE NAME OF REBELLION	DATE	PLACE	REASON
Babanzade Abdolrahman Uprising	1806-1808	Northern Iraq	He did not accept the appointment of Ibrahim Pasha as the governor.)
Yezidis Uprising	1820	South Hakkari- Northern Iraq, Revandiz	The tribes did not accept the administrative orders in the region done by Sultan Mahnut II
Bedrihan Bey Uprising	1840-1846	Cizre	Cizre Bey’s finding courage to rise after the Russian war and the loss of the Ottoman army against Kavalali Mehmet Ali Pasa’s forces in Nizip
Sheykh Ubeydullah Uprising	1878-1881	Zap Vadisi	Helping some tribes in Iran and religious sympathy towards the Sheykh
Sheykh Abdolselam Barzani Uprising	1908-1914	Northern Iraq- Barzan	To establish an independent Kurdish state

As seen, Kurdism ideologies are not seen in riots that occurred prior to the second Constitutional Monarchy. Another example for this is given in a book called ‘‘Kurdish Issue’’ published in Paris in 1933, written by doctor Şükrü Sekban, who was born in Ergani Diyarbakır in 1881. On page 28 of this book it is said: ‘‘I have been involved in general politics for 37 years. I am a man of national consciousness. During the establishment of the ‘‘Kurdish Cooperation and Progress Party’’ I rushed to their first meeting. I was one of the best speakers of that meeting. Second to Naim B. Baban, I got the most number of votes in the Administrative Tribunal elections.

Moreover, as I am not an important figure, I don’t come from a big family either. But the fire in my soul wanted the heart of this community that did not know me at all. Later, I gained the confidence of everyone and no one kept their real ideas from me. I should say that nobody considered the slightest concession for Kurds. But all of us agreed that there should be reforms in six Eastern provinces. And the reform that they wanted was: They want to want to reform: Selection of determined and honorable governors, the building of a few major roads, and the reform of courts in order to implement justice in a better way.

After the first Constitutional Monarchy of (1876), Kurdish nationalist ideas were limited to certain families living in big cities and an elite class unrelated to regional people, and despite any kind of stimulation by the imperialist government, the people of the region has preferred to live inside the Ottoman Government. However, following the proclamation of the second Constitutional Monarchy in 1908, Young Turks representing Ottomans’ movement, replaced their movement with Turkish Nationalism and prepared the grounds for educated groups and especially the young generation for Kurdish nationalism. In this sense, ideologically the first Kurdism activities started at the beginning of 1900s. The first political organization in the context of Kurdism, ‘Kurdistan Strong Determination’, was founded by Fikri from Diyarbakir in 1900. (Demirel, 2005, p:25- 31)

After the proclamation of the second Constitutional Monarchy, while all Armenian organizations were under complete control of Tsarist Russia, the first organization supported by England was ‘‘Kurdish Cooperation & Progress Society’’

which started operating, headquartered in Istanbul, on October 2, 1908. Active until the Balkan War, the community was shut down in 1912 by the government due to malicious activities. Since November 9, 1908 the Society had published a magazine called "Kurdish Cooperation and Progress Magazine" on a weekly basis.

The second important political association established with Kurdism aims was " Hevi " (Hope). Even though it was officially established with its headquarters in Istanbul in 1908. In June 1913 a magazine called Roja Kürd (Kurdish Sun) was published in Istanbul as the society's official publication. Opening many branches in Eastern Anatolia, the society stopped their activities for a while during the first World War and started again until they closed down in 1922.

Another Kurdish organization in that era was the Kurdish Perfection Society led by Sayid Abdul Qadir. This organization was founded in May 1918 headquartered in Istanbul and with seven branches in East and Southeast Anatolia. They published Jin and Kurdistan magazines. Within this general framework since the beginnings of the 20th century the following organizations were also established: the " Hoybun " society that was based on a joint struggle of Kurds and Armenians in Beirut, the 'Kurdish Women Teali Society', the 'Kurdish Nationality Party' , the 'Kurdish Tamimi Education and Publication Society', the 'Kurdish Darülfünun Talebes' , 'Hivi Society', the 'Kurdish National Society', the 'Redeemer of Societies' and many more. After the first World War, American President Wilson and published 14 principles that supported separatist mentality that was developing in the region. According to this, "sovereignty and security will be provided in today's Turkish regions, but other nations under Turkish domination will be given absolute legislative confidence and opportunities to develop." (Ugur, 1999 p: 2-13)

Again, in the third part of August 10, 1920 Treaty of Sèvres (62, 63 , 64 items) mentioning 'Kurdistan' under the title, sets the event in public opinion agenda. In the 64th article of the Svres Treaty the following is said with regards to Kurds:

"Within one year from the date announced by the head of the treaty, if the majority of people who may be found under article 62 express their desire for complete independence and apply to the council of communities, and if the council finds this desire to be in a realizable capacity and recommend its fulfillment left Turkey, to be completely independent desire Izhar, and if the community of nations to the council of the application if, and, if the council these people's desire for independence realize capable satisfied that brings and its fulfillment, Turkey must obey this recommendation and give up all its rights and titles in the region and adjust itself accordingly.

It should be known that among the Seves Treaty signatories was Seyed Abdol Qadir, the head of the "Kurdish Teali Society" which was Funded and formed by the British.

While on one hand Kurdist groups that wanted to take advantage of this situation increased their operations by forming new societies, Allied forces, headed by the Brits, made intensive efforts to impose their wishes on Turkish government. At the same time, being the National Struggle period, there were four uprisings with foreign support as well as domestic collaborative instigators with the aim of establishing an independent Kurdish government:

Ali West Rebellion (1919), Cemil Ceto rebellion (1920), National tribal rebellion (1920), Kocgiri uprising (1921)

2.1.2. The term after the Proclamation of the Republic

Since the early years of national struggle, regardless of any kind of provocation, tribes living in the East and Southeast Anatolia regions gave support to the national struggle. After the victory of the national struggle, in order to turn the Mosul problem against Turkey, the Brits contacted Kurdist societies and led the February 15, 1925 rebellion.

Commissions established during the suppression of the rebellion, organized reports, and held meetings combined with rebellions and despite the

resistance of the Turkish government, the League of Nations Council decided to leave Mosul to British mandated Iraq on May 16, 1926. Meanwhile, uprisings were not just limited to Sheikh Said rebellion. Reçkotan and Raman uprisings followed it respectively and then 1st Ağrı uprising on May 16, 1926 and Mutki uprising on May 26, 1927. Full of uprisings and internal strife, Turkey had been forced to sign the treaty and leave Mosul to British mandated Iraq on June 5, 1926.

There were a total of 24 uprisings during the 15- year period of 1924 and 1938. The most important ones were: Nestorian Rebellion (1924), Reskot and Raman Rebellion (1925), Zila 's Rebellion (1925), Sheikh Said Rebellion (1925) , Semdinli Rebellion (1925), Ağrı Rebellions (1926 , 1927, 1930) , Koçusag Rebellion (1926) , Hakkari- Beytülsebab Rebellion (1926), Guan Rebellion and Beytüşşebap raid (1926), Pervari Rebellion (1926), Mutki Rebellion (1927), Biçar (Güldiken) Rebellion (1927), Zilan's Rebellion (1928), Abdülkuddüs Rebellion (1935) , Abdurrahman Rebellion (1935), Sason Revolt (1935) , Dersim Rebellion (1937). Also, Syed Taha Syed Abdullah , Eruhlu Yakup Aga, Oramar, and Buban tribes' uprisings that arose from personal conflicts and interests, were suppressed in a short time .

2.2. Kurdish movements in neighboring countries in Macro Platform

2.2.1. Kurdism Movement in Iran

Iran is an extremely important country in understanding the development of Kurdism. Being the only country that for many years has continuously had a geographical administrative unit called Kurdistan where Kurds' condition from the point of view of bureaucracy, elites, people and ideologies is extremely different.

