

**A CONTENT ANALYSIS OF TBMM MINUTES ABOUT
AK PARTY'S POSITION ON THE KURDISH QUESTION
BETWEEN 2001 AND 2017**

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
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This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in Political Science and International Relations.

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
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ABSTRACT

A CONTENT ANALYSIS OF TBMM MINUTES ABOUT AK PARTY'S POSITION ON THE KURDISH QUESTION BETWEEN 2001 AND 2017

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The Kurdish Question, long an issue of debate in the Turkish public, became one of the prevalent points of discussion following the Justice and Development Party's (AK Party) rise to power. The aim of this study is to do a content analysis of speeches by AK Party deputies in parliamentary sessions that contain the word "Kürt" between 2001, the founding year of AK Party, and the end of 2017. The study will also scrutinize the claims of AK Party's "swing to a more nationalistic tone", taking into account the opinion pieces, news articles etc. that were published in the given period. The change that was observed in the approach of AK Party deputies to the Kurdish Question, in context and ideology, will be thoroughly analyzed. The upshot of these analysis' will present the turning points in AK Party's handling of the issue in context and ideology on a yearly scale and will define periods that represent the paradigm shifts. The upshot of this thesis, based on TBMM minutes, indicate that statements that were made in the parliament by AK Party deputies became security-centric over the years, displaying that AK Party moved to a more nationalistic position on the Kurdish question.

Keywords: AK Party, Kurdish Question, Nationalism, Content Analysis, Political Parties.

ÖZ

AK PARTİ'NİN KÜRT SORUNUNDAKİ POZİSYONU: 2001-2017 YILLARI ARASINDAKİ TBMM TUTANAKLARI ÜZERİNDEN BİR İÇERİK ANALİZİ

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Uzun yıllardır Türkiye'nin en önemli gündem maddelerinden biri olan Kürt sorunu, özellikle AK Parti'nin iktidara gelmesinin ardından yoğun bir şekilde tartışılmaya başlanmıştır. Bu çalışmamızda AK Parti'nin kurulduğu 2001 yılından 2017 yılının sonuna kadarki süreç içerisinde AK Partili milletvekillerinin TBMM'deki birleşimlerde yapmış olduğu 'Kürt' kelimesini içeren konuşmaları üzerinden bir içerik analizi yapılacaktır. Aynı zamanda bu dönem içerisinde "AK Parti'nin milliyetçileştiği" yönünde yapılan açıklamalar konuyla ilgili literatür üzerinden tartışılacaktır. AK Partili milletvekillerinin Kürt sorununa yaklaşımının yıllar içerisinde bağlam ve ideolojiler açısından nasıl değiştiği analiz edilecektir. Bu analizler sonucunda AK Parti'nin yıllara göre bağlamsal ve ideolojik olarak konuyu ele alış biçimindeki kırılmalara değinilecek bu hususlarla ilgili dönemlendirmeler yapılacaktır. TBMM tutanakları üzerinden temellendirilen bu tezin sonucunda; yapılan açıklamaların yıllar içerisinde güvenlik bağlamına doğru ağırlık kazandığı ve AK Parti'nin Kürt sorununda milliyetçi bir pozisyona yöneldiği ortaya koyulacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: AK Parti, Kürt Sorunu, Milliyetçilik, İçerik Analizi, Siyasi Partiler



To my father...

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AK Party/AKP: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party)

ANAP: Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party)

BDP: Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi (Peace and Democracy Party)

CHP: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People's Party)

DSP: Demokratik Sol Parti (Democratic Left Party)

HDP: Halkların Demokratik Partisi (Peoples' Democratic Party)

HÜDA PAR: Hür Dava Partisi (Free Cause Party)

ISIS: Islamic State of Iraq and Syria

İP: İyi Parti (Good Party)

EU: European Union

MHP: Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Movement Party)

MP: Member of Parliament

PKK: Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê (Kurdistan Workers' Party)

PYD: Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat (Democratic Union Party)

TBMM: Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi (Grand National Assembly of Turkey)

UN: United Nations

VP: Vatan Partisi (Patriotic Party)

YPG: Yekîneyên Parastina Gel (People's Protection Units)

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

“Turkish nationalism and Kurdish nationalism are perceived as mutually exclusive by some societal segments in Turkey and this tension in the making of national identity is the underlying source of Turkey’s most important problem: the Kurdish question.”¹ If somebody asks “What’s the most pressing issue of Turkish politics”, the answer will undoubtedly be the Kurdish question. The first conflict between the state and Kurds can be traced back to Mahmud II period in late 19th century. According to Elphinston, the issue dates back to 1826. He stated, “The Kurdish National Movement in Turkey started as a revolt of the feudal leaders against Sultan Mahmud's attempt in 1826 to break their power and install local governors.”² From that date on, the Kurdish question retains its importance in Turkish politics and likely to keep it in the future.

For many years, the meaning and origin of the word ‘Kurd’ had been discussed, and that debate still goes on. Despite the evidence about the existence of Kurds as a separate ethnic group or nation, “it was repeatedly declared by earlier Turkish political elites that Kurds do not exist as a separate ethnic group; and the state acted in accordance with a principle that Kurds should not exist as a separate ethnic group.”³ “An emblematic example is General Cemal Gürsel, who, through a coup d’etat, removed the civilian government in 1960 and declared himself President, publicly declaring in Diyarbakir that ‘[t]here are no Kurds in this country. Whoever says he is a Kurd, I will spit in his face.’”⁴ In an infamous statement, General Kenan

¹ Hüseyin Alptekin, ‘Democratization and New Ethnic Politics in the Mediterranean: Turkey’s Ethnic Groups at Home and Abroad’, *Mediterranean Politics*, 2017, p. 310.

² W. G. Elphinston, ‘The Kurdish Question’, *International Affairs*, 22:1 (1946), p. 91.

³ Hüseyin Alptekin, ‘Ethnic Incorporation Policies and Peripheral Reactions: How Turkey’s Kurds are Treated by the State and How They Perceive Their Treatment’, *Afro Eurasian Studies*, 1:2 (2012), p. 99.

⁴ Mark Muller, ‘Nationalism and the Rule of Law in Turkey: The Elimination of Kurdish Representation during the 1990s’, in *The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in the 1990s, Its Impact on Turkey and the Middle East*, ed. by Robert W. Olson (University Press of Kentucky, 1996), p. 177.

Evren said after the 1980 military coup: "There is no such thing as a Kurd. They are mountain Turks. It is a concept derived from the 'kart-kurt' sounds coming out while our citizens in the southeast walk on snow. That is why they were referred with that name."⁵ These are some extreme examples demonstrating perceptions about Kurdish question in the past.

In this thesis, I will try to show how the AK Party MPs' approach to the Kurdish question varied over time in terms of TBMM minutes. The main findings of this thesis can be listed as:

- AK Party's increasing nationalistic tendencies on the Kurdish question can be seen, especially after 2015 according to AK Party members' statements containing the word *Kürt* in TBMM minutes.
- The thesis runs against the conventional wisdom that argues that AK Party was liberal before 2007 but turned nationalist afterwards. If there is a breaking point, it can be found much later only after the peak point of PKK terrorism in 2015.
- The upshot of this thesis, based on TBMM minutes, indicate that statements that were made in the parliament by AK Party deputies became security-centric over the years, displaying that AK Party moved to a more nationalistic position on the Kurdish question.

1.1. Thesis Statement

In my thesis, I will use content analysis of TBMM (Grand National Assembly of Turkey/*Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi*) minutes⁶ about AK Party's (Justice and

⁵ H. Akin Ünver, *Turkey's Kurdish Question: Discourse & Politics Since 1990*, 2015, p. 121.

⁶ *Minutes*, also known as protocols or, informal notes are the instant written record of a meeting or hearing. They typically describe the events of the meeting, starting with a list of attendees, a statement of the issues considered by the participants, and related responses or decisions for the issues. (Ganguly, Amit. *English Communication*, 2018, p. 184)

Development Party/*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*) position on the Kurdish question between the years of 2001 and 2017. I have analysed TBMM minutes from the date of AK Party's forming a group in the parliament, 16 August 2001 to the end of 2017. As a result of the analysis, the thesis will show that there are some meaningful increases and decreases in the numbers of quotations that contain the word *Kürt* in regard to contexts and ideologies by years. Therefore, I examined the data about the word's usage in contexts and ideologies in two chapters, as data overview and data analysis.

How the AK Party MPs (Member of Parliament) used the word *Kürt* (Kurd/Kurdish)? Did they use the word in a political, sociocultural, security related, foreign policy related or educational context? What was the tone of their speeches and do they bear the trace of different ideologies such as liberalism, nationalism or conservatism? What are the possible reasons for the variation in the tone, context, and ideology of MPs' statements? What are the reasons of increasing or decreasing use of the word, *Kürt*? These questions will help me answer the research question of this thesis: "How did the AK Party MPs approach to the Kurdish question vary over time?"

1.2. Contribution

In my thesis, I used inductive approach. I drew conclusions from the speeches of the MPs to find out the general position of AK Party on the question in the discursive level. The key variable of my thesis is AK Party's position on the Kurdish question. I measure this variable along three dimensions: the frequency of the use of the word *Kürt*, and the tone and ideology of the respective speeches. While the unit of analysis is a political party (AK Party), the unit of observation will be the speeches given in parliament. On an individual level, I will ask, "Why do different AK Party MPs use the word *Kürt* with different contexts and ideologies in different time periods?" At group level, my question is "why do the AK Party MPs use the word *Kürt* with the same tone in particular time periods while making their speeches?"

1.3. Methodology

“Content analysis is “a research technique for the objective, systematic and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication.”⁷ Although it was initially introduced as a quantitative methodology, it has improved and become more comprehensive. “The qualitative content analysis is a research method for the subjective interpretation of the content of text data through the systematic classification process of coding and identifying themes or patterns.”⁸ There are two types of qualitative content analysis, latent and manifest. While latent content analysis mainly focuses on the interpretation and substantial meaning of the text, manifest content stresses on more concrete components. In my thesis, I used both with more stress on the latent content analysis method.

I selected the period from 2001 to 2017, because it covers the AK Party period up to recent times and it has a good deal of variation. I collected the main data, the minutes, from the website of TBMM.⁹ All the minutes from 1996 to now have been uploaded on the TBMM official web site. I analysed each session and searched for the word *Kürt*. The logic of sampling is based on criterion sampling¹⁰, because its predetermined that thesis will be about AK Party’s position on the Kurdish question, therefore I focused on the speeches of AK Party MPs.

The term *operationalization* means to describe the words into measurable elements. For content analysis, this means the construction of a coding scheme, which is either a set of dictionaries or a set of measures in a codebook.¹¹ In the thesis, the level of

⁷ Driver, p. 393.

⁸ Bernard Berelson, ‘Content Analysis in Communication Research’, *Society* (New York: Free Press, 1952), p. 18.

⁹ via <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak/tutanaklar.htm>

¹⁰ The logic of *criterion sampling* is to review and study all cases that meet some predetermined criterion of importance, thereby explicitly (or implicitly) comparing the criterion cases with those that do not manifest the criterion. (Patton, Michael Quinn. *Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods*, 1990, p. 169-186)

¹¹ Hsiu-Fang Hsieh and Sarah E. Shannon, ‘Three Approaches to Qualitative Content Analysis Hsiu-Fang Hsieh Sarah E. Shannon Content’, *Qualitative Health Research*, 15:9 (2005), p. 1278.

measurement is ordinal scale, because quotations from the speeches in parliament can be measured in order of magnitude.

As stated before, while collecting data from the TBMM minutes, I searched the word *Kürt* in each section. In TBMM, there were 2.055 sessions in 6 terms and 22 legislative years, from 1 October 2001, after the date of AK Party's forming a group in the parliament, to 22 December 2017, which is the last session of the year. My qualitative content analysis dataset (Appendix starting at page 73) has ten columns that represents data filter of my thesis.

Validity and reliability are two main parts of a content analysis thesis. "Whether the research question is valid for the desired outcome, the choice of methodology is appropriate for answering the research question, the design is valid for the methodology, the sampling and data analysis is appropriate, and finally the results and conclusions are valid for the sample and context."¹² "Reliability is largely concerned with whether a study can be repeated."¹³ Actually, consistency is the foremost factor for both validity and reliability in qualitative data analysis.

A latent content analysis is more valid but less reliable, because the interpretation and definition by context is crucial parts of the research. However, manifest content analysis is more reliable but less valid, because its results can be differed only because of missing word error. Manifest content analysis' most important disadvantage is to not consider the context that word is used. In a thesis related with speeches of the MPs, context and validity should be an irreplaceable part and that's why I decided to follow latent content analysis. Although both words *Türk* and *Kürt* used in two different quotations, their context can be contrary. Once a quotation has both words of *Türk* and *Kürt*, it can be said within the context of liberalism, because it might be used with the words of 'culture' and 'equal rights' with egalitarian terms. On the

¹² Kimberly A. Neuendorf, *The Content Analysis Guidebook (Second Edition), The Content Analysis Guidebook* (California: SAGE Publications, 2017), p. 131.

¹³ Lawrence Leung, 'Validity, Reliability, and Generalizability in Qualitative Research', *Journal of Family Medicine and Primary Care*, 4.3 (2015), 324.

other hand, it can also be said within the nationalism context, because the words 'terror' and 'PKK' (Kurdistan Workers' Party /*Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê*) used with terms related to security. Moreover, I used latent content analysis, because some MPs made quotations that contains the word 'Kürt' or slip of the tongue while making their speeches. Because of my qualitative content analysis dataset, my causal hypotheses can be tested conveniently. I formed the hypotheses, according to interrelations with the quotation in different time periods.

In my thesis, I will mention about literature review, firstly. I analysed the literature about AK Party's increasing nationalistic tendencies under five categories. After that, I will mention about the codebook that represents how I prepared the dataset including AK Party MPs' quotations that contain the word *Kürt* in TBMM minutes between 2001 and 2017. Context and ideology parts of dataset constitutes main research question "How did the AK Party MPs approach to the Kurdish question vary over time?" In the fourth chapter, I will prepare an overview of dataset by examining each context and ideology separately. The fifth chapter constitutes the data analysis part and I will focus on contextual and ideological changes among years. Finally, I will prepare a conclusion about my findings and forecasts.

In the next chapter, I will present literature review about AK Party's increasing nationalistic tendencies.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

In this chapter, I will analyse the literature and the views about AK Party's increasing nationalistic tendencies under five categories. Although it is a brand-new issue and discussed more by columnists, I will firstly mention some academic references. The second one is about the statements from AK Party, while the third part is about the statements from the opposition parties. The fourth category is opinions of the columnists, which includes two subcategories that either affirm or object to "AK Party's increasing nationalism". Finally, the fifth one is opinions from the international media outlets.

The root of discussions about AK Party's increasing nationalistic tendencies do not date back to old times. Although there are some authors wrote articles earlier, I can say that discussions about AK Party's increasing nationalistic tendencies has started with the solution process in 2013. These discussions gradually accelerated from 2015 to this day. Shortly before the 7 June 2015 elections, AK Party members have started to make statements revealing, "AK Party is the real nationalist party" and began to redefine the term, *nationalism*. As a consequence of this policy, the vast majority of intellectuals are united in ascertaining AK Party's increasing nationalism.

2.1. Academic debates

One of the first to speak about the issue, Mesut Yeğen, who is one of the prominent sociologist about Kurdish issue, points out the increasing security-oriented policies of AK Party, stating, "The AKP will try to present itself as more determined than ever in combatting the PKK and will try to ensure that the HDP (Peoples' Democratic Party/*Halkların Demokratik Partisi*) is linked with terrorism".¹⁴

Alptekin and Köse claim the resolution process increased the sympathy to

¹⁴ Mesut Yeğen, "The Kurdish Peace Process in Turkey: Genesis, Evolution and Prospects" in *Global Turkey in Europe III: Democracy, Trade, and the Kurdish Question in Turkey-EU Relations*, p. 183.

nationalism in AK Party supporters:

AK Party voters never supported the (solution) process. On the contrary, the process strengthened nationalist feelings within the party. In spite of these negative advances, Erdoğan and AK Party leadership kept the party in line to continue the process. Essentially, as a reaction to solution process, some AK Party votes shifted to MHP (Nationalist Movement Party/*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*).¹⁵

Talha Köse argues the AK Party electorate approached the (solution) process sceptically; in fact the process even sparked nationalistic tendencies within the party.¹⁶ He also asserts that not only AK Party, but entire right wing parties' nationalist tendencies has increased. According to Köse;

The overall political posture of the Turkish right is getting more nationalistic... In the November elections, the AK Party re-gained the majority of the right wing conservative votes that they previously lost to the MHP. This in itself demonstrates the trend of becoming more nationalist among the conservative right wing electorate... Competition between the AK Party and the MHP may further push the Turkish right to the ultranationalist direction.¹⁷

Finally, according to a report by the Center for American Progress, Max Hoffman and two other authors argues that Erdoğan wanted to enlarge to scope of AK Party's political ideology by boosting nationalism. The following excerpt is from the report:

Having lost the support of most Kurds and liberals, Erdoğan has sought to define a new, cohesive concept of Turkish conservatism that satisfies the traditional religious base but appeals to sufficient numbers of nationalists as a means to consolidate control of the Turkish right...

Erdoğan wants to permanently fuse his conservative religious base with the

¹⁵ Hüseyin Alptekin; Talha Köse, "AK Parti'nin Kürt Politikası" in *AK Parti'nin 15 Yılı: Siyaset*, p. 334. Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own.

¹⁶ Talha Köse, 'Rise and Fall of the AK Party's Kurdish Peace Initiatives', *Insight Turkey*, 19:2 (2017), p. 147.

¹⁷ Köse, 'Identity Dynamics of the June and November 2015 Elections of Turkey: Kurds, Alevi and Conservative Nationalists', *Insight Turkey*, 17:4 (2015), p. 116.

conservative nationalist constituency and purge this unified right-wing alliance of dissent.¹⁸

2.2. Statements from AK Party politicians

In last half a decade, nationalism come to the fore of Turkish politics after Erdoğan's famous clause of "We are a power that trampled any kind of nationalism". Although his statement clearly represents to maintain a stance against all types of nationalism, its meaning has changed in time. Many AK Party members started to redefine nationalism, and claimed "AK Party is the real nationalist party" one after another. The initial statement about the issue starts with the speech of the then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan on 17 February 2013 in Mardin:

We are in a process. What is this process? This is a solution process. No one will confront us with both Kurdism and Turkism in this process. We are a power that trampled any kind of nationalism... Do you know what our understanding of nationalism is? It is about patriotism, humanism. It is about taking sides with the poor, waifs and strays. It is about ranking our beautiful country among the top ten in world countries.¹⁹

Almost 1.5 months later, on 31 March, AK Party Istanbul provincial head, Aziz Babuşcu mentioned about the future relationship with liberal shareholders. Although it does not contain the word, *nationalism*, it can be inferred there is a gradual tendency to that:

Our shareholders in our ten-year ruling period will not be in one way or another with us for the next ten years. Let us say that the liberal class become a shareholder in a way, but future is a building period. The building period is not going to be as they desire. Hence, these shareholders will not be with us. Those who walked with us either this or that way yesterday, they would become shareholders with powers opposing to us.

Because building the new Turkey and energizing the future will not be

¹⁸ Max Hoffman; Michael Wer;, and John Halpin, Turkey's 'New Nationalism' Amid Shifting Politics: Further Analysis of Polling Results, p. 4-5.

¹⁹ "Erdoğan: Milliyetçilik ayak altında", *Hürriyet*, February 18, 2013, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/erdogan-milliyetcilik-ayak-altinda-22621388>

acknowledged by them.²⁰

On 10 September, Deputy Prime Minister Bekir Bozdağ started the 'redefining nationalism' process by saying that "We are not orators nor valour nationalists. Our understanding of nationalism is to serve our nation only. It is done by protecting our nation and its values."²¹ AK Party Adıyaman MP Mehmet Metiner had a discussion with MHP İğdır MP, Sinan Oğan in TBMM General Assembly in 20 February 2014 and stated, "Dear Prime Minister stated he trampled ethnic nationalisms, not all nationalisms. We say 'yes' to Turkish nationalism, but we consider any kind of ethnic nationalism as 'jahiliyyah (pre-Islamic period in Makkah) custom' and we are condemning them."²²

On his speech in Trabzon in 2015, Vice President of AK Party, Süleyman Soylu remarked, "Whoever says 'I am a nationalist', whoever says 'nationalism'.... (for them) AK Party is the biggest nationalist party"²³ Moreover, AK Party Adana MP, Talip Küçükcan said, "Slogans and placards do not mean nationalism... It must be known that whoever says 'I am a nationalist', whoever says 'nationalism'... (for them) AK Party is the biggest nationalist party... Our understanding of nationalism is about protecting the nation."²⁴

In Gümüşhane province, Minister of Science, Industry and Technology, Fikri Işık mentioned "They are nationalist in speech; the real nationalist is AK Party and its

²⁰ "AK Partili Babuşcu'dan ilginç değerlendirme", *CNN Türk*, March 31, 2013, <https://www.cnnturk.com/2013/turkiye/03/31/ak.partili.babuscudan.ilginc.degerlendirme/702371.0/index.html>

²¹ "Biz nutuk ve hamset milliyetçisi değiliz", *Milliyet*, September 10, 2013, <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/-biz-nutuk-ve-hamset-milliyetçisi-siyaset-1761599/>

²² "AK Partili Metiner: Kahrolsun Türkçülük, kahrolsun Kürtçülük", *Milliyet*, February 20, 2014, <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/ak-partili-metiner-kahrolsun-siyaset-1839500/>

²³ "Süleyman Soylu: En büyük milliyetçi AK Parti'dir", *Karar*, April 22, 2015, <http://www.karar.com/gundem-haberleri/suleyman-soylu-en-buyuk-milliyetçi-ak-partidir>

²⁴ "Küçükcan: 'Milliyetçilik Sloganla Değil, İcraatlarla Olur", *Hürriyet*, May 19, 2015, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/kucukcan-milliyetçilik-sloganla-değil-icraatlarla-olur-37113441>

hardworking cadres.”²⁵ Additionally, AK Party Ordu MP, Metin Gündoğdu said in a TV programme, “AK Party is a party that applies nationalism in the best way... AK Party is the real nationalist party of this nation.”²⁶

In his talk in Antalya, Vice President of AK Party, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu remarked that “We are nationalist not of words but of deeds. AK Party is the real nationalist party in Turkey. In our understanding of nationalism, there is no way to be a ‘Mr. No’. In our understanding of nationalism, there is a way to be subordinate to nation under all conditions.”²⁷

AK Party Istanbul provincial head Selim Temurci clarified “The real nationalism is about loving the country and providing services from first to last... Nationalism is not about escaping... First, nationalism is about loving all the colours of the country.”²⁸ After resigning MHP’s Polatlı (a district of Ankara) branch, twenty MHP members transferred to and become members of AK Party. Former board member of MHP’s Polatlı branch, Güven Aydoğan said, “The real nationalism is AK Party’s nationalism... If deceased Alparslan Türkeş was alive, he would support AK Party for our national interests and peace.”²⁹

Against such allegations of “AK Party has become a nationalist party”, AK Party İstanbul MP, Mehmet Metiner wrote the following in his own column in Star newspaper dated on 14 August 2017:

²⁵ “Bilim, Sanayi ve Teknoloji Bakanı Işık”, *Radikal*, May 27, 2015, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/gumushane-haber/bilim-sanayi-ve-teknoloji-bakani-isik-1367307/>

²⁶ “Milliyetçi oylar Ak Parti'ye yöneldi”, *Sabah*, September 22, 2015, <https://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2015/09/22/milliyetci-oylar-ak-partiye-yoneldi>

²⁷ “Çavuşoğlu: Gerçek milliyetçi parti Türkiye'de AK Parti'dir”, *Habertürk*, October 18, 2015, <http://www.haberturk.com/gundem/haber/1141729-cavusoglu-gercek-milliyetci-parti-turkiyede-ak-partidir>

²⁸ “Temurci: Milliyetçilik, hayırcılık oyunu oynamak değildir”, *İHA*, October 20, 2015, <http://www.iha.com.tr/haber-temurci-milliyetcilik-hayircilik-oyunu-oynamak-degildir-505183/>

²⁹ “MHP'de AK Parti depremi”, *Akşam*, December 30, 2015, <https://www.aksam.com.tr/siyaset/flas-mhpde-ak-parti-depremi/haber-476357>

AK Party is conservative, because AK Party does not deny its past. It embraces values in the past... AK Party defines itself as not only a conservative party, but also a democrat one, at the same time. Each democratic movement is changing and revolutionist movement, inherently. AK Party's revolutionism is democratic revolutionism.³⁰

Just a month later, Metiner wrote about the same topic, but from a different perspective. He also redefined nationalism and indicated the following:

Thank God, AK Party does not have an identity problem. Thank God, there is no identity and belonging shift in AK Party, too... What is inference of people claiming "AK Party has 'shifted towards nationalist line', from the term *nationalism*? If it is ethnic nationalism meaning racism, nationalism in this manner, namely racism, is trampled as a 'jahiliyyah dirt' as our leader says.. If not, implied nationalism is a country nationalism, everybody knows, AK Party is a party that is based on Turkey nationalism... AK Party's 'Turkey nationalism' concept accepts everybody with their differences.³¹

One of the founders of AK Party, former Turkish parliamentary speaker and Deputy Prime Minister, Bülent Arınç gave a live interview on TV and stated, "Never and ever, we should not transform into MHP. If it abandons from its conservative democratic identity, AK Party loses. I have an objection to MHP's nationalism, MHP's Turkism."³²

2.3. Statements from Opposition Parties

One of the earliest statements from opposition parties about AK Party's increasing nationalistic tendencies belongs to BDP (Peace and Democracy Party/*Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi*) Diyarbakır MP, Altan Tan in August 2013. He argued AK Party has

³⁰ Mehmet Metiner, "AK Parti muhafazakar mı devrimci mi?", *Star*, August 14, 2017, <http://www.star.com.tr/yazar/ak-parti-muhafazakar-mi-devrimci-mi-yazi-1245833/>

³¹ Metiner, "AK Parti milliyetçi bir çizgiye mi kaydı?", *Star*, September 23, 2017, <http://www.star.com.tr/yazar/ak-parti-milliyetci-bir-cizgiye-mi-kaydi-yazi-1257564/>

³² "Bülent Arınç: Beni yok etmek istediler", *Habertürk*, November 23, 2017, <http://www.haberturk.com/bulent-arinc-beni-yok-etmek-istediler-1726500>

come into MHP line about new constitution.³³ In 2015, MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli clarified, "It can be said that AK Party has approached to our line and tag along after us."³⁴ Three months after the Bahçeli's statement, MHP Group Deputy Chairman, Erhan Usta also claimed AK Party has get into the MHP's line in most sensitive issues.³⁵ It followed by the explanation of Vice President of MHP, Ahmet Kenan Tanrıkulu. He said, "AKP has come into the MHP line. As seen in the issues such as security, defence, Euphrates Shield, they have come into our line in foreign policy."³⁶

Furthermore, MHP Istanbul provincial head, Mehmet Bülent Karataş clarified "What Turkish nationalists and their leader said yesterday, they (AK Party) are saying the same thing today. If there is something new, it is not us, it is everybody else. If Turkey has come to Turkish nationalists' thought, it is good."³⁷ In the same meeting, MHP İstanbul MP Arzu Erdem indicated, "MHP said '(solution process) will end', and it has ended. AK Party chose to move in the national line where we stand. And, we said 'you are more than welcome' to them."