Intellectuals and researchers conducting studies on ethnic issues who work on Kurdish issue all emphasize on Kurds being Iranians. According to them since Kurdish language belongs to the family of Persian, Kurds are "Iranian" and their cultural civilization is Iranian. It is true that basically Kurdish vocabulary and sentence structure largely overlaps with Persian. However, by accepting this analysis

language and ethnicity would be the requirements of being Iranian, so it would be impossible to consider the Azari population that form half of the nation as Iranians. This has been one of the basic dilemmas making identity thoughts of being Iranian after 1990. In this context the fundamental paradox is the question: " Is being Iranian mainly of religious-sectarian identity or an ethno-linguistic one??"

The Kurdish issue, generally overly politicized and a matter of priority in terms of violence and politics, ranks third in Iran's agenda of problems.

Compared to Turkey and Iraq, the political and social development of the Kurdish movement in Iran is behind. The Sunni minority among the Shia majority is always a phenomenon of potential for conflicts.

Hamid Ahmadi claims that Kurds are an integral part of Achaemenids , Parthians and Sassanid states. According to him Kurds , with the influence of geography in which they live, were entangled between Muslim arabs and Iranians at war. Ahmadi quotes Minorsy saying that Kurds made an alliance with the Sassanid's against the invasion of Arabs.

On the other hand in Kurdish publications there are claims of being an integral part of the Sassanids and Achaemenids and showing a Kurdish state history just before Islamization and up to the Safavids. Apart from a source signed by Xemgin, written without footnotes, this book is an interesting example in this regard. the book has claimed all governments from Abu Muslim of Khorasan to Babee, from Sheddads to Buyids , from the Ayyubid dynasty until the Safavids to be Kurdish.

When the Sheykh Saed rebellion broke out, Ihsan Nuri Pasha, an officer in the Ottoman army, joined the rebels and then escaped to Syria dn then to Iraq, also believed in Western Indo-Ariyanist opinions of the 20th century. Ihsan Nuri agrees with the opinion that Kurds come from Karduks as mentioned in Xnephon's work and is also in contact with Guti, Kussi , Mamaia and Hadlee with. Ihsan Nuri also showed interest in the popular concepts of "Arians's country.

Today there are different opinions on the origin of Kurds who speak Kirmanji, a language with the same grammar family and lots of Arabic and Turkish word. There are also other issues about the origin of Zaza.

Aside from debates on language and racial origins, from the point of view of recent situation of Kurds and especially Iranian Kurds, the Ottoman-Safavid confrontation was a turning point. The safavid government did not select Kurds as governors but instead he chose members of the Kizilbas (Red-heads) and thus moved towards regions connected to the Ottomans. Up until then, Kurds considered themselves as Iranians, but during that period Kurds living in Ottoman soil and regions close to them was an alienation for the Iranian society.

According to a Kurdist writer, Amir Hassanpour, the most important result of the Ottoman-Iran wars (1514-1516, 1534-1565, 1587-1628, 1636-1638, 1724-1732) was the first division of Kurdistan. Because the agreement signed by Sultan Murad II and Shah Abbas II in 1639 drew a line right through the heart of Kurdistan. As it can be seen, Kurdist circles are ignoring the fact that since the 16th century, because of the politics of the Ottoman which was established by a Turkman, in the Southeastern Anatolia the Kizilbas Turkmen population decreased and Shafii Kurdish population increased, and they avoid the understanding of this region's history. Above example and Xemgin's approach of Safavid government being as Kurdish shows it is based on Western sources and Hassanpour's approach shows concern about 'Kurd's Division' thesis and development of current political motivation.

Essentially, Kurds have been more interested in who would recognize more power and authority for them in their region, rather than religious concerns. The Ottomans had a more positive approach in this sense and as a result powerful Kurdish tribal leaders have emerged. On the other hand, the Qajars gave some Kurdish tribes authority. Especially from mid-19th century the Qajar administration started to have trouble keeping Kurdish regions put and followed a mix of " carrot & stick " and " divide" tactics.

Unlike Azerbaijani Turks, it must be noted that Kurds opposed the Iranian Constitutional Revolution. Kurds also did not play any significant role in the constitutional movement. They Even supported Muhammad Ali Shah Qajar against constitutionalists and again in 1911 the large Kelhor tribe (the Kurdish identity of this group is negotiable) supported Sala -al Dovle against constitutionalists in Tehran.

Today the Kurdish population in Iran are living in Kurdistan, West Azerbaijan, Kermanshah and Ilam provinces. Apart from this, a significant number of Kurds live in northwest Khorasan and a small number in Beluchestan. Kurds living in Khorasan province are those who were sent to that region as a precaution against attacks of Uzbeks during Shah Abbas Safavi.

Kurds in Kermanshah , Khorasan and Balochistan have no sympathy for the Kurdist movements. The main reason for this is that western Azarbayjan and Kurdistan Kurds are Sunni, whereas those Kermanshah and Khorasan are mainly Shii. Mehrdad Izady states that Kermanshah and northern Kurds have an Iranian political view and that they understand the State's political culture more easily. Also it should be mentioned that the Kurdish language in Kermanshah and Khorasan is much closer to Persian than other Kurdish dialects.

Swedish-born ex-officer who served in the French army and resigned after a while, Carl Peter Von Heidenstam (1792–1878) in a book he wrote about his journey to the Ottoman Turkey and Qajar Iran talks about the position of Kurds at that time as well as the conflicts between the two states. Heidenstam writes about Kurds often revolting against the government of Qajar and Ottoman Pashas in van and Kars encourages them to come to Turkey by promising them fewer taxes. Heidenstam also wrote that the son of Fath Ali Shah and the heir to throne Abbas Mirza had trouble in keeping Kurds in border region in place, but a Kurdish tribe escaped from Azarbayjan to a mountainous region near Erzurum.

As can be seen, like Turkmens, have had a historical adventure of commuting between Anatolia, Azerbaijan and Iranian plateau.

Tribal structure has been an unchanged sociological pattern for Turkmens and Kurds for centuries. Denominations , sects and religious issues together with socio-political factors have influenced Turkmens and Kurds. Mass effect of these factors , especially in the governments of Safavids and Ottomans.

The Qajar era was a continuation of old political and social order for Kurds. Kurds were not subject to mass hostilities or genocide in any of these states run by Turks. In the Ottoman society Kurds have had elites especially among clerics and they have also been present in regional administrations. Both Qajar and Ottoman governments saw the tribes local control not as a threat to the central government, but as a helping sociologic reality. During the Qajars, the same thing goes for ShahSavan, Afshar and other Turkish tribes as well as Persian tribes such as Lors and Bakhtiyaris in the south.

According to a 2001 UN text, the number of Kurds in Iran is estimated to be 6 million. In another source in 2001 of the Kurdish population is given as 3.5 to 4 million.

Ezzati says that regions inhabited by Kurds in Iran are in Western Azarbaijan, Kordestan and Kermanshah and includes eight cities with a total population of 2.5 million people and these cities are Piranshahr, serdasht, Bane, Saghghez, Mahâbâd, Sanandaj, Merivan and Pave. Based on an old source, these figures do not reflect today and it also includes Kurds outside the region.

Tore Kjeilen, the Norwegian editor of Encyclopedia of the Orient gives a figure of 6.6 million and the CIA 4.5 million (7% of the total 65.3 million population). Another source in 1995 gives a figure of 4-5 million (%8-10% of the total population). According to Keskin, this figure is 5 million, 30% of which are Shiite Kurds and 70% Sunni.

2.2.2. Kurdism Movements in Iraq

Compared to Turkey and Iran, Iraq has the highest rate of Kurds in the region. While Turkey has the largest number of Kurds, the most advantageous or

autonomously the most advanced Kurds are Iraqi Kurds. As known, the regions inhabited by Iraqi Kurds were under Turkish rule for centuries. The Ottoman rule was the last of these.

As of 1918, after this region was taken from the Turkish/Ottoman government, a serious chaos started there. The UK, aware of the value of oil and how much it would increase in the 20th century, meticulously focused on issues such as the future of Kerkuk and on Turkish borders. In this period, the division between Kurds did not inspire confidence in London. The desire of some Kurdish tribes close to Turkey to be with their relatives was an important issue for the Brits. In addition, differences in expectations caused by tribal structure, Kırmanji - Sorani distinction, trade , agriculture and livestock were other fundamental reasons.