There are also some comments from the other opposition parties. HÜDA PAR (Free Cause Party/*Hür Dava Partisi*) leader Zekeriya Yapıcıoğlu argued approaching to MHP's discourse and increasing nationalistic tendencies in AK Party's discourse is annoying to Kurds.³⁸ While all the views about AK Party's increasing nationalistic

³³ "AK Parti MHP çizgisine geldi", *Habertürk*, August 29, 2013, <http://www.haberturk.com/gundem/haber/873275-ak-parti-mhp-cizgisine-geldi>

³⁴ "Tıkacı çekeceğiz", *Milliyet*, November 19, 2016, <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/-tikaci-cekecegiz--siyaset-2347454/>

³⁵ "En hassas olduğumuz konularda AK Parti, MHP'nin çizgisine geldi", *Oda TV*, February 21, 2017, <https://odatv.com/en-hassas-oldugumuz-konularda-ak-parti-mhpnin-cizgisine-geldi-2102171200.html>

³⁶ "MHP'li Tanrıkulu: Hükümet bizim çizgimize geldi", *Hürriyet*, June 26, 2017, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/mhpli-tanrikulu-hukümet-bizim-cizgimize-geldi-40502056>

³⁷ "AKP biz ne dersek onu yapıyor", *Yurt*, February 26, 2018, <http://www.yurtgazetesi.com.tr/politika/mhp-li-vekilden-bomba-iddia-akp-biz-ne-dersek-onu-yapiyor-h78125.html>

³⁸ "Hüda Par: Kürtler, AK Parti'nin milliyetçi söyleminden rahatsız", *K24*, April 1, 2018, <http://www.kurdistan24.net/tr/news/80da16f1-95c7-4f40-8313-c4cb5497ce67>

tendencies claims “they become a MHP-like political party”, the only different statement belongs to VP (Patriotic Party/*Vatan Partisi*) leader Dođu Perinçek. He argued AK Party has come into the same line with Patriotic Party in the issues such as foreign policy, Western Asia policies, struggle against terror, security policies except secularism and enlightenment.³⁹

2.4. Opinions from Columnists

As I said before, the great majority of columnists affirms AK Party’s increasing nationalistic tendencies. However, there are some opposite views too that disaffirms AK Party’s increasing nationalistic tendencies. I analysed both views into two subcategories.

2.4.1. Opinions from Columnists affirming “AK Party’s increasing nationalistic tendencies”

Ferhat Kentel, one of the most prominent sociologists in Turkey, comments about the relationship between nationalism and AK Party in 2018, “The deeply nationalist vein in AKP is showing its face. Erdoğan’s appointment of Abdülkadir Aksu in place of Dengir Mir Mehmet Fırat demonstrates it will continue with a more statist line or cadres.”⁴⁰ Finally, in 2017, he said, “AKP is no longer a special party; it is a highly nationalist party.”⁴¹

Ali Bayramođlu claims about AK Party’s Kurdish policies started to prioritize security a long time ago. He warns government to return its old line at the beginning, as it would be harder as time passes by. According to his article written in 2008;

³⁹ “Türkiye'nin İran'a El Uzatması Mecburidir”, *Tasnim News*, October 10, 2017, <https://www.tasnimnews.com/tr/news/2017/10/10/1541478/t%C3%BCrkiye-nin-iran-a-el-uzatmas%C4%B1-mecburidir>

⁴⁰ “AK Parti'nin derin milliyetçi damarı”, *Haber 3*, December 9, 2008, <https://www.haber3.com/guncel/politika/ak-partinin-derin-milliyetci-damari-haberi-389723>

⁴¹ “Ferhat Kentel: ‘AKP gücünü koruyor ama meşruiyetini kaybediyor”, *Emek ve Adalet Platformu*, accessed May 1, 2018, <http://www.emekveadalet.org/soylesiler/ferhat-kentel-akp-gucunu-koruyor-ama-mesruiyetini-kaybediyor/>

Kurdish issue constitutes an important indicator regarding to political parties' relationship with both "democracy idea" and "ideology of state"... AK Party policies began to 'acquire a security-oriented colour', especially after the elections... Because of this image and course of events, the government came in for criticism from democrat and liberal circles... It is easy and possible for government to return its old line at this stage; it will be hard and difficult in future.⁴²

Ergun Özbudun is one of the most prominent academicians in constitutional law and president of the committee that prepared a civil constitution draft for 2007 elections. He also gave a warning to government about their tendency to nationalism in an interview dated 2011. Özbudun states, "The reason of liberal intellectuals' support to AK Party is their consideration of the party as the pioneer for change and democratization. If this image is harmed because of the tendency to attract nationalist votes, it will be a serious loss for AK Party."⁴³

Tarhan Erdem is an ex-deputy who ran Industry and Technology ministry for a short time. After 2011 elections, he commented, "(AK Party) took the nationalism road to push MHP under the threshold, but it could not achieve it... Both nationalism and relationship with Kurds are tactical issues for Erdoğan in election period."⁴⁴

In 2014, another important sociologist, Nilüfer Göle drew attention to a different point by mentioning AK Party's changing conservative perspective, "AKP initially put the father (of Islamist right in Turkish politics), Necmettin Erbakan, on the shelf. Now, it is forming a new centre by breaking right-liberal tradition... A movement based on conservatism is breaking our ties with tradition. It has no more relationship with

⁴² Ali Bayramođlu, "AK Parti'nin Kürt politikası", *Yeni Şafak*, November 11, 2008, <https://www.yenisafak.com/yazarlar/alibayramoglu/ak-partinin-kurt-politikasi-13761>

⁴³ "Ergun Özbudun: 'Milliyetçilik AK Parti'ye kaybettirir de", *Açık Radyo*, accessed May 4, 2018, <http://acikradyo.com.tr/arsiv-icerigi/ergun-ozbudun-milliyetcilik-ak-partiye-kaybettirir-de>

⁴⁴ "Tarhan Erdem: Erdoğan 4 yıl sonra siyaseti bırakacak", *T24*, June 15, 2011, <http://t24.com.tr/haber/tarhan-erdem-erdogan-4-yil-sonra-siyaseti-birakacak,151170>

tradition; it is on a quest, continuously.”⁴⁵

After the 2015 general election in 7 June, Mehmet Tezkan, who is a journalist and became a parliamentary candidate from İP (Good Party/*İyi Parti*) in 24 June 2018 elections, wrote, “The President officially declared that solution process is over... He has come to MHP’s line. Both MHP staff and government spokespersons started to speak the same language.”⁴⁶ Additionally, veteran Turkish journalist Rauf Tamer states, “If you are aware, AK Party is shifting towards a nationalist line. It is always been that way, but it is more now. Look at their discourses; they are talking like MHP. They think like MHP. Their reflexes against terror is like MHP... It is certain that AK Party is not a conservative, but a nationalist conservative party.”⁴⁷

Yeğen argues that AK Party’s nationalist tone on the Kurdish question was likely to continue. He stated the following:

We can forecast that AKP and Erdoğan’s sporadic Islamist and even dark nationalist language on Kurdish question will not be softened. Even if they take the road and walk together with MHP for the referendum, AKP and Erdoğan will suffer national and international pressure for determining the Kurdish policy according to MHP’s desire. ⁴⁸

Yeğen also drew attention to danger of increasing nationalistic tendencies for AK Party. He clarifies, “AK Party’s approach to MHP moves away the Kurds, who voted or sympathized to AK Party.

Because we know that MHP is on the stage from around 1965 and it has been the

⁴⁵ "Erdoğan'ı unutulım One Minute", *Hürriyet*, May 26, 2014, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/erdogani-unutalim-one-minute-26486200>

⁴⁶ Mehmet Tezkan, "AKP-MHP koalisyonu için altyapı tamam", *Milliyet*, July 29, 2015, <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/yazarlar/mehmet-tezkan/akp-mhp-koalisyonu-icin-altyapi-tamam-2094143/>

⁴⁷ Rauf Tamer, "Öfke deyip geçmeyin", *Posta*, March 24, 2016, <http://www.posta.com.tr/yazarlar/rauf-tamer/ofke-deyip-gecmeyin-333827>

⁴⁸ "Kürtler 'Evet' dedi mi?", Medium, accessed on May 15, 2018, <https://medium.com/tr724/k%C3%BCrtler-neden-evet-dedi-be0453cad9f5>

least popular party for Kurds.”⁴⁹

Etyen Mahçupyan is one of the most prominent journalists and writer on Turkish politics. He also became one of the advisors of Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu for a short time. In a column dated 2017, he clarified the following by mentioning “ideological differentiation of AK Party”:

It is obvious that AK Party is on an ideological differentiation from the perspective in its foundation. It makes sense it will be difficult to encircle the political base with statist and narrow-nationalist view for the political (conservative democrat) movement that comes from periphery willing to build the centre within a pluralist understanding.⁵⁰

Moreover, in his another column about 24 June 2018 election, Mahçupyan indicates that “After this point, it is not surprised that AK Party’s beginning to move away from all favourable features, approach to a statist and nationalist status quo, and become dependent to MHP’s support for the sake of “Presidency”.”⁵¹

Abdülkadir Selvi also supports the idea of AK Party’s increasing nationalistic tendencies by quoting President Erdoğan’s statements:

Due to the approach to MHP and increased nationalism, the issue has come to the fore. President Erdoğan replied the issue by counting ‘Rabia’ (a four-finger hand gesture that represents a symbol of resistance by Muslim Brotherhood supporters in Egypt) that has also included in AK Party by law. ‘If saying ‘one nation’ means nationalism, we are nationalists. If saying ‘one flag’, or loving the flag means nationalism, we are nationalists. If saying ‘one homeland’, or loving the homeland means nationalism, we are nationalists. If saying ‘one state’, or protecting unity and integrity of state means nationalism, we are nationalists. Dear friends, this is our nationalism.’ He mentioned about their objection to ethnic nationalism, but Erdoğan previously said ‘We do not recognize ethnic,

⁴⁹ “Mesut Yeğen ile söyleşi: AKP’nin Kürt tabanı”, Medyascope, accessed on May 14, 2018, <http://medyascope.tv/2018/03/23/mesut-yegen-ile-soylesi-akpnin-kurt-tabani/>

⁵⁰ Etyen Mahçupyan, "AK Parti'de 'mesafe' sorunu", *Karar*, November 17, 2017, <http://www.karar.com/yazarlar/etyen-mahcupyan/ak-partide-mesafe-sorunu-5464>

⁵¹ Mahçupyan, "AK Partililerin draması", *Karar*, June 10, 2018, <http://www.karar.com/yazarlar/etyen-mahcupyan/ak-partililerin-dramasi-7197>

regional and religious nationalism. We love the created for the Creator's sake.' Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım is saying that 'We did not shift towards Turkish nationalism'.⁵²

Kemal Öztürk who was the former press advisor of Erdoğan between the years of 2009 and 2011, refers to AK Party's increasing nationalistic tendencies that became evident in 2017:

AK Party's nationalist line became clear in (2017 constitutional) referendum process. To attract potential nationalist votes, discourses, actions and symbols shifted towards a more nationalist line, apparently... Up to now, we have faced with some definitions of 'Islamist AK Party', 'Nationalist AK Party', 'Secular AK Party', and finally 'Islamic Kemalist AK Party'. I wonder who is annoyed of the base identity of AK Party, which is 'conservative democrat'?⁵³

In his column on *Hürriyet*, Deniz Zeyrek argues, "AK Party spokespersons began to use similar discourses with MHP at times. These similitude and approach seems to reflect strongly in its young political base. AK Party Youth Branch started to use famous slogans of Grey Wolves in recent collective events, such as AK Party group meetings.⁵⁴ Faruk Aksoy also supports the view of AK Party's increasing nationalistic tendencies by referring the new term of "conservative nationalism". He clarifies, "AK Party has changed its official language quite a lot. The party was defining itself as 'conservative democrat', but now maintains 'conservative nationalist' stand."⁵⁵ Finally, Kemal Can indicates, "AKP always controlled a considerable majority of nationalist voters. However, the party has adopted a more clear nationalist line, through the change of course in Kurdish issue and weakening ties with the West from

⁵² Abdulkadir Selvi, "Cumhurbaşkanı milliyetçiliği nasıl anlattı", *Hürriyet*, October 10, 2017, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/abdulkadir-selvi/cumhurbaskani-milliyetciligi-nasil-anlatti-40605209>

⁵³ Kemal Öztürk, "AK Parti'nin kimliğine ne oldu?", *Yeni Şafak*, September 21, 2017, <https://www.yenisafak.com/yazarlar/kemalozturk/ak-partinin-kimligine-ne-oldu-2040242>

⁵⁴ Deniz Zeyrek, "AK Parti MHP çizgisine mi geldi", *Hürriyet*, November 25, 2017, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/deniz-zeyrek/ak-parti-mhp-cizgisine-mi-geldi-40657441>

⁵⁵ Faruk Aksoy, "MHP durup dururken niye atarlanıyor?", *Yeni Şafak*, August 10, 2017, <https://www.yenisafak.com/yazarlar/farukaksoy/mhp-durup-dururken-niye-atarlaniyor-2039499>

2015.”⁵⁶

2.4.2. Opinions from Columnists disaffirming “AK Party’s increasing nationalistic tendencies”

In his column titled “Has AK Party turned nationalist?” dated 2012, Mahmut Övür argues the increasing nationalistic tendencies of AK Party by quoting İlhami Işık’s statements:

Such argument about ‘there is a cold war period nationalism’ does not reflect the reality. İlhami Işık stated ‘I found claims about AK Party’s increasing nationalistic tendencies as exaggerated, missing, and prejudiced. Because there is a nationalist vein throughout the society in Turkey. Kurdish issue increased this nationalist sentiment even more... AK Party does not deny the realities of nationalists and Kurds. This is not an increasing nationalism.’⁵⁷

Burhanettin Duran argues that being ‘devletlü’ (statist) should not be confused with nationalism:

I consider conservative democracy, discourses of “civilization” and “local and national” interrelated with each other, and all these for meeting organic and cyclical needs. If you combine all of these, my opinion is there is a devletlü (statist) position that can contain Turkey-ness (being from Turkey/*Türkiyelilik*) -or we can call ‘take Turkey’s side’- and many social groups... Hence, conservative democracy, discourses of “civilization” and ‘local and national’ should be understood in this manner. Otherwise, you may assimilate AK Party’s “local and national” discourse with Kemalism and Turkish nationalism.⁵⁸

İsmail Çağlar continues with “AK Party has an ideology and rising nationalism is not something apart from AK Party’s ideology... We talked about increasing nationalistic tendencies of AK Party. Accept it or not, like it or not, this is an intellectual fantasy. Due to society’s increasing nationalistic tendencies, –if we say so- there is an

⁵⁶ Kemal Can, “AKP milliyetçiliği: Yedek anahtar”, *Cumhuriyet*, May 28, 2018
http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/siyaset/985128/AKP_milliyetciligi_Yedek_anahtar.html

⁵⁷ Mahmut Övür, “AK Parti milliyetçileşti mi?”, *Sabah*, October 19, 2012,
<https://www.sabah.com.tr/yazarlar/ovur/2012/10/19/ak-parti-milliyetcilesti-mi>

⁵⁸ “AK Parti 2019 seçimleri için teyakkuzda”, *Kriter*, November 1, 2017,
<https://kriterdergi.com/siyaset/ak-parti-2019-secimleri-icin-teyakkuzda>

increasing nationalistic tendency of AK Party, too.”