There was a wide geographical separation between Iraqi Kurds . England , measuring the reactions to the suggestion of making Hashemite Emir Feisal the Iraq King of Iraq, saw that despite the fact that the Kurds of of Mosul and Erbil welcomed it, and that Kurds in Kirkuk objected it bur finally joined the Kurds in Suleimaniye (who were definitely against Faysal) and combined into one province and accepted the suggestion. Therefore, the Brits' strategy of using/leading the Kurds failed in a short time. Sheikh Mahmud Barzanji's rejection of the authority of the British along with a large portion of Turkish Kurds supporting the movement led by Mustafa Kemal Pasa were the most important factors.

Not finding their hope from the 1930 Anglo- Iraqi treaty, the Iraqi Kurds, especially around Mahmoud began to voice their demands. Berzenci's most important support came from the Barzani tribe in the northern region Behdinan. The leader of the Barzani tribe Mele (Molla) Mustafa Barzani used the tribal identity of his grandfather Naqshbandi as well as being the head of the clan to transform his local authority into political power. However, during World War II there was a lot of pressure that slid the movement to Iran. Living in the Soviet Union for many years after the Mahabad initiative in 1945, with the amnesty issued by general Qasim in 1958 he returned to Iraq and started activities there. General Qasim declared in a new constitution that Iraq was a part of the Arab world and accepted national rights

of the Kurds. General Qasim used Barzani both in suppression of opposing Kurds in Baghdad and in the murder of Turkmens in Kerkuk in 1959. In addition, fearing Barzani, he started to look for other alternative Kurdish tribes. When relations with Barzani soured, figures like Jalal Talabani and Ibrahim Ahmed became clear in Iraq.

However, Barzani maintained power during the 1960s. Barzani's power remained after the Baath Party coup. Barzani's growing power was both supported and provoked by the CIA, Iran and Israel. In early 1970s Baghdad-Barzani conflicts began after the Ba'athist government in Baghdad decided to nationalize oil. Barzani revolted in response to Baghdad's ultimatum and despite Iran's military support given to him, Iraqi forces defeated him. Open the banner of revolt against Baghdad's ultimatum Barzani, Iran's military support given to him despite the Iraqi forces were defeated. Because of Iran and KDP, Iraq came to the brink of a war but with the 1975 treaty Barzani was destroyed one more time and from 1975 Jalal Talebani came to the foreground. Mustafa Barzani died in 1979 in the United States.

2.2.3. Kurdism in Iran-Iraq Equation

After Mustafa Barzani his son Massoud Barzani entered into KDP management. Despite its time-to-time prominent left-identity, Iraqi KDP emphasized on full compliance with tribal structure and traditionalism. Although KDP starts with the word Iraq, its headquarters was in Iran since 1975. After the overthrow of Shah of Iran in 1979, Massoud Barzani got distant from Iran KDP, but Jalal Talabani got closer to Iran KDP. However, during the years of the Iran-Iraq War Barzani's KDP elements in Iraq fought against the Iraqi government, with his elements in Iran together with Iranian forces against the government oppositions, and when requested he fought against Iraqi forces. KDP camps have always been known to shelter groups of opponents of the Iraqi regime, as well as Armenian terrorists and destructive and divisive Turkish national elements.

Jalal Talabani left KDP after the debacle of 1975, and established the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan in 1976 (PUK YNK or KYB). Adopting Marxist-Leninist ideology tried to consolidate these organizations from time to time by

holding meetings in Western Europe Syria. In 1975, Talabani moved to Syria with his supporters and with the start of the Iran-Iraq war went to Suleymaniye region in Iraq. Later with the support of Iraq, Talabani went to Iran and fought against the Iranian regime and IKDP alongside KDP. KYB is active in Suleimaniye and Erbil.

In 1980, with the start of the Iran-Iraq war, struggling in the uncontrolled region of Northern Iraq, KDP dominated this region. Iraq tried to prevent Kurds from settling in this region by both land and aerial attacks. All through the war KYB and KDP were used by Iran and Iraq against each other. The effects of the war on the KDP were relatively much more positive than they were on PUK. In 1986-87 the KDP , PUK and three smaller Kurdish parties combined to create the Iraqi Kurdistan Front and in the final stages of the war achieved significant gains against the Iraqi forces.

In 1988, after the end of the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq initiated a wide campaign in the north with the pretext to rid the region of separatists and with an operation known to the world as Halabja Massacre caused IKDP and other elements to seek refuge in Turkey and Iran and create a 30-km-long buffer zone along the border. Therefore, the fall of 1988 Iraqi Kurds had fallen into the worst situation than ever.

After the Gulf crisis August 2, 1990, all Kurdist elements entered a waiting period. U.S. and its allies started a war against Iraq on 17 January 1991. With the defeat of Iraq at the end of the war the country's Shiite groups in the South and Kurdistans in the North of the north, started an uprising against the existing government.

In the second half of 1990s, there was both a regional and international race for influence in Iraq. The US created no-fly zones in both North and South of Iraq and controlled Kurds in the North and Shiites in the South by air. This put the regional groups into a new fight against each other. This struggle was armed and claimed many the lives. Iran, discomforted by the influence of both US and Turkey, indirectly entered the fight and being close to Talabani's KYB, established alliances

with Kurdist groups in the region. Iran also used its influence on Shiites as an instrument in the struggle between Kurds.

According to Olson, KDP began to stand out in among Iraqi Kurds from 1996. Taking Erbil from the fight with PUK, KDP also began to get support from the U.S. and Israel. U.S. The United States asked Turkey to develop good relations with the KDP. Turkey had not refused this request. Discomforted by KYB getting support from Iran from time to time and due to the conditions of fighting against PKK, Turkey developed closer ties with KDP.

Olson believes that, when it comes to 2000, Iran had a geopolitical disadvantage in the region. However, what really worry Iran are the military operations that Turkey carried out in Iraq in 1990s in order to follow the PKK. Iran has always worried about the political consequences of Turkey's military activities in the region.

After Abdullah Ocalan's capture, Turkey focused on countries associated with PKK. In this context, Turkey asked Iran to surrender Osman Ocalan (who under Iran's auspices) his militants. But Iran allowed for the 6th annual convention of the PKK to be held in Urumie in February 1999. Even Iranian agents had cooperated with PKK in Turkey to guide them to their desired goals. Later it was permitted to transfer weapons to PKK from Russia via Armenia. Talebani was also pressured to recognize opportunities for PKK.

2.2.4. Kurdism Movements in Syria

Syrian Kurds have a concentrated population in the country's north east, in the region near the border with Turkey and Iraq. There are various statistics on the total population, but in the newest analysis, this figure is given as 1.5 million. This corresponds to a total of %9 of the population of Syria.

Syrian land, especially the Northern parts of Turkmans and Kurds has become the scene of political military operations. The first thing that comes to mind here is Saladin Ayyoubi and Nureddin Zengi before him. It has commonly been

stated that Kurds had great contributions in stopping the crusaders with these powers. It is definitely known that Nureddin Zengi was a Turkman, but both Turkmans and Kurds have claimed Ayyoubi to have come from their origin. Even thinking about his statue in Sham, he can be thought of being an Arab too. Having formed a very important and vast historic part of the Ottoman Empire's lands, in today's Syria there was never any issue arising from Kurds until the end of Ottomans' reign. However, with the loss of land at the end of the 19th century and also with the effect of Ottoman-Russia wars, with the 1843-1846 Bedirhan rebellion a critical process had started for the Syrian Kurds. Failing the rebellion, Bedirhan Bey was exiled to Girit by the Ottomans and he was later commuted to Istanbul by Sultan Abdulhamid. One of Bedirhan's sons Emin Ali Bedirhan had actively worked for the Society For The Rise of Kurdistan and his son Celadet joined the Union of Progress with high education, but he almost worked as an intern for future Kurdish political activities. However, the younger son of Emin Ali called Tefik Ali Cinar and family member Esat Cinar took sides with Mustafa Kemal. As separatists Celadet and his siblings Sureyya and Kamuran had been sentenced to death together with their father, but then fled abroad. And so Kurdism had started in Syria.