Fahrettin Altun also claims Erdoğan’s nationalist views by mentioning his ‘national’ discourse in 1999:

The most important condition for our country to overcome the domestic and international problems and pressures it faces is to develop national policies supported by the people. We desperately need a local stance, a national stance.” Recep Tayyip Erdoğan first said these words on July 24, 1999... The reason why Erdoğan recalled these words is to put forward the consistency in his political struggle on one hand and to answer the criticisms that have been brought against his nationalism on the other. Erdoğan emphasized that he has had the approach that is today referred to as “local and national politics” from the very beginning.⁵⁹

Finally, in her column named “President Erdoğan - A patriot or a nationalist?”, Jane Louise Kandur claims today’s nationalism is for all Turkish parties:

To turn back to Turkey, as the elections approach, many Western and Turkish commentators are calling out President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan for using nationalistic rhetoric. They are blaming him for driving polarization... the nationalism that is evident today is not something unique to AK Party, but rather is something which all parties, which all Turks have had instilled in them over the years. And if one looks closely at how this "nationalism" plays out at the AK Party level, at the actual actions of Erdoğan's government, a rather different picture emerges.⁶⁰

2.5. Opinions from International Media Outlets

Some of the major international media outlets mentioned the issue of AK Party’s relationship with nationalism.

As much as I searched, all international media supports the idea of “AK Party’s increasing nationalistic tendencies”, except an old-dated article.

⁵⁹ Fahrettin Altun, "Erdoğan's Istanbul Manifesto", *Daily Sabah*, May 11, 2018, <https://www.dailysabah.com/columns/fahrettin-altun/2018/05/11/erdogans-istanbul-manifesto>

⁶⁰ Jane Louise Kandur, "President Erdoğan - A patriot or a nationalist?", *Daily Sabah*, May 12, 2018, <https://www.dailysabah.com/feature/2018/05/12/president-erdogan-a-patriot-or-a-nationalist>

In 2007, a British news agency *Reuters* featured an interesting interview from German political magazine *Der Spiegel* with heading of “Turkey's Christians like AK despite Islamist past”. The interview was held with Patriarch Mesrob II, the Istanbul-based spiritual leader of Turkey’s Armenians, declared support to AK Party in 22 July 2007 elections. “The AK Party is more moderate and less nationalistic in its dealings with minorities. The Erdogan government listens to us — we will vote for the AK Party in the next elections.”⁶¹ After years, *Spiegel* published an article contains many criticisms to AK Party. By referring 7 June 2015 elections results, it has written, “Millions of Turks, after all, didn't elect Erdogan because of his nationalist agenda and Islamist leanings.”⁶²

Within the same day 1 November 2015 elections, American daily newspaper *The New York Times* published a news article and claimed that victory is an evidence of more nationalist election strategy:

The victory seemed to validate Mr. Erdogan’s electoral strategy of turning more nationalist, and taking a harder line with Kurdish militants in the southeast, where a long-running war resumed in recent months. Much of the party’s gains seemed to come at the expense of the far-right nationalist party, as voters switched to the A.K.P.⁶³

Galip Dalay, who is a Turkish columnist, wrote an opinion piece published in Doha-based media organization *Al Jazeera*, stated “Likewise, hoping to reverse the tide of electoral decline, the AK Party - but particularly President Recep Tayyip Erdogan -

⁶¹ Gareth Jones, “Turkey's Christians like AK despite Islamist past”, *Reuters*, June 20, 2007, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-election-christians-idUSL1835667220070619>

⁶² Maximilian Popp, “Turkey's Struggling Economy: The Demise of the Anatolian Tiger”, *Spiegel*, March 31, 2017, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/turkish-economy-heading-toward-crisis-under-erdogan-a-1141363.html>

⁶³ Tim Arango; Ceylan Yeğinsu, "Erdogan’s Party in Turkey Regains Parliamentary Majority", *The New York Times*, November 1, 2015, <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/02/world/europe/turkey-elections-erdogan.html>

adopted an increasingly nationalist discourse”⁶⁴.

In online version of British daily newspaper *Guardian*, it has written that “But for all his religiosity, Erdoğan is arguably more of a nationalist than he is an Islamist: he is too much of a Turkish patriot to subscribe to a pan-Islamist ideology that would dissolve borders of land and ethnicity.”⁶⁵ Another British media outlet, *BBC* has mentioned, “Taking al-Bab is also an issue of domestic politics for President Erdogan, as it appeals to Turkish nationalism.”⁶⁶

An opinion published in *CNN*, asserts the following about relationship between Erdoğan and nationalism:

While much of the country still looked forward to seeing Turkey draw closer to the liberal, modern West and join the European Union, Erdogan fired up the crowds with nationalist, anti-Western rhetoric. The President and his agenda are a big hit with about half the population, mostly the rural, conservative segments.⁶⁷

Finally, in online version of an American daily newspaper *The Washington Post*, it asserted, “Erdogan deploys such (nationalist) language for a reason.

He may have entered politics as a religiously minded liberal, but he has transformed

⁶⁴ Galip Dalay, "Militant nationalism threatens Turkey's social fabric", *Al Jazeera*, September 14, 2015, <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2015/09/militant-nationalism-threatens-turkey-social-fabric-150913110525084.html>

⁶⁵ Christopher de Bellaigue, "Welcome to demokrasi: how Erdoğan got more popular than ever", *The Guardian*, August 30, 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/30/welcome-to-demokrasi-how-erdogan-got-more-popular-than-ever>

⁶⁶ Fabrice Balanche, "Syria conflict: What is at stake in the battle of al-Bab?", *BBC*, February 11, 2017, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-38939492>

⁶⁷ Frida Ghitis, "Turkey's democracy has died", *CNN*, April 17, 2017, <https://edition.cnn.com/2017/04/16/opinions/turkey-election-less-democracy-opinion-ghitis/index.html>

his ruling Justice and Development Party, or AKP, into a vehicle for expanding his increasingly authoritarian control of Turkey.”⁶⁸

In the following chapter, I will mention about codebook that represents how I prepared the dataset including AK Party MPs’ quotations that contain the word *Kürt* in TBMM minutes between 2001 and 2017.



⁶⁸ Ishaan Tharoor, "The political trend that's more important than 'populism'", *The Washington Post*, February 16, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2018/02/16/the-political-trend-thats-more-important-than-populism/?utm_term=.958b26e4fc55

CHAPTER 3

CODEBOOK

I collected 1.023 quotations (from AK Party MPs' speeches) that contain the word *Kürt* with different lengths in 17 years period. AK Party MPs used the word *Kürt* 3.254 times between 2001 and 2017. I listed all quotations in the first column of my dataset. The second column comprises name of the MP that quotation belongs to, and the third column represents for provinces of the MPs elected. In the fourth column, it is included that position of the MP, such as MP, Minister or Prime Minister. The fifth column keeps record of the gender of the MP, while the sixth one refers for the date that speech has made. The seventh column indicates that quotation is recorded as a direct speech, or it is a response to another party MP's statement.

The eighth column contains the keywords that the respective quotation has. The most repeated keywords are Turk, Kurt, Alevite, Circassian, Roman, Arab, terror, war, peace, PKK, violence, identity, rights, religion, Sunni, Shia, independence, freedom, respect, recognition, and democracy. The ninth column is about the context of quotation that represents the spoken topic that is before the speech, such as security, sociocultural, economic, foreign policy, and education. Finally, the tenth column is about ideology that quotation bears the stamp of, such as liberalism, nationalism and conservatism.

3.1. Text

I searched the word "Kürt" on the Minutes of General Assembly from TBMM's official website, between 21st term's 4th legislative year (1 October 2001) and 26th term's 3rd legislative year (22 December 2017). I have analysed each of 2.055 sessions, separately. Although the names and their provinces are included in the minutes, parties of the MPs are not written therefore I need to find their parties first. Then I picked up AK Party MPs' quotations with their context, because it is crucial for identifying their ideology. Although I have included a minimum of two or three sentences in each quotation, some short quotations compose of one sentence, only.

These are represent an intervention by an AK Party MP. To illustrate, AK Party İstanbul MP Abdullah Başçı stated that “You are slaughtering Kurds!”⁶⁹. While deciding on short quotations’ context and ideology, I benefited from before, during, and after parts of the minutes from the website.

If there is an intervention to a speech, or there is a discussion with some other MPs, I used triple dot “...” between the sentences. For example, AK Party Siirt MP Yasin Aktay said, “Uses a force on Kurdish public... It is the fight on terror!.. Don’t consubstantiate Kurds and PKK!”⁷⁰

If the same MP made a speech in different times within the same session, I used bullet point symbol “•” between the quotations. For instance, AK Party Malatya MP Nurettin Yaşar said that:

- Don’t exploit Kurds!
- Kurds saw your collaboration with terror.
- Kurds know you well. These are rhetoric.⁷¹

Because of both are former MPs of AK Party, Abdullah Gül and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s quotations in their Presidency periods are also included in texts.

3.2. Name

The names of MPs are written same as in the minutes.

3.3. Province

The provinces of MPs are written same as in the minutes. If a MP has elected from different provinces in different elections, I wrote their provinces different, too. For example; Beşir Atalay was elected as Ankara MP in 2002 and 2007 General Elections,

⁶⁹ Turkey. TBMM. *Minutes of General Assembly*. 26th term, 1st legislative year, 82nd session. Available: <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak/donem26/yil1/ham/b08201h.htm>

⁷⁰ Turkey. TBMM. *Minutes of General Assembly*. 26th term, 1st legislative year, 17th session. Available: <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak/donem26/yil1/ham/b01701h.htm>

⁷¹ Turkey. TBMM. *Minutes of General Assembly*. 26th term, 1st legislative year, 17th session. Available: <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak/donem26/yil1/ham/b01701h.htm>

Kırıkkale MP in 2011 General Election, and Van MP in 2015 General Election. Bülent Turan (İstanbul-Çanakkale), Faruk Çelik (Bursa-Şanlıurfa), Mehmet Ali Şahin (İstanbul-Antalya), Mehmet Mehdi Eker (Diyarbakır-İstanbul), Mehmet Metiner (Adıyaman-İstanbul), Mehmet Müezzinoğlu (Edirne-Bursa) are some other examples.

There are some exceptional cases about ministers from outside the parliament. In May 2009, Ahmet Davutoğlu was appointed as the AK Party's first Minister from outside the Parliament, as Minister of Foreign Affairs. In 2011 and 2015 General Elections, he was elected as Konya MP. In August 2014, Numan Kurtulmuş was assigned as Deputy Prime Minister outside of the parliament, too. In 2015 General Election, he was elected as Ordu MP. Just after 17/25 December Investigation, Undersecretary of Prime Ministry Efan Âlâ assigned as Minister of Interior. In 2015 General Elections, he was elected as Bursa MP. Although Bülent Arınç was not a MP candidate in 7th June General Election in 2015, due to parties could not form the government, he continued Deputy Prime Minister role from outside of parliament, until the forming of interim election government on 28 August 2015.

Abdullah Gül and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's provinces in their Presidency periods are left blank.

3.4. Role

The role of MPs, who are also the ministers, written same as in the minutes. If he/she has not an additional role, I typed them as "MP".

In 2011, the role of "Minister of State and Deputy Prime Minister" has removed. To specify the difference between "Minister of State and Deputy Prime Minister" and "Deputy Prime Minister", I used the word "Minister of State" before the ones until 2011, and "Deputy Prime Minister" after this date.

Additionally, there are some ministries whose name has changed, such as the name of "Ministry of Industry and Commerce" changed into "Ministry of Science, Industry, and Technology". I wrote it as ""Ministry of Industry and Commerce / Ministry of

Science, Industry, and Technology” in the dataset.

3.5. Gender

To prevent possible mistakes because of the unisex names; the genders of MPs are double-checked with their photos in TBMM official website.

3.6. Date

The date when the speech is given in parliament is imported from the headlines of each minute, directly.

3.7. Type

While deciding the quotation’s type as a direct speech about Kurdish question, or it is a response to another party MP’s statement about same issue, I benefited from before, during, and after parts of the minutes from the website. Without other parts of the minutes, the quotation itself shows something about it is direct speech or a response. For instance, AK Party Muş MP Seracettin Karayağız stated, “After they conquered Anatolia, Seljuks accept all people in the region as its own citizens, such as Muslim, Kurd, Arab or non-Muslim Armenian, Assyrian, and Greek.”⁷² It is a direct speech, because he hold the floor to make a statement about Muş, in the day of 88th anniversary of the province’s liberation from enemy invasion.