In Syria during the period under French rule , the French did not encourage Turkish dissidents, especially after Sheykh Said's rebellion, to take political military action against the Turkish government. However, an anti-Turkish Kurdist organization called Hoybun was established in Lebanon in 1927. Celaldet published a magazine in Kirmanji language called 'Hawar' (Call) in Sham between 1932-35 and then in 1941-43. Kurdish-French 'Ronahi' and his brother doctor Kamuran Bedirhan's 'Roha Nu' followed 'Hawar'. The publication of these magazines in latin alphabet resulted in targetting/influencing Turkish Kurds too.

In 1957, an intellectual Kurdist group including Dr . Nureddin Zaza, Osman Sabri and Daham Miro established the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Party (SKDP). This was the period when the Soviet Union was leaning towards the Middle East and bipolar orientation period is the period between blocks started. Despite Syria's close relationship with the Soviets, Kurdish leaders would be arrested and

about 250 students would die as a result of the burning of a cinema in Amuda. Shortly after the failure of Nasser's attempt to combine the Arab Republic of Egypt and Syria in 1963 Baath Party's ruling and Syria's policy towards Kurds sharpened. Due to a Ba'athist rule in Iraq, military support was practically coming from Sham to help Iraq in the military action against Iraqi Kurds.

2.3. Separatist Organizations Operating in Turkey

As a continuation of Kurdish movement in the past, in the pre- and post-1980 period, especially to understand the PKK some Kurdish separatist organizations disappeared, some changed names, and some tried to continue their activities as various associations and facades in other fields. In order to understand the social structure of external and internal sensitivities and vulnerabilities of the social structure of these organizations as well as PKK's, it would be appropriate to examine some of these organizations in more details.

While establishing a Kurdistan State is a common issue among all separatist organizations, there are differences of opinion on followed methods to achieve this goal. While some organizations adopt "armed struggle", some others believe that it is too early for armed action and adopt "intellectual action".

Kurdistan Socialist Movement (TAF) , the National Liberation of Kurdistan (KUK) , KAWA , you TEKOSIN and RIZGARI, organizations also adopted armed struggle like the PKK. Kurdistan Socialist Party of Turkey (TKSP), the Leading Kurdistan Worker 's Party (KoiP) and Ala Rizgari organizations advocating thoughtful actions, conducted their activities in this direction. Except for PKK and RIZGARI, none of these organizations have been active since 1980.

2.3.1. Turkey Kurdistan Democratic Party (TKDP)

TKDP was founded illegally on January, 24 1965 with organized initiatives, Kurdish nationalism and Marxist / Leninist views. Their first local

organization was formed in Silopi and Cizre, and then in Eruh and Midyat. By forming a group called sinavcilar, they broke away from TKDP and thus laid the foundations of Kurdistan Workers Party In 1971. TKDP underwent division in 1978 and a group that had broken away from the organization formed the Kurdistan National Liberation (KUK). They had no active operations until combining with the Kurdistan Democratic Union (IAC) and the Kurdistan Freedom Society (CCS) and founded TKDP-UÖ (Turkey Kurdistan Democratic Party National Organization. A member of TEVVGER, a separatist alliance Founded in the same year, TKDP-UÖ united with KUM-MK and changed their names back to TKDP.

When it was established TKDP prepared a 61-item charter of the organization as follows:

- ▶ Changing the Turkish Constitution , Mentioning Kurdish and Turkish terms together in the constitution and announcement that the Turkish government consists of these two elements,

- ▶ No migrants settle in locations called Kurdistan and changing th enames of villages and cities,

- ▶ Having MPs in the Parliament in proportion to its population,

- ▶ Appointment of administrators of Kurdish origin to Kurdish cities,

- ▶ Making Kurdish the official language in Kurdistan and providing education in Kurdish in schools, establishment of Kurdish radio and TV, publication of Kurdish books, magazines and newspapers,

- ▶ Taking financial and economic measure to develop places defined by the government as Kurdistan and for this making heavy industry investments and spending %74 of oil extracted from the region for the region.

2.3.2. Kurdistan Leading Worker 's Party (KoiP - PPKK)

After leaving TKDP, Shivanjilar group and some members of DDKO who had been released with the general amnesty of 1974 testified their activities around the Revolutionary Democratic Culture Association (DDKD). This group decided form a party and established the illegal National Democratic Party (UDP) in 1977. With the arrest of one of the members of UDP, high ranking members of the organization moved to Syria and after a series of meetings decided to change the name of the party to Kurdistan Worker's Party (ICP) because UDP had been deciphered. They continued their activities with great secrecy until their presence was revealed by security forces in 1980 and some militants were caught. Other administrative staff however managed to escape to Europe and Syria illegally.

In 1980 KIP had moved their headquarters abroad and in 1982 and 1983 there had been two separate breaks from the organization forming the ‘KIP-YOUNG Union’ and ‘KIP Unionists Group’. Again in 1983, the organization made a decision to change the name from KIP (Kurdistan Worker Party) to KOIP (PPKK), because of its similarity with PKK.

In Germany Kurdish - KOM (Kurdistan United Worker Association Federation) decided on joint action with KUK-SE and also helped in the foundation of the TEVGER alliance.

The organization started publishing the legal ‘Medya Güneşi’ (Media Sun) comprising separatism and were seen in placarding actions and pamphlet distributions. Later on, two new organizations were established by some who had left KOIP-PPKK: the pro-armed action ‘PESENGE-BASKE SOREJGER (Revolutionary Wing) and ‘PESEN MEYLA SOSYALIST (Socialist Tendency).

2.3.3. Turkey Kurdistan Socialist Party (TKSP)

After the 1974 general amnesty, DDKO militants who were freed reunited in 1975, but began to divide because of differences of methods. Some ex-members of DDKO got together and decided to operate under the name ‘Freedom Road’ and at

the same time tried to convey their thoughts and ideas to masses by publishing the ‘Freedom Road’ magazine.

After the formation of the illegal freedom road fraction they decided to establish youth organizations and spread their ideologies of Kurdistan and with the aim of creating a wider base, open their association under legal guise. They established the Revolutionary People's Cultural Association at (DHKD) in May 1977 and by finally opening branches in various counties and cities they started operating. These associations are no longer active.

Although the cadres gathering around Freedom Path group started to express their wish to establish a party in 1974, the illegal Kurdistan Socialist Party of Turkey (TKSP) was not established until December 1978. They were intensively active in different cities and counties until security forces launched a series of operations in 1980 that led to the arrest of about 350 militants and seizure of numerous weapons. A big part of their leading staff and committee members managed to escape abroad.

TKSP organization considered by the region within the borders of Iran, Syria, Iraq and Turkey as their own land and claimed that Iran, Iraq and Turkey shared these lands. They aimed at establishing a federal government like the Soviet Union in the Esat and Southeast Anatolia and when necessary at times of action and revolution, declare an independent Kurdistan. After 1980, they gathered with members of KOMKOR (Kurdistan Workers' Association Federation) in Germany and made this organization a side organization of TKSP. As the most effective separatist organization in Germany, KONKAR continued operations by organizing demonstrations, distributing papers and notices and from time to time published a magazine called RIYA AZADI.

2.3.4. National Liberation of Kurdistan (KUK) Organization

In 1977, a group active in TKDP (Turkey Kurdistan Democratic Party), left due to ideological differences and formed the Marxist / Leninist -based KUK

organization in 1978. Intensifying their activities in Diyarbakir, Siirt, Mardin, Midyat, Mazıdağı, Derik, Kızıltepe and Nusaybin, the KUK organization aimed at making a Soviet type revolution first and then finally establishing an independent Socialist state that would also include the regions inhabited by Kurds in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria.

Between 1979 and 1980 many intense armed conflicts occurred between the PKK and KUK militants in the region of Mardin and PKK and KUK suffered a large number of casualties.