3.8. Keywords

One of the most important criteria to decide the ideology of a quotation is choosing the keywords. I used semi colon “;” to separate the keywords in the dataset. The process of setting keywords is not about listing all the words, but deciding meaningful indicators. While writing keywords in the cells, I include all keywords in the quotations, because the context and ideology of a quotation cannot be decided with the use of a keyword. For example, the text above has quoted from Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu’s speech on 18 April 2016:

...They are not involved because, it is a terrorist organization, everybody needs

⁷² Turkey. TBMM. *Minutes of General Assembly*. 22nd term, 3rd legislative year, 89th session. Available: <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak/donem22/yil3/bas/b089m.htm>

to know the truth. If ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) is not in Ayn al-Arab, it is under favour of Turkey. We took the people in there, approximately 200,000 Kurdish brothers, into our lands, gladly. Even, we are carrying and transferring daily feed of animals living there as a humanitarian duty; we are this much sensitive on these issues. However, what are PYD (Democratic Union Party/*Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat*) and YPG (People's Protection Units/*Yekîneyên Parastina Gel*) doing? They are sending our Kurdish brothers that do not think like themselves to exile. There are exiled Kurds by PYD and YPG in Northern Iraq, Turkey, various cities of Europe, and Syria today. I ask you to meet them, I ask you to listen them too.⁷³

As seen the quotation has a keyword of 'terrorist' just one time, but the whole speech is in a context of foreign policy, because it includes keywords of 'ISIS', 'PYD', 'YPG', 'Northern Iraq', 'Syria', and 'Europe'. It proves that the word 'terror' is not always used in a context of security. My objective is to demonstrate the importance of usage rate rather than only a usage and to show keywords are not only indicators for deciding context and ideology. Additionally, some quotations do not have any keywords, because they only include one short sentence and there is no significant keywords for them. For instance, in 23 September 2017, AK Party's Şanlıurfa MP İbrahim Halil Yıldız stated, "I am a Kurdish, I am here."⁷⁴ There is not a certain keyword, because it is only an intervention to CHP's (Republican People's Party/*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*) İstanbul MP, Engin Altay's speech, and he did not say anything more.

The keywords can be names of a country, religion, language, ethnicity, party, organization, region, minority, religious sect, nation, etc. Some examples can be listed as, 'Kurd', 'Turk', 'Arab', 'Circissian', 'Turkmen', 'Laz', 'Muslim', 'Christian', 'Jewish', 'Atheist', 'Turkish', 'Kurdish', 'Arabic', 'Turkey', 'Iraq', 'United States', 'Iran', 'Russia', 'Azerbaijan', 'Cyprus', 'Middle East', 'Africa', 'Europe', 'Alevite', 'Sunni', 'Shia', 'CHP', 'MHP', 'HDP', 'PKK', 'PYD', etc.

⁷³ Turkey. TBMM. *Minutes of General Assembly*. 26th term, 1st legislative year, 74th session. Available: <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak/donem26/yil1/ham/b07401h.htm>

⁷⁴ Turkey. TBMM. *Minutes of General Assembly*. 26th term, 2nd legislative year, 121st session. Available: <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak/donem26/yil2/ham/b12101h.htm>

Moreover, they can be some independent words that are used frequently and bears the trace of an ideology; such as 'terror', 'brother', 'problem', 'question', 'issue', 'citizen', 'right', 'organization', 'state', 'democracy', 'unity', 'identity', 'equality', 'freedom', 'ethnic', 'ethnicity', 'together', 'solution', 'origin', 'war', 'peace', 'security', 'sect', 'ditch', 'separation', 'division', 'border', etc.

3.9. Context

The most significant step to determine the ideology of a quotation is to specify its context, and there are three crucial parts that should be considered. The first one is the context of quotation itself, while the second substantial factor is the context of before and after speeches. The third point is about frequency of usage of a keyword and similar keywords that serve same context in a certain quotation, because it cannot be said, "If a keyword used in a quotation, all quotations that contained same keyword represents same context." Therefore, context is not about "containing" particular and similar keywords, it is more about their usage rate in a quotation. I decided contexts and inserted into the dataset, according to these three criteria.

There are five main contexts in my dataset, as political, sociocultural, security, foreign policy, and education. Although there are some other contexts that are about few numbers, such as religion, law and economy, I placed those under one of five main contexts. There are 18 committees of TBMM about different areas, and some speeches has made during discussions on these commissions. I am going to mention only the names of committees within each context.

3.9.1. Political

Political context is one of the most common contexts of AK Party MPs' speeches about Kurdish question in TBMM. There are some topics that I consider their context as political, such as elections, law, democracy, economics, state, government, parliament, etc. As an example of a quotation that is on political context AK Party's Konya MP Leyla Şahin Usta stated below on 18 April 2017:

Owner of that motherland cannot be apart from this nation, because these

territories acquired with the lives and bloods of thousands of our martyrs. Our choices shapes our lives. We are either on the side of the good or evil. We follow either true or false. Choices and elections shapes the future of states and nations, just as on humans. 16 April (election results) shows us that the nation has not preferred and not accepted HDP's choice of hollow and ditch politics, discourses, and their claim that they are representatives of Kurdish public.⁷⁵

Some example keywords of political context can be 'election', 'vote', 'law', 'economy', 'politics', 'power', 'rulership', 'opposition', 'democracy', 'democratization', 'representation', 'bureaucracy', 'parliament', 'separation', 'right-left', 'solution process', 'budget', 'secularism', etc. Additionally, some of the statements has made during discussions of Committee on Justice; Committee on Constitution; Committee on EU (European Union) Harmonization; Committee on Public Works, Reconstruction, Transportation and Tourism; Committee on Environment; Committee on Petition; Committee on Public Enterprises; Committee on Planning and Budget; Committee on Industry, Trade, Energy, Natural Resources, Information and Technology; Committee on Agriculture, Forestry and Rural Affairs; and Committee on Interior.

3.9.2. Sociocultural

The other widespread context on AK Party MPs' speeches is sociocultural. Example subjects of sociocultural context can be listed as culture, religion, ethnic, migration, citizenship, media, women etc. For example, AK Party's Mardin MP Cüneyt Yüksel made a statement below in sociocultural context on 6 September 2010:

According to a rumour, there were seven languages, seven religions, and seven cultures that had lived in Mardin 7000 years ago. Under the name of Muslim, Christian, Jewish, Assyrian, Yaqubi, Chaldean, Nasturi, Yazidi, Turk, Arab, Kurd, and Circissian; Mardin became a peace hometown with people from all these cultures, languages, religions, ethnicities.⁷⁶

Some example keywords of political context can be 'folk', 'identity', 'origin', 'social',

⁷⁵ Turkey. TBMM. *Minutes of General Assembly*. 26th term, 2nd legislative year, 84th session. Available: <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak/donem26/yil2/ham/b08401h.htm>

⁷⁶ Turkey. TBMM. *Minutes of General Assembly*. 23rd term, 4th legislative year, 114th session. Available: <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak/donem23/yil4/bas/b114m.htm>

'peace', 'race', 'belief', 'TV', 'radio', 'civil', 'newspaper', 'film', 'religious sect', 'exploitation'. Furthermore, some of the statements has made during discussions of Committee on National Education, Culture, Youth and Sports; Committee on Human Rights Examination; Committee on Health, Family, Labor and Social Affairs; and Committee on Equality of Opportunity for Women and Men.

3.9.3. Security

The third common context is security. Terror, war, protection, struggle, defence, military and security itself are some of the example subjects in security context. For example, AK Party's İstanbul MP Mehmet Muş made a statement below in security context on 23 February 2017:

The terrorist organization (PKK) is planning to carry out bombing attacks especially to Mediterranean and other western provinces, there are some terrorist branches that are using our province as a base. An operation that is intended to neutralise the terrorists by security units is in the works. It is aimed to establish the safety of life and property of citizens, who are of Kurdish origin, especially.⁷⁷

Some example keywords of security context can be 'PKK', 'YPG', 'martyr', 'attack', 'weapon', 'death', 'kill', 'border', 'ditch', 'terrorist', 'bullet', 'soldier', 'organization', 'threat', 'enemy'. Moreover, some of the statements has made during discussions of Committee on Interior; Committee on Security and Intelligence; Committee on National Defence.

3.9.4. Foreign Policy

The fourth context is about foreign policy. International relations, diplomacy, globalism, foreign affairs, imperialism, institutions are some of the example subjects in that context. For example, AK Party's Diyarbakır MP Mehmet Galip Ensarioğlu made a statement below in foreign policy context in 13 December 2014: "Thanks to European Union reforms, the solution process towards Kurdish question -as the main

⁷⁷ Turkey. TBMM. *Minutes of General Assembly*. 26th term, 2nd legislative year, 74th session. Available: <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak/donem26/yil2/ham/b07401h.htm>

issue of Turkey-, arrived at more healthy level. These reforms turned Turkey's EU process and solution process into kind of a component part."⁷⁸

Some example keywords of foreign policy context can be 'European Union', 'UN' (United Nations), 'Northern Iraq', 'refugee', 'ambassador', 'embassy', 'international', etc. Some of the statements have been made during the discussions of Committee on Foreign Affairs.

3.9.5. Education

The last context is education. Language, literature, dialect, educational institutions are some of the example topics in that context. For example, AK Party's Kirikkale MP Ramazan Can made a statement below in education context in 27 November 2014: "Esteemed deputies; with elective courses such as Qur'an, siyar, Kurdish; headscarf, and 4+4+4 system; more libertarian and individual-centric policies that aims to remove official tutelage in education find an important place in society."⁷⁹

Some example keywords of education context can be 'Kurdish', 'Kurmanji', 'mother tongue education', 'imam hatip high school', 'university', 'school', 'college', 'dictionary', 'academy', 'institute', 'elective course', 'symposium', 'appointment', etc. Some of the statements has made during discussions of Committee on National Education, Culture, Youth and Sports.

Although almost all of the context of quotations themselves also comply with the context of before and after speeches, there are very few numbers of quotations that do not comply with the rest of the speeches. In such circumstances, I choose the context according to the before and after speeches. For example, the text above has quoted from Minister of Science, Industry, and Technology, Faruk Özlü's speech during budget discussions on 12 December 2016:

⁷⁸ Turkey. TBMM. *Minutes of General Assembly*. 24th term, 5th legislative year, 28th session. Available: <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak/donem24/yil5/ham/b02801h.htm>

⁷⁹ Turkey. TBMM. *Minutes of General Assembly*. 24th term, 5th legislative year, 20th session. Available: <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak/donem24/yil5/ham/b02001h.htm>

Dear Speaker, now, today's meeting's topic is budgets of the ministries, not Kurdish problem. If you could say them to come up the agenda, I will be very pleased. Namely, our today's topic is not Kurdish problem; we are talking about budgets of three ministries. Our friends please keep remain on the agenda.⁸⁰

The quotation itself was a response to beside the point statement of HDP's Muş MP, Ahmet Yıldırım. Although the keyword 'Kurdish problem' itself stems for a "sociocultural" topic, I wrote its context as "political", because before and after speeches were about budgets of the ministries and the speech was made during budget discussions. It demonstrates that same keyword does not represent same ideology every time.

3.10. Ideology

While mounting arguments for supporting the thesis, the most important part is to decide the ideology of each quotation, and there are four crucial points that are similar when specifying the context. The first one is the ideology of quotation itself, while the second crucial factor is the ideology of before and after speeches. The third point is about frequency and tone of usage of a keyword and similar keywords that serve same ideology in a certain quotation, because it cannot be said, "if a keyword used such quotation, all other quotations that contained same keyword represents same ideology." Therefore, like context, ideology is not about "containing" particular and similar keywords, it is more about their usage tone and rate in a quotation, too. These three points are very similar with context deciding process, but there is one more criteria as context of a quotation. Although ideology does not have a role to decide the context, context must be considered while setting the ideology of a quotation.

As I said before, some quotations are composed of one or two short sentences, only. While deciding these short quotations' ideology, I benefited from their contexts and before, during, and after parts of the minutes from the website. I decided the

⁸⁰ Turkey. TBMM. *Minutes of General Assembly*. 26th term, 2nd legislative year, 38th session. Available: <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak/donem26/yil2/ham/b03801h.htm>

ideology and inserted into the dataset, according to these four criteria. There are three main ideologies in my dataset: nationalism, liberalism, and conservatism.

3.10.1. Nationalism

Broad definition of nationalism as a political doctrine holds that the nation and the state should be congruous.⁸¹ It is one of the most widespread ideologies of AK Party MPs' speeches on Kurdish question. While an MP prioritizes its own nation and state, differentiates other nations in his speeches, and features the terms such as, nation, history, state, patriotism, superiority, motherland, security, and army with a central role in the speech I can classify the quotation's ideology as nationalism. There are quotations from all of the five contexts, but political, security, and foreign policy are the most common contexts for this ideology. As an example of a quotation that is on nationalist ideology, AK Party's Amasya MP Mehmet Naci Bostancı stated below on 16 November 2017:

Dear Speaker, valued colleagues, there is a terror organization in this country, PKK, which spreads seeds of sorrow and pain and make people enemies of one another. Since 1984, it is killing Kurdish children by taking them to the mountains in order to provoke the Kurds and its killing Turkish children in order to provoke the Turks. All these animosity to serve its own so-called political agenda. For the people of these lands, for those who stand against this hatred and the enmity between peoples, whether they are Turks or Kurds, PKK is the clear and main enemy.⁸²

3.10.2. Liberalism

Liberalism, in its attempt to fulfil its promise, is usually a combination that includes some or all of the following features: individual liberty and autonomy, individual rights, and market economy.⁸³ It is another common ideology of AK Party MPs' speeches on Kurdish question. If an MP makes rights-based expressions and uses more equalitarian language, and highlights the words, such as liberty, freedom,

⁸¹ Paul Lawrence, *Nationalism: History and Theory*, (New York: Routledge, 2014), p. 5.