Getting armed with the help of of a few tribes in the Southeastern Anatolia Region, KUK organization got armed and were involved in both political and armed-actions. After 1980, the organization received a big blow and majority of its militants were arrested and those who got away went to Syria first and then from there to Palestinian camps and got trained there, and finally continued their activities in European countries after 1982.

Using Kurdistan Workers Cultural Association (Koçkaya) In Sweden, the organization was trying to organize the workers and as a result of internal schisms, KUK was divided into two (KUK-MK) and KUK- Socialist Education (KUK-SE) in October 1980. In 1983 two different groups left KUK-MK and started operating under the names Kurdistan Revolutionaries (SK) and KUK – Pharmacists.

From 1986, KUK – SE acted jointly with KÖİP (PPKK) and carried out various placarding actions. The organization, which was a member of TEVGER alliance, experienced various legislative wrangling caused by differences among its members.

2.3.5. Kurdistan Socialist Movement (TAF) Organization

Separated from KÖİP in 1983, the K_P Youth Association Committee and separated from ‘TKSP-Roja WELAT’ were not able to create an adequate organizational and they entered an ideological and political crisis. The organization

executives met in Sweden in 1986 and announced that they had merged under Kurdistan Socialist Movement (TAF).

They based their foundation on armed propaganda in order to reach their goals which were to unite the Kurdistan working class, create political power, establish a Marxist/Leninist Kurdish state in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia territories of Iran, Iraq, Syria and Turkey.

This organization, generally conducting its activities from Lebanon, Sweden, Syria and Germany, also benefitted from the "Kurdistan Cultural Center (CCC)" in Germany. In addition, the organization also had contact with the Kurdish Institute in France. Since the foundation of the organization, while carrying out their activities from abroad, they also tried to create a base mainly in the East and Southeast Anatolia regions in the country by voicing to masses through publications.

The organization sent two different groups to Turkey in 1988 and 1990 under the names of ‘Pioneers’ and ‘Discovery’ to engage in armed activities, but they were defused by security forces. Still trying to survive in Europe by press and publishing activities, the organization was able to publish “Homeland Sun” magazine inside Turkey from time to time.

2.3.6. Socialist Union of Kurdistan (YSK) Organization

Established in Sweden by a group that had separated from AlaRızgari organization due to differences of opinion, the YSK was not able to provide an adequate organization and no effective activity was seen from them. Also a member of TEVGER separatist alliance, the organization has not had any active operational activities up to now due to lack of adequate manpower.

CHAPTER 3

PKK 'S ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

Generally looking at the Structuring of terrorist organizations in the world, it can be said that they arise in an axis of a military organization. In his book 'Basic Tactics in People's War ', Mao Zedong "talks about forms of military organization according to enemy and terrain conditions. E.che Guevara stressed on armed struggle being the fundamental to success and stated that armed forces (army) that are going to fight and the organization that will be established with the support of these forces should be structured. Accordingly, he also states that under the control of the army that will be formed in a hierarchical layout, a civil organization will be necessary to conduct propaganda, collect taxes, direct civilians, provide replenishment and conduct secret activities such as sabotage and espionage.

If an organization which is established as an armed group is able to progress and grow in time, it will also start to have other structural contents that will support them in armed struggles. These could be legal or illegal organizations such as parties, associations, non-governmental foundations and associations that would provide financial and human resources support. Besides those created around these two main functions, there could also be much more sub-units that could for example provide legal support to terrorists being tried, give assistance to the families of dead or injured terrorists' families, and provide ideological information. More examples can be given, but it would be hard to clearly see these units organized individually and take separate responsibilities and tasks. They are rather various units serving identical ideological aims and in intricate and complex structures and act in one order. For example it is possible to see a group initially formed to help terrorists who are in prison, but also at the same time collect financial assistance and even join a terrorist activity. (Alkan, N. 2002 p: 55).

Even if terrorist organizations usually adopt a military-style structure, due to the nature of the struggle, they never reach the order of an army systematically as we know it. According to the general principles laid down by the central

administration, struggles are carried out by lower level chives. Often it is impossible for the central administration at any stage or position to intervene with lower ranks or for lower ranks to take orders from top management. This means that while general plannings are done at the highest level of the hierarchical structure, decisions are made and implemented at tactical levels. Therefore, according hierarchical order, human factor in armed forces is the main subject for terrorist organizations that adopt armed struggle.

The position and psychological state of warring person (terrorist) is just as important as the organization's structure. Because despite seeing orderly structures like team, company, battalion, there is a flexibility to go outside of this systematic order with different groupings. Actually this is an imperative situation for conditions of the fight that could change at any moment. Gaps resulted from structural flexibility are filled by the initiatives of the individuals (fighters) who are in the organization and the continuity of the organization, or in a sense its existence is continued.

In this section necessary information is given that will form a basis for the analysis of PKK's organizational structure. During a 32 -year process, the PKK has undergone changes in many areas since its establishment to the present day, and because of its transformation, its organizational structure has been studied parallel to this process. However, based on the information on PKK's organizational structure which is given here, one should not make a conclusion that the application of the structure in question is the exactly same. Although to a certain extent PKK has been able to implement the organizational structure that they have revealed, they have not been able to fully implement the structures especially in the lower levels that they had predicted. PKK continuously went through structural changes due to internal and external pressure and environmental uncertainty. Subjects like the institutionalization and legitimation and other factors that affected these changes either directly or indirectly. (Alkan, N. 2002 p: 59)

3.1. The PKK's ideology

Ideology can be defined as a set of political or social doctrine, politics that lead the behaviors of a government, a political party, or a social class, political, legal, scientific, philosophical , religious , moral and aesthetic considerations. In the simplest definition, it is a whole set of arranged and structured ideas. The most obvious component that distinguishes terrorism from other crimes is “ideology”. In this context, ideology is accepted as an essential component of terrorism and it is the backbone and the biggest weapon for terrorist organizations. Ideology is a guide to action. The type of applied violence, its objectives, the supply of its members, and the subjects of violence campaigns, are all determined based on this element.

Besides this definition, specifically in terms of positive and negative approach, based on a positive approach, ideology is a systematic structure and narrative of an idea. On the negative side, it is discussed in the form of an idea that does not reflect realities. (Arvada, S. A. 1992 p : 75-79)

Communism practitioner Lenin used ideology in a positive sense and in 1902 analyzed it in his essay called “what to do”: “Since in the process of movements working masses do not formulate an independent ideology themselves, the only thing to do is to choose between the bourgeois or socialist ideologies. There is no other way, because human being has not created ad "third" ideology and moreover, in a society divided by class antagonisms there cannot be an ideology that does not constitute classes is above classes”.

Here Lenin concluded that bourgeoisie develops an ideology and also uses it as a weapon and hence the working class could use ideological weapons too. Strategy has developed based on this result. One very interesting point in this period is the new mass movement that came with industrialization. Therefore, mass psychology has become the subject of ideologies. In this context, “it would not be wrong to state that socio-political program created the socialist ideology. Again, the main factor in shaping the organizational structure of terrorist organizations is ideology. Therefore, in order to understand PKK's organizational structure, one must

primarily look at its ideology. Because aims set forth by the ideologies of an organization can be realized by a suitable organizational structure. Therefore, it can be said that organizational structure will be shaped in accordance with the organization's ideologies and there should be a harmony between them. (Arvada, S. A. 1992 p: 75-79)

During the period before PKK was established and the present day, some books and leaflets explaining the purpose and terms of ideological views can be considered as basic texts. Publications such as "Kurdistan Revolution Road" (Manifesto), "Party Program and Party Charter", "the Political Report" and "On Organization" prepared for PKK I. Conference, "Kurdistan National Liberation Problems and Solutions", "Difficult Role in Kurdistan (National Liberation War - National Liberation Politics), "United Resistance Front in Fight Against Fascism" are the first written documents known to explain initial proposes of PKK.