⁸² Turkey. TBMM. *Minutes of General Assembly*. 26th term, 3rd legislative year, 24th session. Available: <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak/donem26/yil3/ham/b02401h.htm>

⁸³ Dan Avnon; Avner de-Shalit, *Liberalism and its Practice*, (London: Routledge, 2005), p. 14.

equality, democracy, property, representation, rule of law, social justice, individual rights, anti-assimilation, and secularism; I can say the ideology of respective quotation is liberalism. There are quotations from all of the five contexts, but political, sociocultural and education are the most common contexts for this ideology. As an example of a quotation that is on liberal ideology, AK Party's İstanbul MP Erkan Kandemir stated below on 12 January 2016:

Media was used as a means of lynch attempt for politicians in 28 February process, again. It is not content with that; deceased Ahmet Kaya got his share of lynch in media, because of singing in Kurdish. We should reconsider all together that free and objective media is our most valuable priority, which is not a buttress of tutelage and coups, respectful to personal rights and liberties.⁸⁴

3.10.3. Conservatism

The third and last ideology, conservatism by its name announces that it conserves. It recurrently said of itself, in a tone suitable for an axiom of politics, that it is against change.⁸⁵ While an MP makes religion-centric statements and gives importance to the traditions, and emphasizes the words such as religion, tradition, belief, prophet, Allah, Islam, Qur'an, Muhammad, Muslim, Sunni, Shia, Sunnah, Directorate of Religious Affairs, Said Nursi, religious sects, martyr, and mosque in an affirmative way; it can be concluded that conservatism is the ideology of the quotation. There are quotations from all of the five contexts, but political and sociocultural are the most common contexts used for this ideology. As an example of a quotation that is on conservative ideology, AK Party's Adana MP Mehmet Şükrü Erdiñç stated below on 23 February 2016:

I just stated that none of the origins of Turk, Kurd, Arab, Sunni, Alevite; or any ethnic identity or religious belief are superior to each other at all. I did not have a consideration about this. But, an attribution was made here. I am a Muslim person. Alhamdulillah, I am a person that believes in Allah and the Prophet. And

⁸⁴ Turkey. TBMM. *Minutes of General Assembly*. 26th term, 1st legislative year, 26th session. Available: <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak/donem26/yil1/ham/b02601h.htm>

⁸⁵ Ted Honderich, *Conservatism : Burke, Nozick, Bush, Blair?*, (London: Pluto Press, 2005), p. 6.

my Prophet, is the leader of a perception that despises nationalism and racism.⁸⁶

In next chapter, I will refer about an overview of dataset by examining each context and ideology separately.



⁸⁶ Turkey. TBMM. *Minutes of General Assembly*. 26th term, 1st legislative year, 42th session. Available: <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak/donem26/yil1/ham/b04201h.htm>

CHAPTER 4

DATA OVERVIEW

In this chapter, I will mention about data overview with some informative and statistical tables and figures about number of quotations that contain the word *Kürt* by years, MPs, provinces, regions, and positions. Additionally, there are two tables about percentage and number of quotations that contain the word *Kürt* in different contexts/ideologies in regard to different ideologies/contextes by years. Also, there are separate figures for each context and ideology.

When I look at the number of quotations that contain the word *Kürt* by years, it can be seen there are some fluctuations (Table 4.1). Especially after 2009, the usage of the word *Kürt* has increased rapidly, and it reached the top in 2016.

Table 4.1. Number of quotations that contain the word *Kürt* by years

YEAR	COUNT
2001	3
2002	5
2003	9
2004	9
2005	14
2006	6
2007	12
2008	29
2009	22
2010	48
2011	44
2012	93
2013	90
2014	98
2015	78
2016	350
2017	113
TOTAL	1.023

When I look at the number of quotations that contain the word *Kürt* by MPs (Table 4.2), descending order of top ten is Mehmet Naci Bostancı (65 quotations), Mehmet Muş (31 quotations), Ahmet Aydın (30 quotations), Mehmet Metiner (27 quotations), Mustafa Elitaş (21 quotations). Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has 13 quotations that contain the word *Kürt*.

Although he does not have Kurdish origin, number one is Amasya MP Mehmet Naci Bostancı by far with 65 quotations; because he was also carried out AK Party Group Deputy Chairman duty from 2014 to 2018. This means Bostancı alone held more than 6 percent of all AK Party's usage of the word *Kürt* in TBMM.

Table 4.2. Number of quotations that contain the word *Kürt* by MPs (descending)

NAME	PROVINCE	COUNT
Mehmet Naci Bostancı	Amasya	65
Mehmet Muş	İstanbul	31
Ahmet Aydın	Adıyaman	30
Mehmet Metiner	Adıyaman - İstanbul	27
Mustafa Elitaş	Kayseri	21
Yılmaz Tunç	Bartın	21
İlknur İnceöz	Aksaray	19
Bülent Turan	İstanbul - Çanakkale	18
Cuma İçten	Diyarbakır	17
İsmet Yılmaz	Sivas	16
Nurettin Yaşar	Malatya	15
Selçuk Özdağ	Manisa	14
Ahmet Davutoğlu	Non-MP - Konya	13
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	Siirt - İstanbul - President	13
Hakan Çavuşoğlu	Bursa	12
Bülent Arınç	Manisa - Bursa - Non-MP	10
Coşkun Çakır	Tokat	10
Halis Dalkılıç	İstanbul	10
Osman Aşkın Bak	Rize	10
Ramazan Can	Kırıkkale	10
Others		641

When I look at the usage of the word *Kürt* by provinces, top ten cities are İstanbul, Amasya, Adıyaman, Kayseri, Diyarbakır, Bursa, Konya, Malatya, Şanlıurfa and Aksaray (Table 4.3). MPs from some underpopulated provinces as Afyon, Bayburt, Bolu, Gümüşhane, Karabük, Kastamonu, Kırklareli, Kırşehir, and Tunceli did not use the word *Kürt* not even once.

One of the AK Party's Kurdish-based MPs Mehmet Metiner, and Mehmet Muş and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's uses comprise the majority of the use of the word from İstanbul. If a quotation from Hamza Albayrak is excluded, all quotations that contains the word *Kürt* from Amasya belongs to Mehmet Naci Bostancı.

Table 4.3. Number of quotations that contain the word *Kürt* by provinces (descending)

PROVINCE	COUNT	PROVINCE	COUNT	PROVINCE	COUNT	PROVINCE	COUNT
İstanbul	149	Adana	16	Mersin	6	Bilecik	1
Amasya	68	Ordu	16	Ardahan	5	Bitlis	1
Adıyaman	61	Samsun	16	Erzincan	5	Burdur	1
Kayseri	38	Erzurum	15	Eskişehir	5	Çorum	1
Diyarbakır	34	Tokat	15	Osmaniye	5	İğdır	1
Bursa	30	Trabzon	14	Sinop	5	Karaman	1
Konya	29	Gaziantep	13	Ağrı	4	Kars	1
Malatya	27	Non-MPs	13	Niğde	4	Kilis	1
Şanlıurfa	27	Isparta	12	Bingöl	3	Şırnak	1
Aksaray	22	Siirt	12	Giresun	3	Yalova	1
Bartın	22	Antalya	11	Nevşehir	3	Afyon	0
İzmir	22	Batman	10	Sakarya	3	Bayburt	0
Kırıkkale	22	Rize	10	Uşak	3	Bolu	0
Mardin	22	Denizli	9	Artvin	2	Gümüşhane	0
Ankara	21	Hatay	9	Aydın	2	Karabük	0
K. Maraş	21	Yozgat	9	Balıkesir	2	Kastamonu	0
Sivas	21	Düzce	7	Edirne	2	Kırklareli	0
Kocaeli	19	Elazığ	7	Hakkari	2	Kırşehir	0
Manisa	19	Muş	7	Muğla	2	Tunceli	0
Van	19	Çankırı	6	Tekirdağ	2		
Çanakkale	17	Kütahya	6	Zonguldak	2		

After that, when I look to the number of quotations that contain the word *Kürt* by regions (Figure 4.1), it can be seen there is a balanced distribution among the regions.

It can be sorted descending as Marmara (226 uses), Southeastern Anatolia (181 uses), Black Sea (181 uses), Central Anatolia (181 uses), Eastern Anatolia (97 uses), Mediterranean (81 uses), and Aegean (63 uses).




Figure 4.1. Number of quotations that contain the word *Kürt* by regions

The positions of MPs, who used the word *Kürt* in their speeches, is an important indicator about AK Party's Kurdish policy, because it gives some information about how the party considered the issue (Table 4.4). According to the number of quotations that contain the word *Kürt*, the top five positions can be listed as Deputy Prime Minister (25 uses), Minister of Foreign Affairs (20 uses), Prime Minister (16 uses), Minister of National Defence (16 uses), and Minister of State (10 uses).

Table 4.4. Number of quotations that contain the word *Kürt* by positions (descending)

POSITION	COUNT
Deputy Prime Minister	25
Minister of Foreign Affairs	20
Prime Minister	16
Minister of National Defence	16
Minister of State	11
Minister of Interior	10
Minister of National Education	7
President	6
Minister of Justice	6
Minister of European Union	4
Minister of Science, Industry and Technology	4
Minister of Labour and Social Security	4
Minister of Health	4
Minister of Food, Agriculture and Livestock	4
Minister of Economy	3
Minister of Youth and Sports	3
Minister of Family and Social Policies	3
Minister of Culture and Tourism	2
Minister of Energy and Natural Resources	1
Ministry of Environment and Urbanisation	1
Others	873

4.1. Contexts

AK Party MPs' usage of the word *Kürt* in their speeches also show some changes in contexts (Table 4.5) between 2001 and 2017. I will discuss these changes in the last chapter.

Table 4.5. Number and percentage of usage of the word Kürt by contexts by years

YEARS	TOTAL COUNT	CONTEXTS											
		Political		Sociocultural		Security		Foreign Policy		Education			
		Count	Percentage	Count	Percentage	Count	Percentage	Count	Percentage	Count	Percentage		
2001	3	0	0%	1	33%	1	34%	1	33%	0	0%		
2002	5	0	0%	1	20%	3	60%	1	20%	0	0%		
2003	9	1	11%	3	33%	4	45%	0	0%	1	11%		
2004	9	0	0%	4	44%	5	56%	0	0%	0	0%		
2005	14	0	0%	4	28%	9	64%	1	8%	0	0%		
2006	6	0	0%	1	17%	3	50%	2	33%	0	0%		
2007	12	0	0%	7	58%	3	25%	2	17%	0	0%		
2008	29	2	7%	19	66%	8	27%	0	0%	0	0%		
2009	22	1	5%	11	50%	8	36%	2	9%	0	0%		
2010	48	9	19%	24	50%	14	29%	0	0%	1	2%		
2011	44	9	20%	23	52%	7	16%	1	3%	4	9%		
2012	93	22	24%	45	48%	8	8%	12	13%	6	7%		
2013	90	30	33%	39	43%	7	8%	4	5%	10	11%		
2014	98	31	32%	49	50%	6	6%	3	3%	9	9%		
2015	78	27	35%	24	31%	22	28%	3	4%	2	2%		
2016	350	106	30%	74	21%	154	44%	9	3%	7	2%		
2017	113	39	34%	23	20%	40	35%	9	8%	2	3%		

When I look the overall percentage of usage of contexts (Figure 4.2), it can be seen there is a balanced distribution among three common contexts. The biggest one is sociocultural context by 34 percent with 352 uses, while security is by 30 percent with 302 uses, and political is by 27 percent with 277 uses. One of the remaining contexts, foreign policy is by 5 percent with 50 uses, and finally education is by 4 percent with 42 uses.




Figure 4.2. Overall percentage of usage of contexts

4.1.1. Political

Three fourths of political context is used within nationalism by 75 percent with 207 uses, while liberalism is by 19 percent with 52 uses, and conservatism is by 6 percent with 18 uses (Figure 4.3).




Figure 4.3. Percentage of usage of *political* context within ideologies

4.1.2. Sociocultural

58 percent of sociocultural context is used within liberalism with 204 uses, while nationalism is by 30 percent with 105 uses, and conservatism is by 12 percent with 43 uses (Figure 4.4).




Figure 4.4. Percentage of usage of *sociocultural* context within ideologies

4.1.3. Security

The vast majority of security context is used within nationalism by 93 percent with 281 uses, while liberalism is by 4 percent with 13 uses and conservatism is by 3 percent with 8 uses (Figure 4.5).




Figure 4.5. Percentage of usage of *security* context within ideologies

4.1.4. Foreign Policy

Two thirds of foreign policy context is used within nationalism by 66 percent with 33 uses, while liberalism is by 28 percent with 14 uses, and conservatism is by 6 percent with 3 uses (Figure 4.6).




Figure 4.6. Percentage of usage of *foreign policy* context within ideologies

4.1.5. Education

The vast majority of education context is used within liberalism by 86 percent with 36 uses, while nationalism is by 10 percent with 4 uses, and conservatism is by 4 percent with 2 uses (Figure 4.7).




Figure 4.7. Percentage of usage of *education* context within ideologies

4.2. Ideologies

According to TBMM minutes between the years of 2001 and 2017, AK Party MPs' number of quotations that contain the word *Kürt* show some changes in ideologies (Table 4.6). I will discuss these changes in the last chapter.

Table 4.6. Number and percentages of quotations that contain the word *Kürt* by ideologies by years

YEARS	TOTAL COUNT	IDEOLOGIES					
		Liberalism		Nationalism		Conservatism	
		Count	Percentage	Count	Percentage	Count	Percentage
2001	3	1	33%	2	67%	0	0%
2002	5	1	20%	4	80%	0	0%
2003	9	7	78%	2	12%	0	0%
2004	9	4	44%	5	56%	0	0%
2005	14	4	29%	10	71%	0	0%
2006	6	2	33%	3	50%	1	17%
2007	12	4	33%	6	50%	2	17%
2008	29	7	24%	22	76%	0	0%
2009	22	8	36%	14	64%	0	0%
2010	48	20	42%	28	58%	0	0%
2011	44	22	50%	17	39%	5	11%
2012	93	51	55%	31	33%	11	12%
2013	90	52	58%	23	25%	15	17%
2014	98	60	61%	23	23%	15	16%
2015	78	21	27%	49	63%	8	10%
2016	350	36	10%	300	86%	14	4%
2017	113	19	17%	91	81%	3	2%
TOTAL	1.023	319	31%	630	62%	74	7%

When I look the overall percentage of usage of ideologies (Figure 4.8), nationalism almost consists two thirds of the whole by 62 percent with 630 uses. On the other side, liberalism is by 31 percent with 319 uses, while conservatism is by 7 percent with 74 uses.




Figure 4.8. Overall percentage of usage of ideologies

4.2.1. Liberalism

If the contextual breakdown of liberalism is examined (Figure 4.9), it can be seen sociocultural context consists almost two thirds of the whole by 64 percent with 204 uses, while political is by 16 percent with 52 uses, education is by 11 percent with 36 uses, foreign policy is by 5 percent with 14 uses, and security is by 4 percent with 13 uses.