Kurdistan Revolution Road (Manifesto) was a 68-page brochure written by the PKK leader and a senior member of the organization in 1975 and was printed and read to high-level organizational elements in 1978. This text is important in understanding PKK's ideologically anticipated strategy. Because opinions outlined in this brochure serve as a touchstone in the interpretation of the opinions of the elements of the organization of other opinions and also in perception of Marxist / Leninist ideology. Every piece of information and opinion according to this brochure has been tried to be interpreted. With regard to this brochure A. Ocalan has said: "... In order to overcome the lack of a strategy, the task of drawing a strategy was left to the revolutionaries. Proletarian revolutionaries fulfilled this task with the "Road to Kurdistan Revolution" brochure. There they clearly announced Kurdistan Revolution strategy, are ways to achieve the proletariat program objectives, enemies and friends of the revolution, the leader of the revolution, their fundamental forces and allies, and in short, classes in the revolution" (Aydin, A. 1992 p: 62 -65)

In the first part of the brochure, under the title "Community History", they describe the world's social and historical development from the Marxist / Leninist

point of view. In the second part, the history of Kurdistan and the social structure of the so-called Mid - Northwest Kurdistan (Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia Region) zone again with the same ideological logic. And the third part features Kurdistan Revolution has been discussed.

In subsequent periods, the manifesto became a stepping stone for PKK's political and ideological views. Indeed, the party program for November 1978 establishment period was also written under the same headers and in three parts. Published in the same period, the Party Constitution included descriptive information about the party's 304 essential qualities to accomplish the goals set in the program.

Inspecting PPK's written texts it can be seen that they are composed of more detailed copies of the texts from the days of establishment mentioned above and some quotes taken from Marksist / Leninist authors. For example, when analyzing the 1995 Party Program, it can be seen that even many sentences are the same as the 1978 Party Program. As will be explained in more detail in subsequent sections, the same thing can be seen from the decisions made in PKK's congresses and conferences. It has been seen that the contents of revealed PKK texts are so similar that they almost look like copies of one another. Another interesting aspect regarding the subject is that except for Abdullah Ocalan, none of the thousands of PKK members has published a noteworthy book in his name. Texts written by staff members as reports are nothing but reinforced repetition of ideas of Abdullah Ocalan with praise. (Aydin, A. 1992 p:62 -65)

These written express PKK as Marxist / Leninist and in accordance with the accepted principles of Marxism and Leninism, similar to organizations before them, they have formed their ideological and structural basis. The results of the interpretation of the grounds and format of organization needed to realize the objectives of their Party program, their own outlook and ideological approach to the evolution of world society was based on the results reached. Also according to this interpretation, determining the current existing situation a link was made between the past and present and in this context, "Colonial " and " Tough ", accepted as

unchangeable and unquestionable concepts, formed the axis of all PKK's ideas and actions.

The fact that method chosen to achieve the objectives includes violence and the state of fear caused by it is also one of the elements of terrorism. Fear is the most visible product of terrorist acts. Fear is the most emphasized subjects in defining terrorism. From this perspective, terrorism can be defined as "the use of violence in order to create an atmosphere of fear to reach a real or virtual target". It means that the aim is to create fear, to terrify and to ensure that people are afraid of something.

Thomas Hobbes, in his famous work Leviathan (1651) includes fear of death among feelings that lead people to peace. According to his thoughts, a principle law of nature is that "naturally everyone has a right to something". And this law leads everyone to be in a continuous war against each other. The basic cause of fear of death is the right to take away someone else's life. (Aydin, A. 1992 p :62 - 65)

Looking into PKK's ideological status in more detail, in the written texts of the organization at the beginning, the formation of class society suitable for the understanding of history of Marxism. Then it is indicated that exploitation emerges with the emerging of class societies. And on this basis, it has been alleged that exploitation exists in class societies and that exploitation continues by using force. Exploitation that leads to the use of force, is applied both from inside and outside. Accordingly, until the establishment of a socialist society, which started from the slave society to a classless one, the force and exploitation exerted on human society from the outside has constantly evolved.

The classification of external and internal exploitation has been taken as the basis of all evil. In this direction "Feudal, collaborative, retrogressive bourgeoisie" has been considered as internal exploitation and "the Government of the Republic of Turkey" as the focus of foreign exploitation. Thus, considering that exploitations continues in class societies by using force and that Turkey has a class

society, it has been claimed that the exploitation in Turkey is carried out by the Turkish government using force. (Buzođlu, M. H. 1997 p: 76-85)

Considering the necessity for the use of force and violence in order to abolish this system of exploitation, they attempted to create a logical ground to justify use of force and violence. Therefore, the foundation was laid for PKK'S tendency to use force and violence in their organizational structure.

Regarding this issue, it is noteworthy to mention PKK leader's quote: "it is not possible to develop politics of a revolutionary national liberation in the form of peaceful struggle, and even economic and cultural activities....."

It has been said that as a result, this kind of classification has revealed enemies that will be fought against and friends who can be allies and 'history is witnessing the struggle of the class and people who wish to get rid of these two types of exploitation'.

It has been accepted that the Ideological specified in fiction is naturally based on "internal and external force (use of force. According to Engels, one of the founders of Marxist ideology, force has both retrogressive and progressive nature. In this context, the force (counter-force) used by 'the society trying to protect itself against the exploitation' is always progressive and it is the main tool to use in order to progress. The counter force used by an exploited class is legitimate and a historical obligation.

The cyclical conditions of Turkey and the world during the times of PKK's foundation affected the acceptance of this ideological fiction in a positive way. According to that era, "with the development of capitalism colonialism reached a further dimension and the division of human beings into classes on one side and oppressor and oppressed nations on the other hand had reached its summit. Considering the use of force against both external and internal enemies as a historical necessity, this determination has been the basis for all PKK's activities. Since following a historical necessity is an absolute poem of rules, it has been seen as

indispensable. Thus, the exploitation taken as the basis of the force theory has become the reason for the legitimacy of use of force against it. (Buzoğlu, M. H. 1997 p: 76-85)

As the basis of PKK's theoretical approaches, Marxist / Leninist is considered as an important historical development from the point of view of the ideological assumptions of the foundation of the Soviet Union with the October 1917 revolution. With the foundation of the Soviet Union, an alternative arose against capitalism and this started the 'Proletarian Revolutions Era' in the international arena, moved the revolution to the east, allowed the establishment of revolutionary alliances and it basically created and a real national front formed by proletariat, the peasantry and literati's. In addition, the idea that 'these developments, as major characteristics of our age, the October Revolution will continue until the completion of the world revolution. It has been specified that since this historical necessity socialism reveals that the solution is in socialism, 'the method to save Kurdistan' is socialism too.

3.2. PKK's initial claims and Objectives

Generally the ultimate goal of organizations like PKK whose production is terror is to establish a new order in accordance with their own wishes and ideologies by overthrowing the existing government. In order to reach this ultimate goal, the intermediate objectives could be: to wear down the political power of the existing authority, provoke social tensions, create of public opinion, strain the government's repressive measures, break society's resistance power and ensure the participation and support of the public. The main objective of the actions is to wear down the political power of the government in public eye and gradually weaken the moral authority of the state. After creating a crisis of authority and mismanagement, the aim is to get the masses to uprising against the current government and thus paralyze the central government and create public intimidation.

Examining discourses and written texts of PKK organization as a whole during the period, it has been claimed that:

- Kurds have a different language and culture from Turks, Arabs and Persians and are a different race
- The location called Kurdistan is kept under occupation and torn between four countries (Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria)
- Kurds are not allowed to speak or educate in their native language,
- Kurds are being treated as second class in the countries of their residence,
- Kurds are deliberately kept regressed and are not given any contemporary opportunities in the countries where they reside,
- Natural resources of the so-called Kurdistan are plundered,
- Kurdish people are assimilated,
- Kurds who upraise are subject to vanishment, arrest and torture,
- Kurds do not have the right to choose their own destiny.

It has been expressed that based on above reasons, in order for Kurds to be rescued from this situation by PKK, it is intended to establish an independent Kurdistan State based on Marxist/Leninist ideology (Demirel , E., 2005, p :29- 32)

3.3. PKK's Strategy

PKK believes that the only way for the community to enter an independent development is armed struggle against the government. In addition, being aware of the fact that in today's conditions a struggle cannot be successful, a planned, organized and long-term armed struggle strategy, in which all Kurds should attend, was adopted. In this strategy, the leaders are the working class and the main force the peasants. Rural areas are the base of the people's war, and cities as secondary areas and the war of people is expected to develop from the countryside towards the cities.

The following is PKK's fighting steps depending on this strategy:

- ▶ Ideological Formation (Creation of Squads),
- ▶ Ideological Struggle
- ▶ Party Formation as Guiding Bodies,
- ▶ Development of the Party based on Armed Propaganda and Making it Comprehensive to the public,
- ▶ Front and the Army formation,
- ▶ Strengthening of the Army and the Front by Guerrilla Struggle,
- ▶ Transition from Strategic Defense to Strategic Balance,
- ▶ Establishment of Liberated and semi-liberated regions by Dynamic and Guerrilla wars,
- ▶ Transition Strategic Offensive Era,
- ▶ Transition to an Organized Army,
- ▶ Last Army and Guerrilla Attack for the General Public to Revolt,
- ▶ Establishment of the People's National Democratic Government,
- ▶ Mobilization towards (the establishment) the Independent United Democratic Kurdistan.

The processes followed by PKK to achieve their goals (as described above) have actually been expressed three main stages in PKK texts. These stages are "Strategic Defense," "Strategic Balance" and "Strategic Attack".

In PKK's revolutionary theory, these stages have been specified as successive stages in a long-term people's war and thus long-term people's war strategy has been tried to be actualized in details. Actually, regarding the Marxist/Leninist doctrine set out in these stages PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan has stated: "Considering that Kurdistan revolutionary war is going to be a long-term war of people, we are going to give some explanations about what kind of progress Kurdistan revolutionary war will follow according to "strategic defense", "strategic balance" and "strategic attack" which generally are the stages of all wars of people." (Demirel, E., 2005, p:29- 32)

3.4. Organizational Principles of Terrorist Organizations

Generally looking at the Structuring of terrorist organizations in the world, it can be said that they arise in an axis of a military organization. In his book 'Basic Tactics in People's War ', Mao Zedong "talks about forms of military organization according to enemy and terrain conditions. E.che Guevara stressed on armed struggle being the fundamental to success and stated that armed forces (army) that are going to fight and the organization that will be established with the support of these forces should be structured. Accordingly, he also states that under the control of the army that will be formed in a hierarchical layout, a civil organization will be necessary to conduct propaganda, collect taxes, direct civilians, provide replenishment and conduct secret activities such as sabotage and espionage.

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identical ideological aims and in intricate and complex structures and act in one order. For example it is possible to see a group initially formed to help terrorists who are in prison, but also at the same time collect financial assistance and even join a terrorist activity. (Alkan, N. 2002 p: 55).

Even if terrorist organizations usually adopt a military-style structure, due to the nature of the struggle, they never reach the order of an army systematically as we know it. According to the general principles laid down by the central administration, struggles are carried out by lower level chiefs. Often it is impossible for the central administration at any stage or position to intervene with lower ranks or for lower ranks to take orders from top management. This means that while general plans are done at the highest level of the hierarchical structure, decisions are made and implemented at tactical levels. Therefore, according to hierarchical order, human factor in armed forces is the main subject for terrorist organizations that adopt armed struggle.

The position and psychological state of warring person (terrorist) is just as important as the organization's structure. Because despite seeing orderly structures like team, company, battalion, there is a flexibility to go outside of this systematic order with different groupings. Actually this is an imperative situation for conditions of the fight that could change at any moment. Gaps resulting from structural flexibility are filled by the initiatives of the individuals (fighters) who are in the organization and the continuity of the organization, or in a sense its existence is continued.

Besides all these, processes that lead to individual militarization are important in structuring organizations. There are many reasons for an ordinary man to turn into a terrorist with a bold in his hands. To rescue the oppressed, fight against exploitation, and win the love of God and many similar reasons can be thought of. However, for whatever the reason and under whatever conditions, the common point of all is the definition of the idea the terrorists are fighting for as a soldier constantly thinking that they are struggling to rescue each other. While dying or killing, the 'existence of a lofty cause' separates terrorists from ordinary people. Terrorists

persistently avoid questioning themselves and their ideals even if their activities result far from what they had hoped. Questioning is the most harmful thing for a terrorist. The moment he starts questioning his leader, organization or his comrades or who is actually harmed by his action, the fight starts to be lost. Therefore, saints are produced, loyalty tests are repeated and becomes mandatory. Beliefs always come before wisdom. If terrorists think that “the destruction of the Twin Towers not only did not prevent the military domination of the world by the US, on the contrary it legitimized it”, then the activity would be weak. Therefore, the leader's orders are not arguable; if he orders “die”, it must be done (Duzgoren, 1994 p: 35-39)

It is a known fact that terrorists feel sad and empathy when they kill too few people. They do not think about the dead, do not feel the pain of death, do not make comments, and are only concerned with the death count. This comforts them psychologically since the actions, losses and the harm inflicted on the innocent cannot be explained. They are estranged from the victim and can consider the victim mathematically and consider him/her as a material. From the point of view of a terrorist there is a pass-through between killing and getting killed. Death is underestimated and thus victim’s loss of life is simplified since they can die so easily themselves, the death of their victims is also unimportant.

A terrorist’s relationship with other terrorists is based on a full military discipline. The members of the organization see themselves not as a rebels or killers, but as soldiers. They have dedicated their lives to a great fight and have sworn to serve as a member of that army to their last drop of blood. Their psychology in the war is not different from any soldier defending his country. There is somebody to protect from the bad guys. They have demands not for themselves but for somebody else. In order to realize their demands and force the authority that they are resisting against, they do not refrain from targeting anyone, including innocent victims. They believe so much in their righteousness that they do not count the pain that they inflict on the other side.

Actually the innocence of victims is known to the terrorist, but in general the victim is not very important. The terrorist, especially by the activity performed on the

victim is giving a punishment to the opposite side and transfers his own pain to them and shows the insolvency of political authority. (Duzgoren , K. 1994 p: 35-39)

3.5. PKK's Organizational Structure and Properties

It can be said that according to general principles of organization, the period before the foundation of PKK is very important in the structuring of ideological axis of the organization. It is seen that by inspecting the institutional emergence of the PKK as an entrepreneur, the ideological appearance of PKK became clear as of 1973. During this period, led by Abdullah Ocalan, "Kurdistan Revolutionaries" group is considered as the ideological structuring of the group. During the preparation period until 1978, various studies and meetings were held and "Kurdistan Revolution Road (Manifesto)" and "Party Program" were prepared. During a meeting held in this period in Elazığ, " Party Formation" was on the agenda and while the draft program was being , it was decided to take the " Vietnam Communist Party" as the example for the party. Thus, the transition from the youth organization to "Party Formation Process was made.

In Marxist/Leninist ideology, "a more powerful enemy, but with the mobilization of forces to the greatest degree and even the smallest cracks among the enemies, among the bourgeoisie of various countries, every benefit conflict between various groups and classes in the bourgeoisies inside each country, even if it is reliable, in order to gain a mass ally take the greatest care from the smallest possibility can be defeated with meticulous attention. What is intended here is the enemy of my enemy is my friend, and anything that can be provoked should be used and more importantly that "to achieve goal everything is permissible" is taken as a basis.

According to Lenin, Party Formation in the main condition of success

a - Leader,

b - Robust organization,

c - Professionalism,

d - Limited number of members depends on the availability of both workers and supporters from other classes.

Indeed, the PKK leader said “... on the way towards a revolutionary war in Kurdistan, a Leninist must know what and when to do and do it masterfully. We can already say that when we walk in such a way to organize a strong revolutionary party and develop such a party practically, we can slowly fulfill heavy political can say that we can fulfill our political duty”. As a result, it can be said based on the information given above, PKK tried to form their internal organization by taking a model based on Leninism and the Vietnam Communists Party.