Figure 4.9. Percentage of usage of *liberalism* within contexts

4.2.2. Nationalism

When I look the percentage of usage of nationalism within contexts (Figure 4.10), it can be seen that the biggest share belongs to security with 45 percent with 281 uses, while political is with 33 percent with 207 uses, sociocultural is with 17 percent with 105 uses, foreign policy stands at 4 percent with 33 uses, and education is at 1 percent with 4 uses.




Figure 4.10. Percentage of usage of *nationalism* within contexts

4.2.3. Conservatism

The biggest percentage of usage of *conservatism* is in sociocultural context with 58 percent with 43 uses, while political is with 24 percent with 18 uses, security is at 11 percent with 8 uses, foreign policy is at 4 percent with 3 uses, and education is at 3 percent with 2 uses (Figure 4.11).




Figure 4.11. Percentage of usage of *conservatism* within contexts

In the following chapter, I will analyse the data by mentioning about meaningful changes between years using line charts.

CHAPTER 5

DATA ANALYSIS

As I said at beginning of the thesis, Kurdish question has been the most common issue in Turkish politics for many years. This can also be observed in the speeches of the MPs in TBMM. When I look the number of quotations that contain the word *Kürt* by years, it can be seen that there are three important turning points in 2008, 2012 and 2016 (Figure 5.1).

Although solution process had not started, discussions about the issue started to be mentioned in 2008. In 2012, while there were ongoing talks about solution process, PKK carried out some terrorist attacks and it increased the word's usage in TBMM. Especially after 7 June 2015 elections, the solution process came under question by AK Party and it reflected on their speeches in TBMM. In 2016, the use of the word quadrupled the number of usage increased from 78 to 350. The word's usage count in 2016 alone constitutes more than one third of all uses between 2001 and 2017.




Figure 5.1. Number of quotations that contain the word *Kürt* by years

5.1. Context

When I look to the contexts that Kurdish question has discussed between the years of 2001 and 2017 (Figure 5.2), it can be separated the AK Party's contextual period into three. In the first period dated between 2001 and 2006, security is the dominant context. In the second period dated between 2007 and 2014, there is a domination of sociocultural context over the others. Finally, in the last period dated from 2015 to 2017, security again became the top context with a huge usage count, and political context also has a high number of usage. In that period, number of quotations that contain the word *Kürt* in security context is 194 and in political context is 145. That means total usage number of the word *Kürt* in security and political contexts in that period constitutes one third of the all usage between 2001 and 2017.




Figure 5.2. Percentage and numbers of quotations that contain the word Kürt in contexts by years

5.1.1. Political

When I look the percentage and number of quotations that contain the word *Kürt* in political context in regard to ideologies by years (Figure 5.3), it can be seen there is only 1 quotation that is in liberal tone, until 2009. The nationalist usage in political context became dominant from 2009 to 2013. Because of the solution process, liberalism is again used more than other ideologies in 2013 and 2014. After 2014, there is a sharp increase towards nationalism and reached to top usage number in 2016 by 97 uses. In addition, there are some conservative usage of the word from 2011, albeit in few cases.




Figure 5.3. Percentage and number of quotations that contain the word *Kürt* in political context in regard to ideologies by years

5.1.2. Sociocultural

If it the percentage and number of quotations that contain the word *Kürt* in sociocultural context in regard to ideologies by years is examined (Figure 5.4), liberalism is the dominant ideology until 2006. There are some fluctuations between 2006 and 2009; all three ideologies became superior to each other in these years. Liberalism was top used ideology from 2009 to 2017, with an exceptional year that

shows the dominance of nationalism in 2016.




Figure 5.4. Percentage and number of quotations that contain the word *Kürt* in *sociocultural* context in regard to ideologies by years

5.1.3. Security

When I look the percentage and number of quotations that contain the word *Kürt* in security context concerning ideologies by years (Figure 5.5), nationalism has the overwhelming majority in all years, except 2013. There are slight decreases in the percentage of nationalism in security context until 2013, because there were some solution offers about the Kurdish question. Conservatism and liberalism overtook nationalism in that year, because discussions about solution process was on the leading edge in 2013. After the solution process was over, the word's usage in security context had continued with nationalism in a large numbers.




Figure 5.5. Percentage and number of quotations that contain the word *Kürt* in security context in regard to ideologies by years

5.1.4. Foreign Policy

If the percentage and number of quotations that contain the word *Kürt* in foreign policy context concerning ideologies by years is investigated (Figure 5.6), it can be seen there are a few number of uses until 2012, and most of them were used about affairs with Northern Iraq in nationalist discourse until 2012. There are some conservative usage of the word in 2012. Liberal usage of the word in foreign policy context is more than other ideologies, because of the solution process between 2012 and 2014. After that year, the percentage of the word's usage changed towards nationalism and the number reached to top in 2016 with 9 uses.




Figure 5.6. Percentage and number of quotations that contain the word *Kürt* in *foreign policy* context in regard to ideologies by years

5.1.5. Education

Finally, when I look the percentage and number of usage of the word *Kürt* in education context in regard to ideologies by years (Figure 5.7), it can be seen that limited number of the word used until 2010. After that year, ideas about mother tongue education and Kurdish elective course had come to the forefront until 2016. In 2016, nationalism and liberalism had almost equal number of usage in foreign policy context, but liberalism again became the dominant ideology in 2017.




Figure 5.7. Percentage and number of quotations that contain the word *Kürt* in education context in regard to ideologies by years

5.2. Ideology

According to TBMM minutes, I can divide the AK Party's ideological period about Kurdish question into three. The first period may be called as "first nationalist period" between 2001 and 2010, which shows a dominance of nationalist statements over other ideologies about Kurdish issue; and in this period, average number of quotations that contain the word *Kürt* for each year is 16. The second period is "liberal period" between 2011 and 2015, which is so-called, "solution process" and liberal statements has used more frequently, and in this period average number of quotations that contain the word *Kürt* for each year is 81. The third period is "second nationalist period" from 2015 to 2017, and there be huge superiority of nationalism among other ideologies and in this period, average number of quotations that contain the word *Kürt* for each year is 180. Although AK Party defines itself as a "conservative democrat" party, conservatism has the lowest usage rate compared with nationalism and liberalism in the quotations that contain the word *Kürt* in TBMM minutes between the years of 2001 and 2017 (Figure 5.8).




Figure 5.8. Percentage and number of quotations that contain the word Kürt in ideologies by years

5.2.1. Liberalism

When I look the percentage and number of quotations that contain the word *Kürt* in liberalism concerning contexts by years (Figure 5.9), it can be clearly seen that sociocultural context is predominant among other contexts, but there is an exceptional year of 2006 under foreign policy domination with only 2 use of the word *Kürt*. With solution process' effect and rising in total number of the usage of the word, there are some increases in all of five contexts between 2013 and 2015.




Figure 5.9. Percentage and number of usage of the word *Kürt* in *liberalism* in regard to contexts by years

5.2.2. Nationalism

If the percentage and number of quotations that contain the word *Kürt* in nationalism in regard to contexts by years is examined (Figure 5.10), it can be seen security is the superior context from 2001 to 2010 with an exceptional year of 2008 under sociocultural context's dominance. With the beginning of solution process, Kurdish question started to be discussed in political context, and its dominance lasted until 2015. In that period, usage of the word in all contexts had increased except education. In 2016, security context became dominant with 151 uses, while political

context used in 97 quotations. Yet in 2017, number and percentage of security and political context almost equalized to 40 percent by 40 uses and 36 uses, respectively.




Figure 5.10. Percentage and number of usage of the word *Kürt* in *nationalism* in regard to contexts by years

5.2.3. Conservatism

Finally, when I look the percentage and number of usage of the word *Kürt* in conservatism concerning contexts by years (Figure 5.11), it can be seen there were only 3 use of the word until 2010. After that year, sociocultural context became superior until 2017 with an exceptional year of 2016 under political context's dominance.




Figure 5.11. Percentage and number of usage of the word *Kürt* in conservatism in regard to contexts by years

In the last chapter, I will make a conclusion including a summary of the thesis, my findings and forecasts.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

In my thesis, I tried to demonstrate how the AK Party MPs approach to the Kurdish question varied over time in TBMM minutes. By analyzing AK Party members' statements containing the word *Kürt* in TBMM, AK Party's increasing nationalistic tendencies about Kurdish question can be seen, especially after 2015. The positive and negative aspects of *nationalism* or *increasing nationalistic tendencies* is subject for another study.

As a consequence of the analysis, I see there are some meaningful increase and decreases in numbers of quotations that contain the word *Kürt* in regard to contexts and ideologies by years. Therefore, I examined the data about the word's usage in contexts and ideologies in two chapters, as data overview and data analysis.

In data overview chapter, I included some informative and statistical tables and figures about number of quotations that contain the word *Kürt* by years, MPs, provinces, regions, and positions. Additionally, there are two tables about percentage and number of quotations that contain the word *Kürt* in different contexts/ideologies in regard to different ideologies/contextes by years. Also, there are separate figures for each context and ideology.

In data analysis chapter, there are two line charts that demonstrate the changes between 2001 and 2017 about percentage and number of quotations that contain the word *Kürt* in different contexts/ideologies in regard to different ideologies/contextes by years. In addition, there are separate charts to show changes in each contexts and ideologies. In that chapter, I focused more on changes in AK Party's position about Kurdish question by dividing into contextual and ideological periods.

I separated the contexts (political, sociocultural, security, foreign policy, education)

that Kurdish question has discussed in TBMM between the years of 2001 and 2017, into three periods. In the first period dated between 2001 and 2006, security context were predominant. In the second period dated between 2007 and 2014, there is a superiority of sociocultural context. Finally, in the last period dated from 2015 to 2017, security again became the dominant context.

According to TBMM minutes, I divided the AK Party's ideological period about Kurdish question into three. I called the first period as "first nationalist period" between 2001 and 2010, while the second one is "liberal period" between 2011 and 2015. Finally, the third period can be called "second nationalist period" from 2015 to 2017. Although AK Party defines itself as a "conservative democrat" party, conservatism has the lowest usage rate compared with nationalism and liberalism in the usage of the word *Kürt* in TBMM minutes between the years of 2001 and 2017. AK Party's Islamist standing is not evident in the given period.

The 7 June 2015 general election results demonstrates that there is something wrong about the solution process, because both nationalist parties, MHP and HDP increased their votes by 3 and 7 points respectively, while there was a sharp decrease in AK Party votes by 9 points. AK Party's usage of the term *nationalism* has increased much after 7 June elections, and they reaped the benefits of this policy by an almost 9 percent increase in their votes in 1 November general elections.

AK Party and MHP made an electoral alliance called People's Alliance (*Cumhur İttifakı*) for 24 June presidential and general elections in 2018. As common candidate of People's Alliance, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was elected as President by getting 52.6 percent of votes. AK Party got 42.5 percent of votes with 295 seats in parliament, and MHP got 11.1 percent of votes with 49 seats. Overall, People's Alliance got 53.6 percent of votes with 344 seats in parliament. This means there is a 7 percent decrease in votes (from 49.5 percent to 42.5 percent) and 8.6 percent decline in parliamentary seats ratio (from 57.6 percent to 49 percent) of AK Party compared with 1 November general elections in 2015. As a result, AK Party lost the majority of parliamentary seats, after 24 June general elections.

In order to maintain its dominating position in TBMM, AK Party must ally with a party and MHP seems as the most powerful candidate at this stage. Actually, AK Party's close relationship with MHP is not something new. Although it was one of the coalition partners with DSP (Democratic Left Party/*Demokratik Sol Parti*) and ANAP (Motherland Party/*Anavatan Partisi*) from 1999, MHP called for an early election in 2002 and AK Party came to power. According to the results of 2002 general elections, CHP became the only opposition party in parliament, and MHP could not pass the electoral threshold. After this indirect support to AK Party, MHP became the key party for solving "367 crisis" about Abdullah Gül's candidacy in the Presidential election in 2007 by not boycotting the election.

Because of Gül's wife has headscarf, the headscarf issue become a topic of discussion once again. MHP offered a law allowing wearing headscarves in universities accepted with the support of AK Party. In 2012, MHP also supported the change in education system called 4+4+4. In 2013, MHP stood against Gezi Park protests by calling for common sense to both protestors and the government. Finally, MHP gave support to AK Party in the constitutional referendum in 2017 that included 18 amendments including an alteration from parliamentary system to presidential system.

After 24 June general elections, President Erdoğan's statement gives us a clue about how AK Party will have an attitude in the near future: "Although we could not achieve our aim in parliamentary elections, we will be in an endeavour to solve that as People's Alliance to the best of our ability, God willing."⁸⁷ According to Erdoğan's statement, it can be predicted that close relationship with MHP will be continued. On the other hand, MHP will want to take the advantage of its essential position no doubt.

⁸⁷ "Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan: Önümüzdeki dönem ülkemiz için çok farklı olacak", *TRT Haber*, June 24, 2018, <http://www.trthaber.com/haber/gundem/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-onumuzdeki-donem-ulkemiz-icin-cok-farkli-olacak-371747.html>

For example, even though Erdoğan's statements about "We do not have amnesty in our agenda"⁸⁸, Bahçeli did not take steps backward about requesting for amnesty during and after election process.

In case of having such conflicts with MHP, AK Party should keep ready alternative plans for keeping its powerful position in TBMM. Mehmet Aslan, one of the founders of İYİ Parti, claimed AK Party is not be coerced to MHP by saying, "If it is a law is beneficial for continuity of the state, nation and its future, (AK Party) can introduce law with İYİ Parti, they do not need MHP... If AK Party defends something and it is beneficial for people, İYİ Parti will support it."⁸⁹

Although AK Party took most steps and came close to the solution in Kurdish question than other parties, their experiences show that starting a new solution process does not seem probable. Additionally, HDP leader Selahattin Demirtaş's imprisonment decreases the probability of approaching the HDP.

After 4 MPs' appointment as ministers, AK Party now have 291 seats in parliament. They only need 10 MPs to reach the majority in TBMM. It may be seen some MP transfers between parties, especially from right-wing parties to AK Party.

⁸⁸ "Erdoğan: Gündemimizde af yok", *CNN Türk*, June 10, 2018, <https://www.cnnturk.com/turkiye/erdogan-gundemiizde-af-yok>

⁸⁹ "İYİ Partili Aslan: AK Parti Meclis'te MHP'ye muhtaç değil", *Sözcü*, June 28, 2018, <https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2018/gundem/iyi-partili-aslan-ak-parti-mecliste-mhp-ye-muhtac-degil-2492575/>

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APPENDIX: The dataset about AK Party MPs' quotations that contain the word Kürt

TEXT	NAME	PROVINCE	ROLE	GENDER	DATE	TYPE	KEYWORDS	CONTEXT	IDEOLOGY
"Bu analizde Kürt kökeni tartışılmamış da dil, kültür, folklor ve kimliklerin korunma, geliştirme ve açıklanmasına, kendi analizlerine bağlı basın, radyo ve televizyon dâhil her türlü medya aracılığıyla yaygın yapılmasına, özel okullarda kendi ana dilini ile eğitimi yapılmasına... Kürt di ve kültürü, üzerindeki enarjımla yapacak enstitüler ve benzeri kurumların kurulabilmesine haklarına kavuşmalarına". Az Tuncel Raportu nu onada da gör."	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	Istanbul	Prime Minister	Male	14.12.2009	Response	etik; kimlik; dil; yaygın; eğitim; Kültür; Çekmez; medya; yurttaş; medya	Sociocultural	Nationalism
"Eğitim alanında, Kürt kökeni tartışılmamış da dil, kültür, folklor ve kimliklerin korunma, geliştirme ve açıklanmasına, kendi analizlerine bağlı basın, radyo ve televizyon dâhil her türlü medya aracılığıyla yaygın yapılmasına, özel okullarda kendi ana dilini ile eğitimi yapılmasına... Kürt di ve kültürü, üzerindeki enarjımla yapacak enstitüler ve benzeri kurumların kurulabilmesine haklarına kavuşmalarına". Az Tuncel Raportu nu onada da gör."	Mustafa Kabaoğlu	Konya	MP	Male	16.12.2009	Direct Speech	Kongo; Türkmen; Azeri; Azerbaycan; Arap; Omanlı; vatan; Etil; ekonomik; kalkınma; birlik; beraberlik; demokrasi; kimlik; tanınma; RTI; vatan; dil; medya; hukuk	Foreign Policy	Nationalism
"Eğitim alanında, Kürt kökeni tartışılmamış da dil, kültür, folklor ve kimliklerin korunma, geliştirme ve açıklanmasına, kendi analizlerine bağlı basın, radyo ve televizyon dâhil her türlü medya aracılığıyla yaygın yapılmasına, özel okullarda kendi ana dilini ile eğitimi yapılmasına... Kürt di ve kültürü, üzerindeki enarjımla yapacak enstitüler ve benzeri kurumların kurulabilmesine haklarına kavuşmalarına". Az Tuncel Raportu nu onada da gör."	Kulbetin Azu	Diyarbakır	MP	Male	16.12.2009	Direct Speech	ekonomik; kalkınma; birlik; beraberlik; demokrasi; kimlik; tanınma; RTI; vatan; dil; medya; hukuk	Sociocultural	Nationalism
"Eğitim alanında, Kürt kökeni tartışılmamış da dil, kültür, folklor ve kimliklerin korunma, geliştirme ve açıklanmasına, kendi analizlerine bağlı basın, radyo ve televizyon dâhil her türlü medya aracılığıyla yaygın yapılmasına, özel okullarda kendi ana dilini ile eğitimi yapılmasına... Kürt di ve kültürü, üzerindeki enarjımla yapacak enstitüler ve benzeri kurumların kurulabilmesine haklarına kavuşmalarına". Az Tuncel Raportu nu onada da gör."	Mehmet Emin Ekmen	Batman	MP	Male	18.12.2009	Direct Speech	Türk; hukuk; sosyal; adalet; liberal; at; din; dış; dil; Kürt; barış; dil; kardeşlik; vatan; dil; medya; hukuk	Sociocultural	Liberalism
"Eğitim alanında, Kürt kökeni tartışılmamış da dil, kültür, folklor ve kimliklerin korunma, geliştirme ve açıklanmasına, kendi analizlerine bağlı basın, radyo ve televizyon dâhil her türlü medya aracılığıyla yaygın yapılmasına, özel okullarda kendi ana dilini ile eğitimi yapılmasına... Kürt di ve kültürü, üzerindeki enarjımla yapacak enstitüler ve benzeri kurumların kurulabilmesine haklarına kavuşmalarına". Az Tuncel Raportu nu onada da gör."	Kıram Dincer	Van	MP	Male	19.12.2009	Direct Speech	gerek sonunu; terör; adiyet; birlik; özgür; adına; eşit; (değeri); Kürt sorun; hak; bayrak	Security	Nationalism
"Eğitim alanında, Kürt kökeni tartışılmamış da dil, kültür, folklor ve kimliklerin korunma, geliştirme ve açıklanmasına, kendi analizlerine bağlı basın, radyo ve televizyon dâhil her türlü medya aracılığıyla yaygın yapılmasına, özel okullarda kendi ana dilini ile eğitimi yapılmasına... Kürt di ve kültürü, üzerindeki enarjımla yapacak enstitüler ve benzeri kurumların kurulabilmesine haklarına kavuşmalarına". Az Tuncel Raportu nu onada da gör."	Ahmet İbadi	Batman	MP	Male	22.12.2009	Direct Speech	Alavi; Şirazi; Türk; laik; antikapitaliz	Security	Nationalism
"Eğitim alanında, Kürt kökeni tartışılmamış da dil, kültür, folklor ve kimliklerin korunma, geliştirme ve açıklanmasına, kendi analizlerine bağlı basın, radyo ve televizyon dâhil her türlü medya aracılığıyla yaygın yapılmasına, özel okullarda kendi ana dilini ile eğitimi yapılmasına... Kürt di ve kültürü, üzerindeki enarjımla yapacak enstitüler ve benzeri kurumların kurulabilmesine haklarına kavuşmalarına". Az Tuncel Raportu nu onada da gör."	Abdulmuttalip Özok	Hakkâri	MP	Male	23.12.2009	Direct Speech	Alavi; Şirazi; Roman; Yahudi; Emeni; Kum; sosyal; vatan; dil; medya; hukuk	Sociocultural	Liberalism
"Eğitim alanında, Kürt kökeni tartışılmamış da dil, kültür, folklor ve kimliklerin korunma, geliştirme ve açıklanmasına, kendi analizlerine bağlı basın, radyo ve televizyon dâhil her türlü medya aracılığıyla yaygın yapılmasına, özel okullarda kendi ana dilini ile eğitimi yapılmasına... Kürt di ve kültürü, üzerindeki enarjımla yapacak enstitüler ve benzeri kurumların kurulabilmesine haklarına kavuşmalarına". Az Tuncel Raportu nu onada da gör."	Mehmet Halil Demir	Mardin	MP	Male	24.12.2009	Direct Speech	Kürtçe; yaygın; GAP; devlet	Security	Nationalism
"Eğitim alanında, Kürt kökeni tartışılmamış da dil, kültür, folklor ve kimliklerin korunma, geliştirme ve açıklanmasına, kendi analizlerine bağlı basın, radyo ve televizyon dâhil her türlü medya aracılığıyla yaygın yapılmasına, özel okullarda kendi ana dilini ile eğitimi yapılmasına... Kürt di ve kültürü, üzerindeki enarjımla yapacak enstitüler ve benzeri kurumların kurulabilmesine haklarına kavuşmalarına". Az Tuncel Raportu nu onada da gör."	Cemil Çiçek	Ankara	Minister of State	Male	25.12.2009	Direct Speech	GAP; Kürtçe; dil; ağırlık; kur; (değeri)	Sociocultural	Nationalism
"Eğitim alanında, Kürt kökeni tartışılmamış da dil, kültür, folklor ve kimliklerin korunma, geliştirme ve açıklanmasına, kendi analizlerine bağlı basın, radyo ve televizyon dâhil her türlü medya aracılığıyla yaygın yapılmasına, özel okullarda kendi ana dilini ile eğitimi yapılmasına... Kürt di ve kültürü, üzerindeki enarjımla yapacak enstitüler ve benzeri kurumların kurulabilmesine haklarına kavuşmalarına". Az Tuncel Raportu nu onada da gör."	Ali Kılıçkaya'dın	Adana	MP	Male	28.01.2010	Direct Speech	medil; silah	Security	Nationalism
"Eğitim alanında, Kürt kökeni tartışılmamış da dil, kültür, folklor ve kimliklerin korunma, geliştirme ve açıklanmasına, kendi analizlerine bağlı basın, radyo ve televizyon dâhil her türlü medya aracılığıyla yaygın yapılmasına, özel okullarda kendi ana dilini ile eğitimi yapılmasına... Kürt di ve kültürü, üzerindeki enarjımla yapacak enstitüler ve benzeri kurumların kurulabilmesine haklarına kavuşmalarına". Az Tuncel Raportu nu onada da gör."	Beşir Akbalı	Ankara	Minister of Health	Male	02.11.2010	Response	Alavi; Şirazi; Türk; Laz; Çekmez; barış	Security	Nationalism
"Eğitim alanında, Kürt kökeni tartışılmamış da dil, kültür, folklor ve kimliklerin korunma, geliştirme ve açıklanmasına, kendi analizlerine bağlı basın, radyo ve televizyon dâhil her türlü medya aracılığıyla yaygın yapılmasına, özel okullarda kendi ana dilini ile eğitimi yapılmasına... Kürt di ve kültürü, üzerindeki enarjımla yapacak enstitüler ve benzeri kurumların kurulabilmesine haklarına kavuşmalarına". Az Tuncel Raportu nu onada da gör."	Ramazan Bağak	Şanlıurfa	MP	Male	25.02.2010	Response	Türk; Çekmez; Alavi; Şirazi; Laz; asker; devlet; silah; kadın	Political	Liberalism
"Eğitim alanında, Kürt kökeni tartışılmamış da dil, kültür, folklor ve kimliklerin korunma, geliştirme ve açıklanmasına, kendi analizlerine bağlı basın, radyo ve televizyon dâhil her türlü medya aracılığıyla yaygın yapılmasına, özel okullarda kendi ana dilini ile eğitimi yapılmasına... Kürt di ve kültürü, üzerindeki enarjımla yapacak enstitüler ve benzeri kurumların kurulabilmesine haklarına kavuşmalarına". Az Tuncel Raportu nu onada da gör."	Egemen Bağış	Istanbul	Minister of State	Male	03.03.2010	Direct Speech	etik; dil; ayırma; Türk; Arap; Arnavut; eşit; yurttaş	Sociocultural	Liberalism
"Eğitim alanında, Kürt kökeni tartışılmamış da dil, kültür, folklor ve kimliklerin korunma, geliştirme ve açıklanmasına, kendi analizlerine bağlı basın, radyo ve televizyon dâhil her türlü medya aracılığıyla yaygın yapılmasına, özel okullarda kendi ana dilini ile eğitimi yapılmasına... Kürt di ve kültürü, üzerindeki enarjımla yapacak enstitüler ve benzeri kurumların kurulabilmesine haklarına kavuşmalarına". Az Tuncel Raportu nu onada da gör."	Suat Kılıç	Samsun	MP	Male	03.10.2010	Direct Speech	Türk; Laz; Çekmez; ayırma; vatan; dil; medya; hukuk	Sociocultural	Liberalism
"Eğitim alanında, Kürt kökeni tartışılmamış da dil, kültür, folklor ve kimliklerin korunma, geliştirme ve açıklanmasına, kendi analizlerine bağlı basın, radyo ve televizyon dâhil her türlü medya aracılığıyla yaygın yapılmasına, özel okullarda kendi ana dilini ile eğitimi yapılmasına... Kürt di ve kültürü, üzerindeki enarjımla yapacak enstitüler ve benzeri kurumların kurulabilmesine haklarına kavuşmalarına". Az Tuncel Raportu nu onada da gör."	Nurettin Altınan	Çankırı	MP	Male	24.03.2010	Direct Speech	Kürtçe; Yağlı; sepin; muhalefet; sarıcı	Political	Liberalism
"Eğitim alanında, Kürt kökeni tartışılmamış da dil, kültür, folklor ve kimliklerin korunma, geliştirme ve açıklanmasına, kendi analizlerine bağlı basın, radyo ve televizyon dâhil her türlü medya aracılığıyla yaygın yapılmasına, özel okullarda kendi ana dilini ile eğitimi yapılmasına... Kürt di ve kültürü, üzerindeki enarjımla yapacak enstitüler ve benzeri kurumların kurulabilmesine haklarına kavuşmalarına". Az Tuncel Raportu nu onada da gör."	Ahmet Aydın	Aydın	MP	Male	04.08.2010	Direct Speech	barış; Türk; köken; vatan; problem	Sociocultural	Nationalism
"Eğitim alanında, Kürt kökeni tartışılmamış da dil, kültür, folklor ve kimliklerin korunma, geliştirme ve açıklanmasına, kendi analizlerine bağlı basın, radyo ve televizyon dâhil her türlü medya aracılığıyla yaygın yapılmasına, özel okullarda kendi ana dilini ile eğitimi yapılmasına... Kürt di ve kültürü, üzerindeki enarjımla yapacak enstitüler ve benzeri kurumların kurulabilmesine haklarına kavuşmalarına". Az Tuncel Raportu nu onada da gör."	Kürşad Tüzmen	Mersin	MP	Male	04.08.2010	Response	Alavi; İleri; demokratik	Sociocultural	Liberalism
"Eğitim alanında, Kürt kökeni tartışılmamış da dil, kültür, folklor ve kimliklerin korunma, geliştirme ve açıklanmasına, kendi analizlerine bağlı basın, radyo ve televizyon dâhil her türlü medya aracılığıyla yaygın yapılmasına, özel okullarda kendi ana dilini ile eğitimi yapılmasına... Kürt di ve kültürü, üzerindeki enarjımla yapacak enstitüler ve benzeri kurumların kurulabilmesine haklarına kavuşmalarına". Az Tuncel Raportu nu onada da gör."	Voyta Köymek	Kahramanmaraş	MP	Male	14.04.2010	Direct Speech		Sociocultural	Liberalism