In PKK’s first conference political report titled “the Problem of the Organization of the Party”, the following was included about the internal organization of the party:

“... The most important tasks that we face are:

- Rebuild the Center sub-organizations strongly,
- Organizing of ideological leadership,
- Organization of propaganda and agitation,
- Strengthening mass ties,
- And as the basis of all these, the staff as education of the staff

In line with the above-mentioned ideological logic of the PKK, the reasons for getting organized are expressed as follows: ‘‘In the colonies held under the occupation of military regime, if economic colonism has developed too, the objective conditions of the revolution are available. However, it is not possible to seize power in colonies by legal struggle or uprising’’.

With these findings: "fulfilling our duties against oppression and exploitation is only possible by organizing a political organization under the guidance of scientific socialism, a National Liberation Front leading this political organization, and a strong army fighting connected to this front’’ shows that PKK has realized the foreseen solution and at the same time its basic organs. (Duzgoren, 1994 p: 35-39)

Accordingly, PKK has adopted the Party, the army and the Front -shaped triple organization and in particular in regards with spreading their values in society;

- 2005, Kongra-Gel (Kurdistan People's Congress),
- KKK (Kurdistan Democratic Confederalism)
- In 2007, led to the formation of the KCK (Kurdistan Democratic Society Movement)

3.5.1. Party (PKK)

Party is the political organizing of an organization that determines its goals. At the same time it is the highest decision-making management body that determines the overall strategy of the organization and manages the front and army operations. The organization of the party in a highly- disciplined and confidential manner has been taken as a basis. The Party has been accepted as a guide in an ideological sense for Kurdistan National Liberation Struggle. .

Although its name is "Kurdistan Workers Party", PKK is actually a wide management structure with administrative/political and military wings. A.Ocalan

defined party as follows: " ... party is a democratic, free and equal society towards the transformation based on a program, with interests in all social segments of a common strategy, including -environmentalists , feminist, cultural – a wide organization based on organization and social movements, does not neglect legitimate defense and takes a tactic as a basis. In another definition, the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) was defined as the last Kurdish rebel movement. Another issue is the lack of opposition to the party leadership. Especially considering the militant personality of the leadership, it can be said that PKK is a party-looking militant group rather than a party. (Meteors , H. 1991 p: 45-47)

As a party with Marxist nature, the organization started professional political activities and from this period on party members did not even change their jobs without the knowledge and consent of the party. PKK completed organizing in 1978 and the discipline that is necessary in organizing an illegal party became the most important quality. For this purpose, in the party statutes included formation of an inspection and intelligence committee and was implemented. While PKK's organizational structure was plain and simple at the beginning, subdivisions that depended on the development of the organization increasingly became complex, but the triple structure was always maintained. (Meteors , H. 1991 p: 45-47)

3.5.1.1 . Form of Party Organization

The initial setup of the party organization was projected to be as in table 2, and by adding Army (ARGK) in 1984 and Front (ERNK) in 1985, the main foundation was completed. According to this, the Congress, the General Chairman and the General Presidency of the Council, the Central Committee, the Central Disciplinary Committee, State embodiments, Regional Committees and Local Committees tried to carry out the organization in the shape of cells. However, during certain time periods, conferences were organized and changes were made in the structure and activities of the organization according to developing conditions, but it cannot be said that the restructuring was done at all levels and in full, or that the units always fulfilled their duties and functions.

3.5.1.2. Party's Organizational Functioning

It was stated that the functioning within the party structure would be held according to "democratic centralism. A hierarchical structure is expressed as the lowest ranking member were bound to a unit, sub-committees and representatives of the higher committee and the representation, all committees and representations to the Central Committee and all of these are bound to party president and Congress. Accordingly, all organization, are obligated to give instructions from the top to bottom give reports from bottom to top.

Instructions coming from top organizations must absolutely be implemented with the right to criticize and this includes the party's central side, except extraordinary circumstances all party management committees are appointed and removed with elections, and it has been said that all this shows the democratic side of the party. In addition, it is stressed that in all party's elections and implementations the minority is subject to the majority. Confidentiality is essential in organizational relationships. Code names are used in the organization. The resumes of new terrorists who join the organization are entered into the books and a code name is given to be used in activities.

The terrorist have to use the code name and hide his/her real identity. Those who attempt to escape from the organization will be tried by the organization and severely punished (usually executed). To prevent escapes, every terrorist is used in armed action. In addition, of sexuality is a taboo in these organizations. Man-woman relationships are prohibited and those involved in this types of relationship are punished.

3.5.1.3. Penal System in the Party

Violating the Party discipline, not complying with and applying the Party statutes, speaking contrary to the party lines or propaganda, not performing or dampening the legitimacy of the party's decisions and instructions, violating the

party life and formalization, disclosing party secrets, not protecting party values and facilities and similar situations are considered party crimes.

Those who commit such crimes will be sent to Central Disciplinary Committee by the General Chairman or the Central Committee, investigated and punished in a democratic way. Accordingly, depending on the status of the crime, those who commit party crimes could get task restraints, impeachment, membership suspension, temporary dismissal, expelling from the party etc. As seen above, punishments given by an organization that adopts violence and is armed should be much more severe.

CONCLUSION

It is possible to say that Kurdistan cases found in the background of PKK entered into the world agenda in 1780. Facts like the Kurdish grammar book written in Italy, the Kurdish dictionary published in Russia can be considered as the first examples for this constitution. Not still politicized and Kurdish activities showing individual characteristics until the Second Constitutional Monarchy was declared in 1908, it started to gain an ideological feature from this date on and their demands for an independent Kurdistan began at the end of WWI and continued as intense riots during the 1924-1938 period. The most important effect of such traumatic situation experienced in the region up to the present day is the creation of broken social structures and thus the emergence of corporate entrepreneurs more sensitive and conscious against alternative systems and logics. As assessed in detail below, this is thought to be this. The main purpose of creating and continuously keeping that Kurdish issue on the agenda.

However, a major contradiction here should not be overlooked. How can Kurdish revolts between 1923 and 1938 be explained while following the First World War as a result of a national struggle, the Turkish nation founded a republic? More interestingly with so many uprisings, how can lack of any remarkable uprisings between 1939 and 1958 be explained? The connection between these events can shed light on today's PKK issue too.

Following the First World War, going to the Paris conference in the Ottoman delegation between January 18-May 7, 1919, Sherif Pasha, Seyit Riza and Seyit Abdulkadir who had sent letters to England and the Paris Conference respectively and requested help from England and the Paris conference requesting assistance to establish an independent Kurdistan state in the East and Southeastern Anatolia region. However, again the same people from the same region, as in other regions of Turkey had participated in the War of Independence with "Independence or death" password and had established the Republic. Thus, as claimed to be a separate nation from Turks in 1919, while the Ottoman government was so weak and powerless, they should have refused to participate in the national struggle led by

Mustafa Kemal and they should have established a Kurdish republic instead. Even more interesting and strange is the people who sacrificed themselves for the independence of Turkey change their minds after one year and start riots in East and Southeast Anatolia with the intention of establishing a separate Kurdish state. In the continuation of this interesting period after intense rebellions and years of crisis between 1924-1938, no serious incident related to Kurdism occurred between 1939-1958. The 1924-1938 uprisings that included Sheikh Said and Dersim rebellions aimed at dismantling the Ottoman Empire, but could not prevent the establishment of the new Republic of Turkey and this can be considered as the struggle of powers. The fact that no remarkable Kurdism activity related to the 1924-1938 period occurred between 1939 and 1958 can be explained in this way. Europeans could not find the time and the energy to divide Turkey with Kurdism activities from 1939 – 1958, because they were too busy trying to destroy each other during WWII. Due to this, there was no Kurdist activity that disrupted the peace between 1939 and 1958.

We can analyse Kurdish between 1923-2000 organizing in the sense of religious community and infer struggle to search their right. From 1960 to 1980 Kurds organizing in the sense of left which penetrate in that period. After 1980, Kurds gather in the idea of right and nationalism. When Kurds search their identity and cultural rights in the community of right violent politics and terrorism began. The idea of organizing and creating a model and become close to the idea of nationalism, PKK's attitude turns into the shape of recent years.

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